瑜伽師地論略纂 10.77

10.77

論問云以何道理應知諸法離言自性等，下答中謂一切法假立自相乃至亦非一切都無所有。此中，破執有二：「乃至是言所行，是言境界」，牒外二計；第二、「如是諸法，非有自性」下，重破外計，成立自宗。二計者，謂一切法假立自相乃至唯假建立，非有自宗，明外計云，如能詮之名與所詮之境皆是唯假建，不稱境故。如所執計名實目得所詮之境，此境唯假建立，非有自性，言體是無。既計名所詮不稱境，所計之境是非有已，外八轉計，故第二、論云「亦非離彼別有自性是言所行，是言境界」。言名詮所詮既不相稱，即能詮名中有彼色等體和合，此是稱言，是言所行、境界。故論主非之，亦非離所詮之體，彼別有一和合自性是言所行、是言境界者。謂若假立名等，即所詮之色等上有是言所行、境界義，名遍計所執。計所詮稱言，是言境界，色等與名和合，即名中和合是言所行、是言境界者，不然。雖所計非實、妄性非無，外人若計所詮既無，即前所言所有自性等亦是非有，故論主第二、論云「如是諸法，非有自性如言所說，亦非一切都無所有」，即所詮如遍計所執，言所說法非有性者，亦非一切都無所有，言有依他，妄境非無。此破第一、名詮所詮稱外境計。如是非有，亦非一切都無所有者，外所計言與名稱所目法，此不離言，前非之言，此是非有，今指言如是所執和合非有者，亦有依他妄計在故，亦非一切都無所有。又釋：初乃至唯假建立，非有自性來，明破外計。如名下所詮之法稱能目名，當知一切色等法唯假建立，非有自性，言如所計之外是無。外人既見所詮是無，不稱言故，可隨轉計之：如言是名所目之法，不稱色名者，應離所目色外別有自性是言所行、是言境界。今論主非之，故言亦非離彼別有自性是言所行、境界者，雖作是非，非所計有，其依他性等，體是非無故。

The treatise asks: By what reasoning should it be known that all dharmas have an ineffable intrinsic nature, and so forth? In the answer below, it says: "The self-characteristics of all dharmas are nominally posited [...] up to [...] nor are they entirely nonexistent." Herein, the refutation of grasping has two [parts]: up to "are the domain of speech, the realm of speech" cites the two external attachments; second, from "such dharmas do not possess an intrinsic nature" onward, it reiterates the refutation of the external attachments and establishes its own school's doctrine. Regarding the two attachments: [the text] says that the self-characteristics of all dharmas are nominally posited up to "they are merely nominal designations, not possessing [intrinsic nature]"; our own school explains the external attachment by stating that names as designators and objects as the designated are both merely nominal designations, because they do not correspond to the object. As with the imagined grasping, it is assumed that the name truly refers to the designated object, yet this object is merely a nominal designation and lacks an intrinsic nature, its verbal essence being nonexistent. Since it is grasped that what the name designates does not correspond to the object, and the grasped object is already nonexistent, the outsider then turns to grasp differently; therefore, second, the treatise states: "Nor is there, apart from that, another separate intrinsic nature that is the domain of speech, the realm of speech." This means that since the designator and the designated do not correspond to each other, then within the designating name the essences of matter and so forth are combined, and this corresponds to speech, being the domain and realm of speech. Therefore the author of the treatise negates this: nor is it that apart from the essence of the designated, there is a separate combined intrinsic nature that is the domain of speech, the realm of speech. This means that if names and so forth are nominally posited, then upon the designated matter and so forth there is the sense of being the domain and realm of speech, which is called the imaginary nature. Grasping that the designated corresponds to speech, that it is the realm of speech, and that matter and so forth combine with the name, so that the combination within the name is the domain of speech, the realm of speech—this is incorrect. Although what is grasped is not real, the erroneous nature is not nonexistent; if the outsider assumes that since the designated is nonexistent, then the intrinsic nature and so forth spoken of previously are also nonexistent, therefore the author of the treatise, second, states in the treatise: "Such dharmas do not have an intrinsic nature as spoken of in words, nor are they entirely nonexistent." That is, although the designated, like the imaginary nature, as dharmas spoken of in words, lacks intrinsic nature, it is also not entirely nonexistent; this means that other-dependent nature exists, and the erroneous object is not nonexistent. This refutes the first grasping that names and designations correspond to external objects. Regarding "as such they are nonexistent, nor are they entirely nonexistent": the words and the dharmas denoted by the names grasped by the outsider do not depart from speech; earlier this was negated by saying that these are nonexistent, but now pointing out that such grasped combinations are nonexistent, because there is still other-dependent erroneous grasping present, they are also not entirely nonexistent. Another interpretation: first, from [the text] up to "merely nominally established, lacking an intrinsic nature," clarifies the refutation of the external attachment. If the designated dharma under the name corresponds to the denoting name, it should be known that all dharmas such as matter are merely nominal establishments and lack intrinsic nature, meaning that external [objects] as grasped are nonexistent. Once the outsider sees that the designated is nonexistent because it does not correspond to speech, they may turn to grasp accordingly: if the dharma denoted by the name according to speech does not correspond to the name "matter," then apart from the denoted matter there must be a separate intrinsic nature that is the domain of speech and the realm of speech. Now the author of the treatise negates this, hence stating: "nor is there, apart from that, a separate intrinsic nature that is the domain and realm of speech"; although making this negation, it is not that what is grasped exists, because the substance of the other-dependent nature and so forth is not nonexistent.