瑜伽論記 9.136

9.136

基云：論問：以何道理，知離言性？答中，謂一切法假立自相乃至亦非一切都無所有，此中破執有二，乃至是言所行是言境界牒外二計。第二、如是諸法非有自性下，重破外計成立自宗。二計者，謂一切法假立自相，乃至唯假建立，非有自相，非外計云：如能詮之名與所詮之境皆是假立名不稱境故，如所執計名實目得所詮之境，此境唯假建立非有自性。言體是無，既計名所詮不稱境，所計境是非有已。外人轉計，故第二論云：亦非離彼別有自性，是言所行是言境界。言名詮所詮既不相稱，即能詮名中有彼色等體和合，此是稱言是言所行境界，故論主非之，亦非離所詮之體彼別有一和合自性是言所行是言境界者，謂若假立名等即所詮之色等上有是言所行境界義名遍計所執計所詮稱言是言境界，色等與名和合即名中和合者，是言所行，是言境界者不然，雖所計非實妄性非無，外人若計所詮既無，即前所言所有自性等亦是非有，故論主第二論云：如是諸法非有自性，如言所說，亦非一切都無所有，即所詮如遍計執言所說法非有自性者亦非一切都無所有。言有依他妄境非無，此破第一名詮所詮稱境外計，如是非有亦非一切都無所有者，外所計言與名知合稱所目法，此不離言，前非之言此是非有，今指言如是所執和合非有者，亦有依他妄計在故，亦非一切都無所有。又釋，初乃至唯假建立非有自性來明破外計，如名下所詮之法稱能自名，當知此一切色等法唯假建立非有自性。言如所計之體是無，外人既見所詮是無，不稱言故乃隨轉計云：如是名所目之法不稱色名者，應離所目色外別有自性，是言所行是言境界。今論主非之，故言亦非離彼別有自性，是言所行境界者，雖作是非非所計有，其依他性等體是非無故。論云：如是諸法，非有自性，如言所說，亦非一切都無所有。如前所計如言所說非有自性之法，如所執者非有，如依他法假立名言者，此法亦非一切都無所有，不可無依他等。非有自性者，謂遍計所執，如言所說，亦非一切都無所有者，謂依他等也，非但依他離言法是有，其所執非有之法有妄情在，故亦非一切都無所有，所以第二論云：如是非有亦非一切都無所有，上來既明所計非有依他圓成是有，故論問言，云何是有？然答中應言若稱知離言依他等是，今取能照之智故，乃至云唯是無分別智所行境界，其後得亦得緣著真法不妄，今取正緣者故唯據無分別智。

Ji says: The treatise asks: By what reasoning does one know the ineffable nature? In the answer, from "All phenomena are conventionally designated with intrinsic characteristics" up to "nor are they utterly nonexistent," there are two parts refuting attachments: up to "is the domain of speech and the object of speech" restates the two external positions. Second, from "Such phenomena do not have an intrinsic nature" below, it repeatedly refutes the external positions and establishes its own school. The two positions are: "all phenomena are conventionally designated with intrinsic characteristics" up to "solely conventional designations, not having intrinsic characteristics"—is this not what the opponent maintains: that just as the expressing name and the expressed object are both conventional designations, the name does not correspond to the object; hence, as they cling to it, the name truly designates and grasps the expressed object, but this object is solely a conventional designation and does not have an intrinsic nature. The entity of speech is nonexistent, and since they cling to the expressed object of the name as not corresponding to the object, the clung-to object is already nonexistent. The opponent changes his position, and therefore the second passage of the treatise says: "Nor is there, apart from that, a distinct intrinsic nature that is the domain of speech and the object of speech." If the expressing name and the expressed object do not correspond, then within the expressing name there is a conjunction with the entity of form, etc., and this corresponds to speech and is the domain and object of speech. Therefore the author of the treatise denies it: "Nor is there, apart from the expressed entity, a distinct conjunctive intrinsic nature that is the domain and object of speech." This means that if a name is conventionally designated, then on the expressed form, etc., there is the meaning of being the domain and object of speech—this is called parikalpita attachment, grasping the expressed object as corresponding to speech and being the object of speech; and if form, etc., conjoin with the name, then what conjoins within the name is the domain and object of speech—this is incorrect. Although what is grasped is not real, the nature of error is not nonexistent. If the opponent grasps that since the expressed object does not exist, then the previously mentioned intrinsic nature, etc., are also nonexistent, therefore the author of the treatise in the second passage says: "Such phenomena do not have an intrinsic nature as spoken of by speech; nor are they utterly nonexistent." That is, just as the expressed phenomena spoken of by parikalpita speech do not have an intrinsic nature, neither are they utterly nonexistent. This means that the paratantra erroneous object is not nonexistent; this refutes the first opponent's view that the expressing name and expressed object correspond to the object. As for "Being nonexistent in this way, yet not utterly nonexistent": the opponent's attachment was that speech and name conjoin to correspond to the designated phenomenon, which is not apart from speech; previously this was denied, saying it is nonexistent. Now, pointing out that such an attached conjunction is nonexistent, yet because the paratantra erroneous grasp is present, it is also not utterly nonexistent. Another explanation: from the beginning up to "solely conventional designations, not having an intrinsic nature" clarifies the refutation of external positions. Just as the expressed phenomenon under a name corresponds to the expressing name itself, one should know that all such phenomena like form are solely conventional designations and do not have an intrinsic nature. This means that the entity as conceived does not exist. Since the opponent sees that the expressed object does not exist and does not correspond to speech, he subsequently changes his position, saying: "If the phenomenon designated by such a name does not correspond to the name 'form', then apart from the designated form there must be a distinct intrinsic nature that is the domain and object of speech." Now the author of the treatise denies it, hence saying: "Nor is there, apart from that, a distinct intrinsic nature that is the domain and object of speech." Although he raises this objection, it is not existent as clung to, yet the entity of the paratantra nature, etc., is not nonexistent. Therefore the treatise says: "Such phenomena do not have an intrinsic nature as spoken of by speech; nor are they utterly nonexistent." Like the phenomena previously grasped that do not have an intrinsic nature as spoken of by speech—just as what is grasped is nonexistent, so as paratantra phenomena conventionally designated by names and words, these phenomena are also not utterly nonexistent; one cannot deny the paratantra, etc. "Do not have an intrinsic nature" refers to the parikalpita as spoken of by speech; "nor are they utterly nonexistent" refers to the paratantra, etc. Not only are the ineffable paratantra phenomena existent, but in the nonexistent phenomena that are clung to, an erroneous disposition is present; hence they are also not utterly nonexistent. Therefore the second passage of the treatise says: "Being nonexistent in this way, yet not utterly nonexistent." Having clarified above that what is grasped is nonexistent while the paratantra and pariniṣpanna are existent, the treatise asks: "In what way do they exist?" In the answer, it should have said that they exist if they correspond to the knowledge of the ineffable paratantra, etc.; but here it takes the illuminating wisdom, and hence goes on to say: "It is solely the domain of non-conceptual wisdom." Subsequent wisdom can also cognize real phenomena without error, but here it takes the direct cognizer, and thus relies solely on non-conceptual wisdom.