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瑜伽師地論略纂 1.73

瑜伽師地論略纂 1.73

Language
Classical Chinese

1.73

辨中有中,十四門: 一、生時節。前趣滅位,後趣即生,如生滅相,稱兩頭等。 二、具根,化生故。下第二卷於四生中解化生云:具足六處,或復不具。中有何須必具五根?答:彼解無想天及初生命終名不具,隨順小乘,說六識身無意根故,非餘化生有不具根。又劫初鬼畜既亦化生,何必要具?劫初人畜一切具根,以化生故。若說男女根,中有之中容其無形。問:既與當果相似,一業所招,如何必具根?答:以化生故,與當生不同。 三、相狀。業識所引,善惡異故。 四、極淨天眼境,即大菩薩、廣慧聲聞,廣修者見極細故。 五、不同前將死位起內我愛,唯起境界愛,緣當生境故。 六、同當生形,一業招故。如狗中有,雖待時等轉受狐身,本將向狗,生形仍似狗。 七、如天眼見障外色,然得見無邊隨類業故。 八、身無礙,往彼生處,隨山河等,身皆度往,一無障礙,猶如通力,生處即礙。 九、不見異趣,見同類及身當生處,業勢異故,不同餘宗。 十、往生形儀。惡業眼視下淨者,生三惡趣,雖見生處,見其勝淨,所以欣生。若見穢相,不欣生故。《俱舍》云:天首上三橫,地獄頭歸下,與此不同。或此說地獄面視於下,非頭不向下,但與餘二趣視下相似,故同說之。 十一、生時分限。七日一死,壽勢頹故;極經七死,必得生處,業必熟故。如住壽極八萬四千,此亦如是,不可為難。設劫滅時,輪王業熟,亦定七日轉生他方,或業可轉,而未受果。設色界中有,亦唯七日;若得生處,日時不定。有說欲界中有七日,色界不定。此義不然,無文說故。 十二、可轉生處。生時二緣未合,謂父母等未和合;禽獸等非時,如狗生狐中等,時處未和合故;或如謗解脫,生地獄等。皆可轉故。 十三、釋異名,有四。總有四有,謂生有、死有、本有、中有。生有初剎那,名生有;死未後剎那,名死有;生後死前,名本有;死後生前,名中有。一名中有,前後二有中間故。中有非趣,本有雖中,不名中有。二名健達縛,此名尋香行,尋當生處香而行往故;或唯食香,香所資故。如作樂者,名尋香故。此唯欲界名,非色界者。彼雖不尋香,尋香類故,亦名尋香。見生處起愛,不聞生處香,自無鼻識,生處無香故。三名意行,身隨心往,速疾自在故。或名趣生,趣向生有故。 十四、三界有無。除無色界,以無形故。欲、色二界中,亦非必定有,變人為虎,雀化為蛤等,無中有故。《涅槃經》言:或說欲、色界有中有,或說欲、色界無中有,皆不解我意故。若一切有者,何故說有不解我意?故許通無。容豫者有,速疾者無。陷身入地獄,此等皆無故。色界頓生故,中有形大如本有;欲界身中有,如生有之半,等形漸故。此准小乘,大無文故。無色界死,生下界時,隨前死處,中有現前。此有一難言:如在欲界,得色界定,業力猶微,成後報業;次得無色定,業勝為生報,生無色界;受生報已,生色界中,方受後報。爾時欲界二十劫空,乃於欲界前身死處,中有現前,向色界生。此亦難解。應言則於當生處現,理亦何失?雖有此解,理實不然。前死處現,其理為正。無色無處,即於入定死處受果,故從死處,中有現前。若生處現,便大疎遠。生處尚遙,誰復傳識?故前說是。〈決擇分〉中五十四,問:何因得知有中有耶?答:從此沒已,若無所依,諸心、心所無有道理轉至餘方故。設有難言:如聲發響,此滅彼生,何須中有?彼自釋言:不應如響,唯惑亂故。響非實有,意變似彼;聲外響生,心亂倒故。復有難言:應如於影,質對影生,何須中有?彼自釋言:不應如影,彼不滅故。質在影起,不同死已,後趣方生,故有中有。復有難言:如心緣境,心慮境生,何假中有?彼自釋言:亦不應說如取所緣,非行往故。心不往境,慮起境生。生死不然,須往生處,既假傳識,故須中有。

