瑜伽論記 15

English (machine translation) 15

Language: English

15.3

Above, in explaining skill in the aggregates with reference to the two meanings of name and form, the explanation of the meaning of form through ten meanings is now concluded.

Here, first the names of the four aggregates are explained. First, what preceded is summarized to introduce what follows, up to "establishing the characteristics according to what is appropriate." Second, the explanation. Within this, first the names of the four aggregates are explained separately through ten gates, and later all four aggregates are explained through nine gates with reference to the three natures.

15.5

In the former part, first the characteristic of establishing a single mind in the second fascicle of the Maulī Bhūmiḥ is explained. Here, two sūtras are cited separately, which are not text from the Maulī Bhūmiḥ. "As the World-Honoured One said..." is the first sūtra; "And as it was said..." is the second sūtra.

15.6

Below, in explaining the text of the sūtra, Jing says: "'Such kinds... up to generating a single mind' means rolling forth; what is subsumed under the continuity of currently arisen mind is called 'generating a single mind.' This explains the citation of the first sūtra, 'merely generating a single mind,' as well as explaining the subsequent sūtra's words, 'due to a single pure mind.' Furthermore, 'relying on the principle of conventional continuity, it is called uttering a single word and generating bodily action': this explains the first sūtra and 'a single verbal expression, how much more bodily and verbal [action], respectfully practicing in accord with one's mental capacity.'"

15.7

Ji says: "Here, in terms of taking an object by relying on conditions, whatever number of moments [the mind lasts] is called 'a single mind'; it is not that a mind of merely a single moment is called 'a single mind.'"

15.8

Second, it clarifies that the conceptualizing mental consciousness and the non-conceptual five consciousnesses cognize the present object together. There are three causes and conditions to explain this: First, being extremely clear: because that mental consciousness apprehends the present object together with the five consciousnesses, the mental consciousness apprehends each clearly with respect to the object. Second, because of attention directed toward it: because root attention desires to grasp the present object, the mental consciousness co-arising with the five consciousnesses cognizes that form together [with them]. Third, because of nourishment from two supports: that mental consciousness, on the one hand, relies on the mental faculty, namely manas. On the other hand, it also receives nourishment by relying on the eye faculty: because that visual consciousness discerns form relying on the eye, it enables that mental consciousness to grasp the object distinctly; therefore, the eye faculty also provides nourishment to that mental consciousness, hence it is said to have 'nourishment from two supports.'"

15.9

Ji says: "As the Pramāṇasamuccaya and Nyāyamukha state: 'The five consciousnesses are only direct perception; the simultaneous mental consciousness is likewise.' Now here, the five consciousnesses are clear, distinct direct perception, and are not called conceptualizing because they are not associated with investigation, reflection, and so forth. Although the sixth [consciousness] cognizes direct perception together with the five, it is called conceptualizing because it is associated with investigation and reflection; being called cognizing the present together, it can obtain clarity. If it is the mental consciousness subsequent to those five consciousnesses, then it is not clear because it cognizes the past; just as cognizing events of hundreds of thousands of kalpas is not clear, as refuted in Fascicle 51. Now, since this first cause states 'because it is extremely clear,' it achieves clarity just as when cognizing the present; it is not that the five consciousnesses cognize the past and thereby regain clarity. Because the second cause, being simultaneous with the five, directs attention toward the five objects, one knows that it also cognizes the present. As for the third cause, 'nourishment from two supports': visual consciousness has four supporting faculties, and mental consciousness has five supporting faculties—four are identical with the eye, and the fifth adds its own. This means that mental consciousness, relying on nourishment from its own faculty and the eye faculty—two supports—is then able to cognize the present. If it relied solely on its one own support, then cognizing the object would not be clear; this is stated according to a dispersed, non-meditative state. Here, taking the eye as a doorway to grasp objects is called 'nourishment'; it is not identical to the visual consciousness's reliance on its faculty being called nourishment. Furthermore, when wholesome or unwholesome consciousnesses such as the eye arise, they must necessarily be induced by the mind to be possible; because the mind nourishes visual consciousness, wholesome and unwholesome [states] can exist, from which one knows that mind and eye cognize together."

15.10

Third, it explains association with defilements. The sovereign mind is pure in its intrinsic nature, but only because of association and being pursued by latent propensities does it become deeply [defiled]. Jing says: "Among the treatises of the Hīnayāna, the Vibhajyavādins are able to adopt this meaning from the Mahāyāna as their doctrine; hence they say: 'The nature of mind is originally pure; because adventitious dust obscures it, it is said to be impure; later, when free from obscurations, it regains purity.'"

15.11

Question: "Regarding the entanglements of the stages, among the two causes of mental defilement, which should they be called?"

15.12

Answer: "They should be called 'associated': whether primary or secondary afflictions, whenever they are currently arisen, all are called entanglements."

15.13

Regarding "Here, what is said to be latent propensities... up to their non-tranquil nature": this text means that the seeds of affliction are called coarse heaviness and non-tranquility, because those seeds of affliction render body and mind incapable. The eleventh [fascicle] of the Yogācāra states: 'Mundane concentrations can only sever and abandon the coarse heaviness of that category, but do not uproot the seeds.' That text states that the force of the seeds of affliction remaining in body and mind without capability is called 'coarse heaviness.'"

