瑜伽師地論略纂 12.48

12.48

論云「即於此中前剎那行自性滅壞，無間非先諸行剎那自性生起，正觀為生等，乃至正觀為滅」者，若依小乘，生在未來，三相在現在；今依大乘，生等三相在現在，滅在過去。如次前文辨，言本無今有名生，簡無為故，言無為是有，而是本有；今有有為，本無今有，而彼本有，言前剎那，後無間有，非先種類生。若一色法，前念滅，後念生，此極相似，云何言非先之言？義曰：若不言相似，即是彼法。是彼法者，即一法體勝行是常住法，即無有滅。以非即前剎那法體，故有相似之言。　言住者，大乘二釋：一說現在能有牽後果之功名住。　若爾，云何阿羅漢後心名住？以不能牽後心故。義曰：以此妨故，故二說。今論云諸行生已，即時未壞，正觀為住，不得是生已經停名為住。　若爾，即住與生別時，故小乘別此言。今大乘應言：諸行生已，即時未壞，如五十二亦得生位經停，以立為住。　異者，若言此生法變壞名異者，此亦不然，即與生時別念故。以生時未變易，後變易方名異者，即生、異別時故。今應言：此已生行望前亡滅，諸行剎那自性唯起別異名異，即異前念皆名異也。以此義故，生、異同時。　滅者，若即現在與異同時而名滅者，即滅是無法，住、異是有法，如何有法俱時亦有無法？故此論云「從此諸行生剎那後，即此已生諸行剎那自性滅壞，正說為滅」，即由有法無時，至過去世方立滅相，故生滅明闇而不同時。　問曰：若然，即一剎那無有四相。義曰：此法滅即此法生時，如秤兩頭，平等平等，故一剎那有生有滅。　若然，何故不先滅後說生耶？義曰：從初說故，以初時要有生故，故諸滅非先唯最滅後方生起。　問：諸經中皆言三有為相，何者為三？義曰：有二義：一、攝住入異；二、攝異入住。言住入異者，以住相似無為故。又若聞諸法有住，即厭有為心不猛；今言唯異者，即有為深可厭。以有異故，不同無為有住，故以住相攝入異相。若約小乘，以異能滅壞生法故，於相功能勝，住能牽後生法，於滅無功，故攝住入異。二、說攝異入住。異於自剎那有功能故，生已未壞，說名為住，故有功能，異從異前法，於自念無功，故攝異入住。又異順滅相，自性不顯，故攝異入住。　若爾，何故不攝異入滅耶？義曰：異是有法，滅是無法，一是過去，一是現在，相貌雖有相似，不可攝入滅相。下〈決擇〉五十三及〈本地〉第三卷抄。

The śāstra states: "Right here, the intrinsic nature of the formations of the previous moment ceases and perishes, and immediately without interval, formations that did not exist before have their momentary intrinsic nature arise, which is correctly viewed as arising, and so forth, up to correctly viewed as cessation": If based on the Hīnayāna, arising is in the future, and the other three characteristics are in the present; now, based on the Mahāyāna, the three characteristics of arising and so forth are in the present, while cessation is in the past. As distinguished in the passage immediately preceding, the statement that what previously did not exist now exists is called arising; to exclude the unconditioned, it states that the unconditioned exists, yet it exists originally, whereas now conditioned phenomena exist, previously non-existent and now existent, while that [unconditioned] exists originally; saying that the previous moment is immediately followed by the subsequent, a category not present before arises. If with a single material phenomenon the previous thought-moment ceases and the subsequent thought-moment arises, these are extremely similar; why does it speak of "not present before"? The commentary explains: If it did not speak of similarity, it would be that very phenomenon. If it were that very phenomenon, then that single phenomenon's sublime activity would be permanent and eternal, and there would be no cessation. Because it is not the very substance of the previous moment's phenomenon, the expression "similarity" is used. As for abiding, there are two explanations in the Mahāyāna: One says that the present ability to produce a subsequent fruit is called abiding. If so, how can the final mind-moment of an arhat be called abiding, since it cannot produce a subsequent mind-moment? The commentary explains: Because of this difficulty, there are two explanations. Now the śāstra says that when formations have arisen, immediately not yet destroyed, they are correctly viewed as abiding; they cannot abide by having arisen and then paused over time. If so, abiding and arising would occur at different times, which is why the Hīnayāna distinguishes this statement. Now the Mahāyāna should say: When formations have arisen, immediately not yet destroyed—as in the fifty-second [fascicle], they may also pause during the stage of arising, which is established as abiding. As for difference: if one says that the alteration and destruction of this arisen phenomenon is called difference, this too is incorrect, because it would be a different thought-moment from the time of arising. If it were not yet altered at the time of arising and only later called difference when altered, then arising and difference would be at different times. Now one should say: with respect to the cessation of the previous, the momentary intrinsic nature of these arisen formations merely arises as distinct and different, which is called difference; that is, being different from the previous thought-moment is in all cases called difference. By this reasoning, arising and difference are simultaneous. As for cessation: if it were in the present simultaneously with difference and called cessation, then cessation would be a non-existent phenomenon, whereas abiding and difference are existent phenomena; how could an existent phenomenon simultaneously have a non-existent phenomenon? Therefore, this śāstra says: "From after the moment these formations arise, the momentary intrinsic nature of these very formations that have arisen ceases and perishes, which is correctly stated as cessation." That is, because when the existent phenomenon is gone, only upon reaching the past time is the characteristic of cessation established; thus arising and cessation are like light and darkness and are not simultaneous. It is asked: If so, then a single moment does not have the four characteristics. The commentary explains: The cessation of this phenomenon is the very time of the arising of this phenomenon, like the two ends of a balance scale, equal and level; therefore, a single moment has both arising and cessation. If so, why does it not speak of cessation first and then speak of arising? The commentary explains: Because it speaks from the beginning; since in the beginning there must be arising, all cessations are not prior, and arising occurs only after the final cessation. Question: The sūtras all speak of three conditioned characteristics; what are the three? The commentary explains: There are two meanings: first, subsuming abiding into difference; second, subsuming difference into abiding. As for subsuming abiding into difference: because abiding resembles the unconditioned. Furthermore, if one hears that phenomena have abiding, the mind revulsing conditioned phenomena will not be fierce; now saying there is only difference makes conditioned phenomena deeply revulsive. Because there is difference, unlike the unconditioned which has abiding, the characteristic of abiding is subsumed into the characteristic of difference. If according to the Hīnayāna, because difference can destroy the arisen phenomenon, its functional efficacy among characteristics is superior, whereas abiding can produce the subsequent arisen phenomenon and has no efficacy regarding cessation; therefore, abiding is subsumed into difference. The second explanation is subsuming difference into abiding. Because difference has efficacy in its own moment, having arisen and not yet destroyed, it is called abiding, and thus has efficacy; difference follows from being different from the previous phenomenon and has no efficacy in its own thought-moment, so difference is subsumed into abiding. Furthermore, difference accords with the characteristic of cessation and its intrinsic nature is not apparent, so difference is subsumed into abiding. If so, why is difference not subsumed into cessation? The commentary explains: Difference is an existent phenomenon, whereas cessation is a non-existent phenomenon; one is past and one is present; although their aspects bear similarities, it cannot be subsumed into the characteristic of cessation. See the notes on the fifty-third fascicle of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī and the third fascicle of the Maulī Bhūmi below.