In analyzing the intermediate state (antarābhava), there are fourteen sections: First, the timing of its arising. At the moment when the prior destiny ceases, the subsequent destiny immediately arises; like the characteristics of arising and ceasing, they correspond like the two pans of a scale. Second, it is complete with faculties, because it is of apparitional birth (aupapāduka). Below, in the second fascicle, explaining apparitional birth among the four modes of birth, it states: it is endowed with the six sense-bases, or else it is not endowed with them. Why must the intermediate state necessarily possess all five faculties? Answer: That passage explains that the Heaven without Conception (asaṃjñi-deva) and dying at the initial moment of life are called unendowed, in accordance with the Hīnayāna, saying that the six consciousness-bodies lack a mental faculty; it does not mean that other apparitional births have incomplete faculties. Furthermore, since pretas and animals at the beginning of the aeon were also born apparitionallly, why must they be complete? Humans and animals at the beginning of the aeon were all complete with faculties because they were of apparitional birth. If one speaks of male and female faculties, it is possible for the intermediate state to be without gender. Question: Since it resembles the future fruit and is induced by a single karma, how could it necessarily be complete with faculties? Answer: Because it is of apparitional birth, it differs from the future birth. Third, its form and appearance: it is guided by karmic consciousness, differing according to good and evil. Fourth, it is the sphere of the extremely pure divine eye: that is, great bodhisattvas and broadly wise śrāvakas who cultivate extensively see it because it is extremely subtle. Fifth, unlike the prior state when about to die where internal self-love arises, it only gives rise to craving for sense-objects, because it takes the future sphere of birth as its object. Sixth, its shape is the same as the future birth, because it is brought about by a single karma. For example, regarding an intermediate state of a dog, even though through waiting for the time and conditions it changes to take the body of a fox, because it originally was destined toward a dog, the shape of its birth-form still resembles a dog. Seventh, like the divine eye, it sees colors and forms beyond obstructions; yet it is able to see boundless [realms] according to the karma of its type. Eighth, its body meets no obstruction: going to its place of birth, according to mountains, rivers, and so forth, its body crosses and passes through them all entirely without obstruction, just like supernormal power; yet it is obstructed at the very place of birth. Ninth, it does not see different destinies; it only sees those of the same kind and the place where its body will be born, because the momentum of karma differs; this is unlike other schools. Tenth, the manner of posture in going to take birth: one with evil karma whose eyes look downward and see purity is born in the three evil destinies; although seeing the place of birth, seeing it as superior and pure, one therefore rejoices and takes birth. If one saw foul appearances, one would not rejoice in taking birth. The Kośa states: "Deities have heads upward, three go horizontally, and hell-beings have heads going downward"; which is different from this text. Or, this text means that hell-beings have their faces looking downward, not that their heads do not point downward; but because it is similar to the other two destinies looking downward, they are described together. Eleventh, the limit of its life-duration: it dies once every seven days, because the momentum of lifespan decays; passing through at most seven deaths, it is certain to obtain a place of birth, because karma must ripen. Just as remaining in life reaches at most eighty-four thousand [aeons], this too is like that, and should not be raised as an objection. Even when an aeon is destroyed, if a wheel-turning king's karma is ripe, it will also definitely change and be born in another realm within seven days; or, karma can change when the fruit is not yet experienced. Even for an intermediate state in the form realm, it is also only seven days; if it obtains a place of birth, the days and hours are not fixed. Some say the intermediate state of the desire realm lasts seven days, while that of the form realm is indefinite. This interpretation is incorrect, as no text states so. Twelfth, changeable places of birth: when the two conditions at the time of birth have not yet combined—that is, parents and so forth have not united; birds and beasts and so forth are not in season, such as a dog being born among foxes, because time and place have not combined; or as in the case of slandering liberation and being born in hell—these are all changeable. Thirteenth, explaining alternative names: there are four. In all there are four states of existence (bhava): existence at birth (upapatti-bhava), existence at death (maraṇa-bhava), basic existence (pūrva-kāla-bhava), and intermediate existence (antarā-bhava). The first instant of existence at birth is called existence at birth; the final instant of existence at death is called existence at death; after birth and before death is called basic existence; after death and before birth is called