15.14

Regarding "Furthermore, maintaining conditioned phenomena... up to direct realization as suffering": because the coarse heaviness of latent propensities maintains conditioned phenomena with taints, one does not attain autonomy, causing conditioned phenomena to be non-tranquil; those conditioned phenomena become suffering, hence it is said.

15.15

Below, it explains the contemplation of suffering. Regarding "like a poisonous, burning carbuncle, etc.": the Stage with Investigation and Reflection states that like a poisonous, burning carbuncle smeared with hot ashes, having its pain further increased, is called the contemplation of the suffering of suffering; like a poisonous, burning carbuncle smeared with cold medicine, giving rise slightly to faint pleasure, is called the contemplation of the suffering of change; and like a poisonous, burning carbuncle whose intrinsic nature is conditioned phenomena, is called the contemplation of the suffering of conditioning.

15.16

Ji says: "What is said here about the mind being pure in its intrinsic nature when it arises refers to being called pure because it is not intrinsically defiled, not that it is pure because it is taintless, just as in the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra."

15.17

Fourth, the three defiling distresses: The first refers to unwholesome karma; the second refers to grief and suffering, by standard of the lower realms; suffering in terms of fruition—where only suffering and no grief exists across the stages—is the third; hence it pervades the three realms.

15.18

Fifth, it explains bondage. Jing says: "Seeds of affliction pursuing and binding are called the mental bondage of affliction. Delighting in pursuing robes, bowls, and various activities, obstructing the cultivation of the noble path, is called the bondage of karma."

15.19

Regarding "Furthermore, in three places... up to the mind of renunciation": delighting in and clinging to saṃsāra obstructs the mind of revulsion that seeks liberation; that is, it obstructs wholesome roots conducive to liberation.

15.20

Regarding "the joy and pleasure in attaining renunciation": the wholesome roots of warmth and the like arise within absorption, associated with joy and pleasure, capable of attaining the expedients of renunciation for the noble path; unwholesome karma of the desire realm can obstruct those three kinds of wholesomeness.

15.21

Regarding "in attaining the noble path": this directly obstructs the essence of the noble path that is to be attained. Furthermore, "karma conducive to maturation is also called entanglement of karma" refers to karma of the miserable realms, karma of Uttarakuru, karma of the heaven of non-conception, and so forth.

15.22

Furthermore, "karma of wrong aspirations, etc." refers to wishing to become a nāga, garuḍa, and so forth, as well as the karma of various non-Buddhists seeking rebirth in heaven. Being differentiated, they unfold into six; combined in general, they become four: 1. karma delighting in activities; 2. karma acting as an obstruction in three places; 3. karma conducive to maturation; 4. karma of wrong aspirations—these constitute the four. Unfolding the three within the second, they are differentiated as six.

15.23

Tai says: "1. The mind to leave home is called the mind of renunciation; 2. giving rise to joy and pleasure regarding leaving home; 3. regarding attaining the noble path. The former two are the expedients of the noble path; therefore, for the noble path, joy and pleasure in attaining the noble path is not established."

15.24

Ji says: "Renunciation as well as joy and pleasure: this is leaving home. If it is the Dharma of leaving home, that is the preliminary practice for the path of seeing."

15.25

Sixth, it explains the omnipresent and the object-determining [mental factors]: first, inquiry and reply stating and listing them; second, distinguishing their characteristics; third, explaining their functions; finally, distinguishing their four objects.

15.26

In distinguishing characteristics: 'positing the focal object' means positing nominal designations. 'Grasping through nominal compounding' means grasping conventional appearances. 'Characteristics of latent propensities for verbal expression' means that not yet discerning conceptualizations of nominal designations and so forth, one merely has seeds of verbal expression pursuing and perfuming, causing one to give rise to conceptualizing thoughts according to one's capacity. 'Accordingly feeling' means that whatever object one encounters, one accordingly feels it.

15.27

Next, explaining their functions: Ce says: "Earlier, their own-characteristics were distinguished; here, their functions are distinguished in relation to the fruit: attention and the like are called causes, and mind is the fruit."

15.28

Ji says: "Here, what is the function of contact? It serves as the support for feeling, conceptualization, and volition. As in other places like the Abhidharma, where it is only the support for feeling, why does it not mention conceptualization and volition? The difference between this and that is that this, according to the general discussion, holds that all rely on contact, because contact arises immediately after attention. If according to accompanying manifestation, it is only feeling. What is the function of feeling? Serving as the support for the arising of craving: craving for sense spheres and the like all arises only after feeling."

15.29

Below, it explains the five object-determining factors: they arise due to four objective matters—namely, what is loved, etc. Desire relies [on what is loved]; determination is the support for resolve; familiarity is the support for mindfulness; contemplation is the support for two, as in the treatise.

