瑜伽師地論略纂 10.84

10.84

論云「又若諸色未立假說詮表已前，先有色性等，乃至當知諸法離言自性」者，外計云：諸色未立前先有自性，後依色性假立名色，攝取於色。今牒計云：若是者，是則離色外假說詮表，以後依色性制立假說故。如嬰孩等初生等時，先見色性，後若依色性制立假說者，此嬰孩兒於色根法，於色根事，應起色覺，而為色解。此嬰孩兒先見於色，後不依色而起色解，故知先有色性，後依色性制立假說者，不應道理。而何嬰孩兒而實不起色等覺解？由此因緣道理故，當知諸法離言自性。上來合有三翻破，准牒文知之。

The treatise says, "Furthermore, if before establishing the nominal designation and expression of forms, there were already previously the nature of form, and so forth, up to: one should know that all phenomena have an intrinsic nature that is ineffable." The heterodox view claims: Prior to establishing forms, their intrinsic nature already exists; subsequently, relying on the nature of form, one nominally designates the name 'form' and grasps form. Now, stating their claim: If it were so, then nominal designation and expression would be separate from form, because the nominal designation is established later based on the nature of form. Just as when an infant is newly born, it first sees the nature of form; if it subsequently established a nominal designation relying on the nature of form, this infant ought to give rise to a conception of form and form an understanding of form regarding the faculty and phenomenon of form, and regarding the object of the faculty of form. Yet this infant, having first seen form, does not subsequently give rise to an understanding of form relying on form. Therefore, one knows that to say the nature of form exists first, and later one nominally establishes a designation relying on the nature of form, is unreasonable. Why does an infant in fact not give rise to a conceptual understanding of form and so on? By this causal reason and principle, one should know that all phenomena have an intrinsic nature that is ineffable. In all, there are three turns of refutation above, which may be known by conforming to the quoted text.