intermediate existence. The first name is 'intermediate existence' (antarā-bhava), because it is between the prior and posterior existences. The intermediate state is not a destiny (gati); although basic existence is in the middle, it is not named intermediate existence. The second name is gandharva; this is translated as 'walking toward scent', because it travels pursuing the scent of its future place of birth; or, it feeds exclusively on scent, being sustained by scent. Just as musicians are called gandharva. This is a name only in the desire realm, not the form realm. Although those in that realm do not seek scent, because they are of the category of seeking scent, they are also named gandharva. Seeing the place of birth, they give rise to craving; they do not smell the scent of the place of birth, for they themselves lack nose-consciousness and the place of birth lacks scent. The third name is 'going by mind' (manomaya), because the body goes following the mind, swiftly and freely. Or, it is called 'approaching birth' (saṃbhavaiṣin), because it is heading toward existence at birth. Fourteenth, presence or absence in the three realms: except for the formless realm, because it lacks physical form. In the desire and form realms, it is also not necessarily present; when a human transforms into a tiger, or a sparrow metamorphoses into a clam, and so forth, there is no intermediate state. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "Some say the desire and form realms have an intermediate state, and some say the desire and form realms have no intermediate state; neither understands my intent." If all possessed it, why would it say that saying it exists does not understand my intent? Therefore it is accepted to be commonly absent. Those who linger have it; those who are swift do not. Sinking bodily into hell—in these cases all lack it. Because birth in the form realm is instantaneous, the intermediate state's form is as large as basic existence; the intermediate body of the desire realm is like half of existence at birth, because its form is gradually equalized. This conforms to the Hīnayāna, as the Mahāyāna lacks a textual statement. When dying in the formless realm and taking birth in a lower realm, the intermediate state appears at the prior place of death. Here an objection is raised: Suppose someone in the desire realm obtains form realm concentration, but the karmic power is still weak, becoming karma to be experienced in a later rebirth (aparaparyāya-vedanīya); next, they obtain formless concentration, whose karma is superior and becomes karma to be experienced in the next rebirth (upapadyavedanīya), being born into the formless realm; having received the retribution in the next rebirth, they are born into the form realm, only then receiving the retribution in a later rebirth. At that time, the desire realm has been empty for twenty aeons; then at the place where the previous body died in the desire realm, the intermediate state appears and proceeds to be born into the form realm. This also is difficult to explain. One should say that it appears at the future place of birth—what fault would there be in principle? Although there is this explanation, in reality it is not so. Appearing at the prior place of death is the correct principle. The formless has no location; one receives fruit directly at the place of entering concentration and dying, and therefore the intermediate state appears from the place of death. If it appeared at the place of birth, it would be extremely detached and distant. The place of birth being still distant, who would transmit the consciousness? Therefore the prior statement is correct. In the fifty-fourth fascicle of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī, it asks: "By what cause do we know that there is an intermediate state?" Answer: "After perishing from this, if there were no support (āśraya), there would be no principle by which the minds and mental factors could transfer to another place." Suppose an objection is raised: "Just as a sound produces an echo, this perishing and that arising, why is an intermediate state needed?" It itself explains: "It should not be like an echo, for that is merely illusory confusion. The echo is not real; the mind transforms to resemble it; an echo arises external to the sound because the mind is confused and inverted." Another objection is raised: "It should be like a shadow: directly opposite the physical object a shadow arises; why is an intermediate state needed?" It itself explains: "It should not be like a shadow, because that [object] has not perished. The object remains while the shadow arises; it is not like dying, after which a subsequent destiny only then arises. Therefore there is an intermediate state." Yet another objection is raised: "Like the mind taking an object as condition, when the mind contemplates, the object appears; why rely on an intermediate state?" It itself explains: "It should also not be said to be like apprehending an object (ālambana), because there is no traveling and going. The mind does not go to the object; contemplation arises and the object appears. Birth-and-death is not like this: one must travel to the place of birth. Since it relies on transmitting consciousness, an intermediate state is necessarily required."

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