15.30

Seventh, it explains the three minds of instantaneous encounter, inquiry, and determination, which are homogeneous before and after. The meaning of the question here is: all mental factors are the remaining aggregates that are not non-conjoined; do these dharmas arise at the time of the mind of instantaneous encounter, up to the mind of determination? The answer states: they arise according to the mind. Why here are only the first three minds referred to, and not the fourth and fifth? The reflection on each is also within the question. Furthermore, the nature of the preceding mind is definitively only indeterminate; omnipresent and object-determining factors are undetermined: four pervade the three natures, or some can co-arise with other wholesome and afflicted factors. If wholesome or unwholesome minds arise, they must be accompanied by these dharmas; this principle is definite. Because omnipresent and other factors are not determined to only one nature, here only this is asked, and therefore only the first three minds are asked about, not the latter two.

15.31

Eighth: Question: "As the sūtra states... up to now, its differences": this cites the sūtra. Why, when those dharmas ripen with distinct characteristics, is it said that they are harmonious and without difference?

15.32

Meaning of the question: The nature and characteristics of mind and mental factors are each distinct; why is it said that they cannot be separated, being harmonious and without difference? Answer: When multiple [factors] harmoniously support one another and only then arise, their experience and comprehension of the object are complete; if one is missing, there is no understanding; hence they are called without difference.

15.33

Ninth: the four synonyms for mental factors. Why are they called conjoined? Answer: "Due to equality of entity, etc.": Ji says: "Equality of entity refers to substance; because substances are all one, there is no second feeling, etc.

15.34

Equality of locus means that they operate conjoined in the same objective locus; furthermore, they are equal in reliance and focal locus. Equality of time means being in the same moment. Equality of function means performing their respective actions conjoined on the same object, like cognizing blue as blue.

15.35

Furthermore, wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate functions are equal. Jing says: "Why is equality of cognitive aspect (ākāra) not distinguished? The explanation is: in the Mahāyāna, when distinguishing cognitive aspects, one cannot say they are equal. Why? Cognitive aspect is the seeing part (darśanabhāga), and aspect is the object part (nimittabhāga); that is, when mind and mental factors grasp the preceding object, the cognitive understanding of the seeing part differs in various ways, and the object parts transformed on the basis of this seeing part have numerous distinctions; therefore, one cannot say that cognitive aspects are conjoined and equal."

15.36

Tai says: Alternatively, when explaining the locus, the locus is divided into two; with respect to the mutual identity of action, etc., he explains the meaning of conjunction through four equivalences, which is just a difference of opening and combining.

15.37

In explaining 'having active modes' [ākāra]: for instance, the eye-consciousness and its mental factors together apprehend the same fundamental object (bimbālambana), but each gives rise to multiple active understandings with respect to the one cognitive object, each manifesting an objective aspect (nimittabhāga) that arises within its own mind; this is called proceeding with immeasurable kinds of active modes.

15.38

In 'having a basis' [āśraya]: Jing says: For instance, a single eye-consciousness depends on three faculties to arise: the first is the eye faculty; the second is the mental faculty of immediate uninterrupted cessation; the third is distantly dependent on manas as the defiled faculty. The other consciousnesses are also like this. Therefore, it is said that by designating a single category, multiple bases are stated, which is called 'having a basis.'

15.39

Question: If so, all conditioned dharmas such as form arise only by relying on bases; if that is the case, then form dharmas would also have a basis—why is it [restricted] only to [mind]?

15.40

Now, to resolve this: although among conditioned dharmas none is without a basis, yet as for the meaning of 'basis' stated here, here it refers to the faculties as bases. The other form dharmas do not arise depending on faculties, and therefore are not called 'having a basis.'

15.41

Ji says: This means that mental factors and the like belong to the same category as consciousness in depending on bases; as the eye-consciousness relies on the eye faculty, the simultaneous mental factors do likewise, and the rest can be known by analogy.

15.42

An opponent raises an implicit objection, saying: 'Among all conditioned dharmas, which one lacks a basis? Why do mental dharmas alone receive this name?' Therefore, it is resolved: 'Although among conditioned dharmas none is without a basis, yet that is not the meaning of basis defined here, because their own respective causes are not constant bases, and associated, co-arising dharmas are also not constant bases. Only that which serves constantly as a basis qualifies for the measure of a basis here. Hence the eye and other [faculties] are that which belongs to consciousness and the like, so it is called having a basis, unlike other dharmas.' Alternatively, 'basis' means that the six classes of consciousness rely on the multiple supporting faculties, and the consciousness that relies on them receives the name 'possessing a basis.' Thus it says 'constant basis'; this explanation is superior.

15.43

The tenth explains the five kinds of mutually opposed dharmas: first, the opposition of suffering and pleasure; second, the opposition of suffering and pleasure to equanimity; third, [the opposition of] neither-suffering-nor-pleasure to ignorance; fourth, the opposition of knowledge (vidyā) to ignorance (avidyā); fifth, the opposition of knowledge to nirvāṇa.

15.44

Regarding the answer: 'Because they serve as companions to all feelings and all afflictions; they are mutually opposed': Jing says: Equanimity feeling is pervasive in being associated with all feelings and afflictions; ignorance is likewise pervasive in being associated with all afflictions. Since the meaning is equivalent, they are opposed.

15.45

Ji says: Serving as a companion to all feelings refers to equanimity feeling; serving as a companion to all afflictions refers to ignorance. Feeling serves as a companion to feelings, and affliction serves as a companion to afflictions, hence it is said that they are mutually opposed. Furthermore, feeling and ignorance can both serve as companions to feelings and afflictions; hence they are explained in opposition to each other. On the basis of this passage, it proves that in the fourth dhyāna, the limbs of equanimity feeling and correct awareness are not established as [separate] limbs.

