瑜伽師地論略纂 10.83

10.83

論云「又如前說色等諸法，隨假說有自性者等，乃至而有自性」等者，此中意，重破彼外計。云如前所說色等諸法，若隨假說有自性者，言隨名即有所詮者，要先有所詮事體，然後隨情所欲制立假。汝既言隨名即稱目有所目者，先未制立假說名前，彼所詮事應無自性，以隨名方有事故，即名未起前彼事無也。未起名前彼事既無，而現詮表能詮之名，不應道理。假說之名既無所有，所詮法事隨能詮名有自性，不應道理。展轉破之。

The treatise says, "Furthermore, as previously stated, if form and other phenomena were to possess an intrinsic nature in accordance with nominal designation, and so forth, up to: yet have an intrinsic nature," and so on. The meaning here is to re-refute that heterodox conception. It means that, as previously stated regarding form and other phenomena, if they were to possess an intrinsic nature in accordance with nominal designation—saying that immediately corresponding to a name there is a designated entity—there must first be the entity and substance of the designated referent, and only then, in accordance with the desires of the mind, are nominal designations established. Since you claim that immediately corresponding to a name, that which designates corresponds to that which is designated, then prior to establishing the nominally designated name, that designated entity would have to lack an intrinsic nature, because the entity would exist only in accordance with the name; that is to say, before the name has arisen, that entity would not exist. Since that entity does not exist before the name has arisen, that there should be an expressive name that designates it is unreasonable. And since the nominally designated name does not exist, that the designated phenomenon or entity should possess an intrinsic nature in accordance with the designating name is unreasonable. This refutes it progressively.