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瑜伽師地論略纂 12.48

English (machine translation) 12.48

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English

12.48

The śāstra states: "Right here, the intrinsic nature of the formations of the previous moment ceases and perishes, and immediately without interval, formations that did not exist before have their momentary intrinsic nature arise, which is correctly viewed as arising, and so forth, up to correctly viewed as cessation": If based on the Hīnayāna, arising is in the future, and the other three characteristics are in the present; now, based on the Mahāyāna, the three characteristics of arising and so forth are in the present, while cessation is in the past. As distinguished in the passage immediately preceding, the statement that what previously did not exist now exists is called arising; to exclude the unconditioned, it states that the unconditioned exists, yet it exists originally, whereas now conditioned phenomena exist, previously non-existent and now existent, while that [unconditioned] exists originally; saying that the previous moment is immediately followed by the subsequent, a category not present before arises. If with a single material phenomenon the previous thought-moment ceases and the subsequent thought-moment arises, these are extremely similar; why does it speak of "not present before"? The commentary explains: If it did not speak of similarity, it would be that very phenomenon. If it were that very phenomenon, then that single phenomenon's sublime activity would be permanent and eternal, and there would be no cessation. Because it is not the very substance of the previous moment's phenomenon, the expression "similarity" is used. As for abiding, there are two explanations in the Mahāyāna: One says that the present ability to produce a subsequent fruit is called abiding. If so, how can the final mind-moment of an arhat be called abiding, since it cannot produce a subsequent mind-moment? The commentary explains: Because of this difficulty, there are two explanations. Now the śāstra says that when formations have arisen, immediately not yet destroyed, they are correctly viewed as abiding; they cannot abide by having arisen and then paused over time. If so, abiding and arising would occur at different times, which is why the Hīnayāna distinguishes this statement. Now the Mahāyāna should say: When formations have arisen, immediately not yet destroyed—as in the fifty-second [fascicle], they may also pause during the stage of arising, which is established as abiding. As for difference: if one says that the alteration and destruction of this arisen phenomenon is called difference, this too is incorrect, because it would be a different thought-moment from the time of arising. If it were not yet altered at the time of arising and only later called difference when altered, then arising and difference would be at different times. Now one should say: with respect to the cessation of the previous, the momentary intrinsic nature of these arisen formations merely arises as distinct and different, which is called difference; that is, being different from the previous thought-moment is in all cases called difference. By this reasoning, arising and difference are simultaneous. As for cessation: if it were in the present simultaneously with difference and called cessation, then cessation would be a non-existent phenomenon, whereas abiding and difference are existent phenomena; how could an existent phenomenon simultaneously have a non-existent phenomenon? Therefore, this śāstra says: "From after the moment these formations arise, the momentary intrinsic nature of these very formations that have arisen ceases and perishes, which is correctly stated as cessation." That is, because when the existent phenomenon is gone, only upon reaching the past time is the characteristic of cessation established; thus arising and cessation are like light and darkness and are not simultaneous. It is asked: If so, then a single moment does not have the four characteristics. The commentary explains: The cessation of this phenomenon is the very time of the arising of this phenomenon, like the two ends of a balance scale, equal and level; therefore, a single moment has both arising and cessation. If so, why does it not speak of cessation first and then speak of arising? The commentary explains: Because it speaks from the beginning; since in the beginning there must be arising, all cessations are not prior, and arising occurs only after the final cessation. Question: The sūtras all speak of three conditioned characteristics; what are the three? The commentary explains: There are two meanings: first, subsuming abiding into difference; second, subsuming difference into abiding. As for subsuming abiding into difference: because abiding resembles the unconditioned. Furthermore, if one hears that phenomena have abiding, the mind revulsing conditioned phenomena will not be fierce; now saying there is only difference makes conditioned phenomena deeply revulsive. Because there is difference, unlike the unconditioned which has abiding, the characteristic of abiding is subsumed into the characteristic of difference. If according to the Hīnayāna, because difference can destroy the arisen phenomenon, its functional efficacy among characteristics is superior, whereas abiding can produce the subsequent arisen phenomenon and has no efficacy regarding cessation; therefore, abiding is subsumed into difference. The second explanation is subsuming difference into abiding. Because difference has efficacy in its own moment, having arisen and not yet destroyed, it is called abiding, and thus has efficacy; difference follows from being different from the previous phenomenon and has no efficacy in its own thought-moment, so difference is subsumed into abiding. Furthermore, difference accords with the characteristic of cessation and its intrinsic nature is not apparent, so difference is subsumed into abiding. If so, why is difference not subsumed into cessation? The commentary explains: Difference is an existent phenomenon, whereas cessation is a non-existent phenomenon; one is past and one is present; although their aspects bear similarities, it cannot be subsumed into the characteristic of cessation. See the notes on the fifty-third fascicle of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī and the third fascicle of the Maulī Bhūmi below.

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