15.46

The above ten gates of miscellaneous determination of the names of the four aggregates are concluded.

15.47

Below, the second part takes the three natures as a general heading to subsume the four formless [aggregates], and traverses nine gates to explain and differentiate them.

15.48

Therein, first, gathering the four aggregates to constitute the three natures: stating that 'all are without distinction' means that the four aggregates all pertain to the three natures, and there is no distinction of some pertaining and others not pertaining.

15.49

Next, reciting a verse, the nine gates are listed: 1. ground of reliance (āśraya); 2. intrinsic nature (svabhāva); 3. conjunction (saṃprayoga); 4. conventional, etc. (saṃvṛti); 5. soft/inferior, etc. (mṛdu); 6. matter/object (vastu); 7. distinction (bheda); 8. acquisition and loss (āyāpāya); 9. antidote and that which is counteracted (pratipakṣa and vipakṣa).

15.50

Below, traversing the nine gates to differentiate the three natures, there are three sections: first, traversing the nine gates to differentiate the wholesome aggregates. First, clarifying the ground of reliance, which has six periods; this will be differentiated below in the explanation of the third gate, conjunction.

15.51

Second, clarifying intrinsic nature: in the Mahāyāna, all eleven are intrinsically wholesome, unlike the Vibhāṣā, which takes only shame, modesty, and the three wholesome roots as intrinsically wholesome.

15.52

Third, regarding conjunction: according to [fascicle] sixty-nine, among the eleven wholesome [factors], pliancy (praśrabdhi) alone is excluded, and the other ten are present in all wholesome minds. If according to fascicle three of the first portfolio: How many arise depending only on wholesome mind, not in all places, yet [arise] in all stages and not at all times?

15.53

Answer: Faith and the rest, ending with non-harming.

15.54

Furthermore, [fascicle] fifty-three says: Wherever there is shame (hrī), there must be modesty (apatrāpya); wherever there is modesty, there must be shame. Although there are various differing explanations, we now rely on [fascicle] sixty-nine as definitive: if in meditative stabilization (samādhi), it must arise together with all eleven; if a wholesome mind arises in an unstabilized stage, it must arise together with ten factors, excluding pliancy. Now, the statement of presence or absence in the six periods is spoken based on the predominance of power. Fascicle fifty-three says: 'One with modesty does not necessarily have shame' is also based on power, because shame is self-blame, whereas modesty is shame before others. Whenever there is guilt with self-blame, by principle one must feel shame before others; but one who feels shame before others does not necessarily feel self-blame. If one does not rely on power but discusses presence or absence in terms of substance, then one should also accept that wherever there is shamelessness (ahrīkya) there must be immodesty (anapatrāpya), but where there is immodesty there is not necessarily shamelessness.

15.55

Fourth, regarding designated and real: according to the first fascicle of the Abhidharma[-samuccaya], non-delusion takes innate, heard, contemplated, and cultivated wisdom of discerning discernment as its essence, and takes non-permission of evil as its karma. This text seems to say that non-delusion is nominal (prajñapti), using wisdom among the specific objects to reveal the essence of non-delusion. The Tripiṭaka Master says: Citing associated wisdom reveals the essence of non-delusion; since the twenty-two faculties do not subsume the wholesome root of non-delusion, we know there is another textual source, where the text states that the three dharmas are nominal.

15.56

Fifth, differentiation into the three grades: the wholesome roots of unstabilized stages are inferior; the mundane wholesome [factors] of stabilization are middling; the taintless are superior. Within the taintless wholesome [factors], first abandoning the higher defilements is called inferior; next abandoning the middling defilements is called middling; later [abandoning] the inferior defilements is called superior. Now they are stated combined, so 'inferior grade' means all wholesome roots belonging to unstabilized stages, or taintless wholesome roots in stabilized stages that abandon the higher afflictions.

15.57

The 'middling grade' refers to mundane stabilized wholesome [factors] and those taintless ones that can abandon middling afflictions; the superior grade refers to supramundane wholesome roots that abandon inferior afflictions. Furthermore, regarding 'all wholesome dharmas, either through the power of application, etc.': Jing says: Diligently cultivating application close to this life to achieve the superior grade is called the power of application; or, having repeatedly practiced through many past lives to achieve the superior grade is called the power of repeated practice; being accomplished by nature from beginningless time is called the power of intrinsic nature; generating superior wholesomeness through exerting effort toward superior fields of merit such as the Three Jewels is called the power of the field and exertion; arising based on that pure body free from desire to achieve the superior grade is called the power of purity.

15.58

Ji says: All wholesome minds in the upper two realms, and also the wholesome minds with or without taints grasped by those in training (śaikṣa) and beyond training (aśaikṣa).

15.59

Sixth, the wholesome roots arise depending on eight kinds of matters: the first three are merit, namely giving, morality, and cultivation—cultivation being the four immeasurables; the next three are wisdom, namely hearing, thinking, and cultivating.

15.60

The 'remaining cultivation' refers to all other cultivation aside from the four immeasurables, which are the wholesome [roots] leading to liberation and leading to penetration. The seventh, discernment, means entering the path of seeing, cultivation, and beyond training, discerning the truth principles of the established and unestablished, etc. The eighth, gathering sentient beings, is the practice of benefiting others. 'It should be known that here, as appropriate, they rely on the stated matters' concludes the preceding subsumption of the wholesome roots under the eight matters.

15.61

From 'or in the present life' downward explains their superior benefits: if that practitioner, either in the present life or in a future life, becomes defiled in mind by any one kind of greed, anger, or wrong view, because of relying on the eight matters to cultivate all antidotes such as giving and morality, he is made to no longer be associated with defiled dharmas.

15.62

Seventh, explaining the distinctions of wholesome: either of one kind, up to ten kinds. As explained in the Maulī Bhūmiḥ: the first, wholesome in general, is called wholesome because it is faultless, distinguishing it from unwholesome and the like; the second refers to innate, acquired by application, etc.; the third refers to intrinsic, associated, originating, etc., up to the fifteenth, where there are five kinds of numerical tenfold groupings of wholesomeness, as in fascicle three of the Maulī [Bhūmiḥ].

15.63

Furthermore, regarding 'all wholesome dharmas, either by counteracting defilement, etc.': wholesome is distinguished through six meanings. Jing says: Counteracting defilement is the wholesome of abandonment as antidote. The appeasement of defilement is the antidote of subduing afflictions. Receiving fruits is the wholesome with taints of ordinary people and trainees. Purity of the mental continuum is the wholesome dharmas arising within the body of one beyond training. Making offerings to sacred shrines applies to both ordinary and noble beings, cultivating only the portion of merit. Gathering sentient beings is the wholesome of benefiting others.

15.64

Ji says: The antidote refers to the path of uninterrupted progress (ānantaryamārga). Appeasement refers to the path of liberation (vimuktimārga), or the taintless path followed by the tainted path. Purity of the mental continuum refers to the wholesome morality of restraint.

15.65

Eighth, in clarifying wholesome as having no faults and having virtues, there are four pairs: 1. abandoning evil and gathering wholesome; 2. relinquishing suffering and attaining pleasure; 3. weariness of the conditioned and delighting in the unconditioned; 4. clarifying present benefit and future benefit.

15.66

In the first pair: 'confronting evil' means abandoning the two evils; 'causing separation from entanglements and latencies' means skillfully causing already arisen evil dharmas to be severed; 'causing non-perversion with respect to the cognitive object' means skillfully causing unarisen evil dharmas not to arise; 'gathering wholesome' means generating the two wholesomes; 'causing wholesome roots not to decline' means being able to guard already arisen wholesome dharmas from being lost; 'causing them to proceed and continue in an outflow of uniform mode' means skillfully causing unarisen wholesome dharmas to arise.

15.67

In the second pair, there are six phrases clarifying the abandonment of the cause of suffering and the fruit of suffering; 'not harming oneself,' etc., is one phrase clarifying the attainment of the fruit of pleasure, which refers to 'being able to cause one to experience the joy and pleasure arisen therefrom.'

15.68

In the third pair, 'being able to exhaust birth, etc.' is suppressing the conditioned; among the eight sufferings, the suffering of birth is foremost, and the wholesome is able to exhaust all eight sufferings with birth as foremost. Furthermore, 'being able to increase...' downward clarifies delighting in the unconditioned.

15.69

In the fourth pair, present benefits are three: 1. wealth does not decline; 2. courage among the assembly and widespread reputation; 3. no regret at the approach of death. Future benefits are three: 1. rebirth in good destinies; 2. wholesome [roots] without decline or loss; 3. swift realization of nirvāṇa.

15.70

Ninth, there are fifteen kinds of antidotes: the antidote of disgust (nirvedha) contemplates suffering and origination to produce disgust, which is the path of application; the antidote of abandonment (prahāṇa) is the path of uninterrupted progress; the antidote [of realization] realizes that unconditioned state, which is the path of liberation; the distant antidote (dūrībhāva) begins from the path of liberation, and the subsequent paths arisen thereafter maintain a distant defense against the previously severed afflictions, causing them never to arise again, which is named the distant antidote. These four antidotes completely encompass the paths. The three subsequent restatements merely come about due to differences in meaning, with no separate essence. 'The antidote to the entanglements directed toward desires' contemplates the sensory objects of the five worldly desires as impure, subduing greed in general. 'The antidote to the entanglements directed toward non-desires' contemplates those enemies as dear friends, subduing anger in general. Furthermore, as the text below says, desires are humans and gods, and non-desires are the three evil destinies. 'The antidote to latencies' severs the latencies of those three families, which is the contemplation of suchness. 'The antidotes to soft, middling, and superior afflictions' clarifies that the subsumption of counteraction is also exhaustive. 'The antidote to distraction' restrains the mind in stabilization. 'The antidote of admonition' reprimands sentient beings to make them calm their afflictions. 'The antidote to debility': Jing says: Rousing oneself to cultivate can remove debility. Ji says: Rendering evil debilitated is named the antidote to debility. 'The antidote of suppression' refers to the contemplation of impurity for sentient beings with excessive greed, and the like.

15.71

The above four are the applications of the path of abandonment; below clarifies the direct abandonment of uninterrupted progress, namely the antidote of dissociation. In total, four restatements explain fifteen kinds of antidotes. The above nine gates clarify the wholesome.

15.72

Below clarifies defilement: first, generally opening two headings to indicate the order of exposition; later, explaining the two headings, each having nine gates.

15.73

In the ground of reliance of root afflictions, it first clarifies that the grounds of reliance of afflictions have six kinds in terms of the cognitive object; later, they are assigned to their respective grounds of reliance.

15.74

In the former [explanation], the first is the agreeable object grasped by greed; the second is the object grasped by anger; the third is the object grasped by ignorance; the fourth is the object grasped by conceit. There are seven kinds of conceit: first, simply named conceit (māna), which arises taking an inferior object; second, called excessive conceit (atimāna), which arises taking an equal object; third, conceit exceeding conceit (mānātimāna); fourth, conceit of inferiority (ūnamāna), which both arise grasping a superior object. The distinct five grasping aggregates are what the conceit of self (asmimāna) grasps. Upside-down [apprehension] regarding what is attained and not yet attained is erroneous conceit (mithyāmāna). Upside-down [apprehension] regarding virtues is conceit of superiority (abhimāna). In terms of the correct principle among the seven, the first conceit considers oneself superior to the inferior and equal to the superior; conceit exceeding conceit and conceit of inferiority grasp only superior objects. Here, [the text] merely mentions the objects of the seven conceits according to a single aspect. The fifth is the object of view; the sixth is the object of doubt. Regarding these six afflictions, according to other treatises they do not follow this order.

15.75

Regarding conjunction, as for 'ignorance is conjoined with everything; doubt is not conjoined at all,' Master Ji and others say: According to the sixth fascicle of the Abhidharma[samuccaya], anger is not conjoined with greed, conceit, or views, but it does not say that anger is not conjoined with doubt. Another interpretation: after [explaining] anger, it says: 'As with anger, so it is with doubt.' Hence we know that in that text anger is conjoined with doubt. That it is not conjoined with everything here is based on the majority [of cases]; that text is based on anger arising from long, ceaseless doubting, where anger is conjoined with doubt. This treatise speaks of the initial moment, while that treatise is based on the later moment; this treatise is based on coarse characteristics and thus they are not conjoined, while that treatise is based on subtle characteristics and thus they can be conjoined; that treatise is based on the principle of actual reality. Here, greed and anger are mutually opposed and do not conjoin; it allows greed to conjoin with conceit and views, and that treatise agrees. This treatise has anger conjoined with conceit and views. The Abhidharma[samuccaya] does not allow this, stating that anger does not conjoin with conceit and views; this treatise is based on the principle of actual reality, whereas that treatise follows the provisional principle. Furthermore, that text is based on the designation of the aspect of intensifying resentment. That treatise says: If one arouses intense resentment toward this matter, then one does not produce self-exaltation or analytical investigation toward it; therefore they cannot be conjoined. However, this treatise is based on the subtle, actual principle of mental activity: when feeling conceit toward someone or analytically investigating them, hatred can still be accommodated; therefore they can be conjoined. This is according to the Mahāyāna, and the principle holds without contradiction. Another interpretation resolves this passage with that one by stating: 'As with greed, so with anger' means that anger does not conjoin with conceit, views, and so forth, and 'so it is' means not that greed conjoins with conceit and views, but both that anger does not conjoin with greed just as greed does not conjoin with anger. This treatise says: 'As with the intensification of defiled affection, so it is also,' meaning not by anger, and also greed can conjoin with conceit; just as greed does not conjoin with anger, so anger does not conjoin with greed. As asked in that treatise, anger does not conjoin with conceit and views. However, the former interpretation is superior, and the other texts agree with this. As the fifty-eighth fascicle below states: the five views are mutually unconjoined because their intrinsic natures do not conjoin; greed, resentment, conceit, and doubt are mutually opposed, and thus they are mutually unconjoined, fully stating the reason. That is based on the coarse aspect following the provisional principle, which likewise does not contradict.

15.76

Regarding the three grades, the afflictions of a firm footing, meaning those whose faculties have matured, being mostly of the upper grade by nature: Jing says: For those aged twenty and above, whose strength is established, their various faculties have matured; at that time, they mostly arouse upper-grade afflictions.

15.77

Tai and Ji both say: From the age of fifteen onward, the faculties mature; if afflictions arise, they are mostly of the upper grade by nature. The afflictions of improper preparation refer to where afflictions ought not to arise; it is where active preparations ought not to be aroused, yet afflictions are aroused, namely the various afflictions aroused with respect to the Three Jewels.

15.78

Regarding afflictions that possess karma, meaning those that initiate karma: the Abhidharma[samuccaya] states that the defilements abandoned by cultivation in the desire realm that can initiate bad actions are also unwholesome, while the rest are indeterminate; this accords with the notion here that the afflictions initiating karma are of the upper grade.

15.79

Under the section on objects, there are six propositions of greed. Tai says: The term 'greed' means that because unobtained objects do not exist, the greedy mind manifests the aspect of the object on its own and clings to it; this is not like desiring an object that possesses an intrinsic characteristic in the past or present, and so it is called 'greed for greed.' 'Covering greed' means that toward past objects previously enjoyed one gives rise to yearning attachment; because already enjoyed objects are heavy and possess the meaning of covering over, it is called 'covering greed.' Present objects last only briefly and future ones have not yet arisen, so unlike the past they are not called 'covering greed.' Having and having no feeling corresponds to the greed of the two views to be severed.

15.80

Regarding anger, Jing says: All sentient beings of the desire realm arouse anger relying on ten matters. The first six and the tenth arouse anger toward sentient matters. The seventh, disagreeable objects, arouses anger toward non-sentient matters. The eighth and ninth matters arouse anger toward either sentient or non-sentient things, because one may arouse anger out of jealousy toward another's body, another's actions, or superior material requisites; habituation is likewise, as one arouses anger through past habituation toward the sentient or non-sentient.

15.81

Regarding 'relying on the first six matters, nine harmful matters are established,' and so forth: the first three are general, and the next three are distinguished according to the [three] times into nine. First, hearing another person say that someone yesterday reviled oneself or one's friends, or praised one's enemy: hearing this today is called giving rise to three kinds of anger grasping past matters of praise and slander regarding oneself, enemies, and friends. The text is abbreviated and merely says 'past enemies and friends,' but 'oneself' can also be subsumed under 'friends'; the future and present are each threefold and should be understood accordingly. Below, when subsuming the ten into three: purely being angry at another's view is not directed at a sentient being, nor does it arise toward the original sentient situation, so it is not called 'anger toward objects' but merely 'anger toward views.' Ji says: Among the four kinds below, excluding jealousy, if one previously could not tolerate a sentient being and produces anger toward an object, it is called 'sentient anger'; because it is due to prior intolerance, it is also called 'habitual anger' and 'view anger.' The reason jealousy is not discussed is that it arises grasping an object—meaning one must first grasp an object such as equal reputation, gain, or lineage before producing anger—so it is not discussed here. Moreover, the first six forms of vexatious harm are collectively termed 'sentient.' Apart from these, giving rise to anger grasping mountains, rivers, and the great earth is called the seventh, 'anger toward objects.' Arising grasping the eighth matter of jealousy, namely hearing and the like, is also subsumed under 'sentient anger.' Because here one repeatedly practices contentious views, it is also 'anger toward views.' Otherwise, the eighth, habituation, extends to the other nine. Among these ten, there are three categories: seven are sentient anger, one is object anger, and one is view anger. Habituation extends to all three kinds. Ce says: the first subsumes the first six and the eighth anger; the second subsumes the seventh anger; the third subsumes the tenth anger.

15.82

Regarding ignorance, it produces seven kinds of unknowing, or nineteen, based on seven matters. In the first category among the seven, it produces three kinds of unknowing, namely unknowing regarding the three times. In the second matter there are also three, namely a self in the six internal bases, what belongs to a self in the external bases, and conceiving both as multiple selves. In the third matter there are also three, namely the three kinds of unknowing regarding karma, retribution, and both. Jing says: Arousing the view of an agent toward karma created; arousing the view of an experiencer toward its vipāka; and arousing both the view of an agent and an experiencer toward karma and vipāka: the characteristics of these three views are called ignorance. Furthermore, they constitute three views of causelessness and wrong causes: positing a self as the agent is called a 'wrong cause'; slandering that there is no proper cause is called 'causelessness.' This merely restates the matters above and does not explain further distinct matters of unknowing.

15.83

Ji says: Due to their combination, unknowing of causelessness and wrong causes arises; this differs from the Maulī Bhūmiḥ in the ninth fascicle. In the fourth matter there are three, namely the Three Jewels. In the fifth matter there are four, namely the four truths. In the sixth matter there are two.

15.84

Jing says: That is, having no clear comprehension regarding causes and the conditioned formations born of causes; the matters of unknowing are two. Ji says: That is, because of confusion regarding the cause of dispassion, one posits an agent, an experiencer, a puruṣa, and so forth; because of confusion regarding the fruit, one adopts ideas of purity regarding conditioned formations as experiencers and so forth, thereby producing wrong practice. In the seventh, there is one.

15.85

Jing says: Supposing the worldly roots of goodness one has attained to be the attainment of the noble path, one gives rise to the conceit of superiority. Ji says: That is, the text on conceit of superiority regarding true comprehension of the six contact bases; therefore there are nineteen. Since the text merely contains the seven spheres of unknowing and so on, consult the ninth fascicle of the Maulī Bhūmiḥ, which completely sets forth the mutual subsumption of the seven unknowings and nineteen unknowings, and so forth. Conceit arises relying on six matters, as already explained above under the section on supporting bases.

15.86

Views rely on two matters. First, in the matters of superimposition there are four; recording them in order, excluding wrong views, they are the view of individuality, extreme views, and the two attachments to views and precepts. 'Permanence and impermanence' are called superimpositions. Jing says: It should say 'conceiving the impermanent to be permanent as superimposition'; this text is inverted. Or it may be that impermanence is annihilation, and superimposing its annihilative nature is also called superimposition.

15.87

Regarding the third and fourth superimpositions, Jing says: Grasping vows and prohibitions as the cause for being born in the Brahmā world is called the method for superior rebirth, which is attachment to vows and prohibitions; conceiving various defiled views to be the cause of nirvāṇa and liberation is attachment to views. If one does not grasp vows or views, but directly conceives Brahmā to be the cause of sentient beings, or even grasps other contaminated dharmas as the path, as the cause of nirvāṇa, and as supreme, all of these are wrong views.

15.88

Ji says: In the Mahāyāna, grasping bad bodily and verbal vows, such as observing the vows of pigs or chickens, is attachment to views because it is born of conceiving a non-supreme view as supreme; this differs from the Hīnayāna treatises.

15.89

Among the four matters of deprecation, 'there is no giving' and so forth is called deprecating cause. As in the Abhidharma[samuccaya], there are five here, namely giving, love and joy, sacrifice, good conduct, and bad conduct; deprecating fruit is the same.

15.90

Regarding deprecating function, the Abhidharma[samuccaya] says: 'That is, asserting there is no this world, no that world, no mother, no father, and no apparitional sentient beings is called deprecating function.' Here there are three concluding statements: first, deprecating the function of going and coming between different worlds, which is 'this and that world'; second, deprecating the function of sustaining the seed, which is 'father and mother'; third, deprecating the function of continuity, which is 'apparitional sentient beings' here. Therefore, in this treatise's explanation of human function having four kinds, it says: first, going and coming, meaning there is no this or that world; second, the function of holding the womb, meaning the statement that there is no mother; third, deprecating the function of planting the seed, deprecating by saying there is no father; fourth, deprecating the karma of future existence, meaning there are no intermediate-state apparitional sentient beings proceeding from the karma of future existence. This treatise splits father and mother into two, whereas that [treatise] treats them as one.

15.91

Regarding the five views arising relying on these extensive and brief eight matters and two matters: briefly they are two, superimposition and deprecation; extensively they are eight, namely four each of superimposition and deprecation, which give rise to the five views. Furthermore, relying on the sixty-two matters, two views arise. Among the sixty-two, there are four of universal permanence, four of partial permanence, sixteen with form, eight without form, and eight of neither-with-nor-without, totaling forty views that take eternalist view within extreme views as their substance; seven annihilationist views take annihilationist view within extreme views as their substance; the remaining fifteen have wrong views as their nature.

15.92

Doubt arises relying on six matters: first, hearing non-genuine Dharma that is contradictory from beginning to end, doubting whether the principle stated is correct or not correct; second, seeing a master's wrong conduct, doubting whether his practice is the path; third, seeing differences of opinion among those one has faith in and accepts—when the heterodox teachers one accepts do not agree with the multitude's opinions, doubting whether their destination is truly ultimate; fourth, being foolish and slow by nature, producing doubt on this account; fifth, producing doubt through not having comprehended the profound nature of dharmas; sixth, doubting because of regression of wisdom regarding the vast Dharma teaching.

15.93

Under the section on distinctions, Jing says: Arousing defilements in one's prime is called the state of distraction; or the various entanglements of the desire realm may be called the state of distraction. Afflictions of breaking precepts are called afflictions in the state of admonition and repentance. Afflictions aroused upon reaching old age or illness are called afflictions in the state of emaciation and debility. Afflictions in the meditative stages are called the state of suppression; or afflictions that regress and arise after having been suppressed, or abandoning the defilements of a lower stage to give rise to the defilements of a higher stage, are called afflictions in the state of separation from bonds.

15.94

Tai says: 'The eleventh is the stage before generating the mind [of awakening] and taking the precepts; the twelfth is having generated the mind and taken the precepts, wherein one is reproved and held to account by others for whatever infractions of precepts occur, and repents oneself—the defilements in this stage; the thirteenth is cultivating the meditation on impurity and the like so that the defilements are subdued and weakened, yet the weakened defilements manifest from time to time; the fourteenth is having attained the mundane six practices and the like to subdue the defilements of cultivation, yet defilements of seeing remain; the fifteenth is having attained the antidote consisting in detachment on the path of seeing, yet defilements of cultivation continue to manifest.'

15.95

Ji says: 'These correspond in order to the fifteen kinds among the wholesome [states] mentioned earlier; each is established according to a single predominant meaning and the names are not designated by an intrinsic nature, just as the internal gate is termed "disgust", the path of seeing is termed "holding", and the path of cultivation is termed "remote part".'

15.96

Next, explaining the bases of the secondary afflictions, of which there are nine: first, living mutually together, for living together often gives rise to anger and resentment; second, mutual reproval, because reproving one's own faults produces concealment and vexation; third, due to gains and offerings, which gives rise to jealousy; fourth, based on wrong livelihood, which gives rise to deceit and flattering dissimulation; fifth, based on disrespect for venerated teachers, which gives rise to arrogance and negligence; sixth, due to intolerance, which gives rise to harmfulness; seventh, violating the higher morality, which gives rise to shamelessness and unconscionableness; eighth, violating the higher mind; ninth, violating the higher wisdom, because of which the remaining twelve arise.

15.97

Question: Respect takes shame as its substantial entity, and disrespect takes shamelessness as its substantial entity; how is it now said that disrespect for venerated teachers gives rise to arrogance?

First 97 of 525 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

瑜伽論記 — Classical Chinese