瑜伽師地論略纂 13.44
瑜伽師地論略纂 13.44
- Language
- Classical Chinese
13.44
論解修習作意中云「若諸異生以緣轉識為境乃至內麁重縛所縛」者,此中汎解,不言入獨覺見道者,略而不論。又觀行同故,唯斷人執相似,若說聲聞,已說獨覺。此中言緣轉識為境者,違《攝論》文。彼云:菩薩初學應先學如實因緣。如實因緣者,即阿賴耶識。故相違也。一解云:其實菩薩地前作阿賴耶唯識,如《攝論》說。然通三乘前見道行故,名唯觀轉識。轉識中有雜染,故能緣之,非菩薩不緣第八。又皆緣第八作唯識,然入見諦已後,即緣本質第八,若能作唯識觀,此約後得智。若未入見諦,緣本質不若,無後得智故,緣自第六之影像,故名緣轉識,非謂本質中不緣第八。《攝論》約本質,此間約影像說,無過。聲聞等人類菩薩雙觀,入見諦已去,後得智起,方實緣阿賴耶,不然不緣。若前不緣第八,後如何得緣? 問曰:如何聲聞亦作此觀耶?述曰:若不定聲聞根已熟,要得入見諦已,方趣大乘,即容可作此觀得有;其根未熟,決定人入見道,則不然。此文約根已熟不定說,又約種子體說。三乘俱斷一切集、苦二諦,若有一法未達未偏知,我終不說得漏盡,得諦觀已,三乘同觀。若約名隨義別是作緣者,唯雙觀菩薩有,二乘非是。《攝論》等約體,此亦如是,故有一切皆達;若約名中義隨者,則無。二乘唯觀人我故,除一切煩惱障,菩薩雙除。二乘觀別,如前說。觀故達阿賴耶,如前說無異。又正解:菩薩能知第八,非二乘人。二乘人此中見道,依緣轉識觀,後入見諦,了知一切雜染及諸縛等。菩薩地前實緣第八,未緣著故,名緣轉識,後入見諦,緣阿賴耶。阿賴耶非二乘緣。
Where the treatise explains mental application in cultivation, saying: "If ordinary persons take the evolving consciousnesses as their cognitive object, down to: are bound by internal bonds of dauṣṭhulya": here it explains in general terms; that it does not mention entering the pratyekabuddha path of seeing is because it is abbreviated and not discussed. Furthermore, because their contemplative practice is the same, both uniquely severing the grasping of a person in a similar way, when the śrāvaka is mentioned, the pratyekabuddha is already mentioned. Here, stating that they "take the evolving consciousnesses as their cognitive object" contradicts the text of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. That text says: When a bodhisattva first trains, they should first train in real causal conditions. Real causal conditions refers to the ālayavijñāna. Thus they contradict each other. One explanation says: in fact, prior to the bhūmis, bodhisattvas practice consciousness-only with respect to the ālayavijñāna, as stated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. However, because this practice precedes the path of seeing common to the three vehicles, it is designated as contemplating only the evolving consciousnesses. There is defilement in the evolving consciousnesses, hence they can take them as cognitive objects; it does not mean that the bodhisattva does not take the eighth consciousness as a cognitive object. Furthermore, they all take the eighth consciousness as an object to practice consciousness-only; however, only after entering the perception of truth do they take the fundamental eighth consciousness as their cognitive object. If they can perform the contemplation of consciousness-only, this refers to the subsequently attained cognition. If they have not yet entered the perception of truth, their capacity to take the fundamental substance as an object is inadequate because they lack subsequently attained cognition; they take the reflected image of their own sixth consciousness as cognitive object, and thus it is designated as "taking the evolving consciousnesses as cognitive object"; it does not mean that among the fundamental objects they do not take the eighth as object. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha speaks in terms of the fundamental substance, whereas here it speaks in terms of the reflected image, so there is no fault. Those among the category of śrāvakas and bodhisattvas who perform dual contemplation: only after entering the perception of truth and having subsequently attained cognition arise do they truly take the ālayavijñāna as cognitive object; otherwise they do not take it as object. If they previously did not take the eighth consciousness as object, how could they take it as object later? Question: How can śrāvakas also perform this contemplation? The commentary explains: If an indeterminate śrāvaka whose faculties are already ripe must first enter the perception of truth before proceeding to the Mahāyāna, then they may feasibly have this contemplation; if their faculties are not yet ripe and they are of determinate lineage entering the path of seeing, then they do not. This text speaks in terms of the indeterminate lineage whose faculties are already ripe, and also speaks in terms of the substance of seeds. All three vehicles equally sever all of the two truths of origination and suffering: "If there were even a single dharma not realized and not completely known, I would never say that one attains the exhaustion of outflows." Once the contemplation of the truths is attained, all three vehicles contemplate identically. If it is about taking objects according to the distinction of conventional names following meanings, only the bodhisattva of dual contemplation has this, not the two vehicles. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other texts speak in terms of the substance, and so does this; therefore, they realize all. If it is according to meanings following conventional names, they do not. Because the two vehicles contemplate only the personal self, they eliminate all afflictive hindrances; the bodhisattva eliminates both [afflictive and cognitive hindrances]. The distinction of the contemplation of the two vehicles is as explained before. Through contemplation they realize the ālayavijñāna, with no difference from what was said before. Alternatively, the correct explanation is: the bodhisattva is able to know the eighth consciousness, whereas practitioners of the two vehicles are not. Here, the path of seeing for practitioners of the two vehicles contemplates by relying on the evolving consciousnesses as objects, and later, having entered the perception of truth, they fully know all defilements and various bonds. Prior to the bhūmis, the bodhisattva truly takes the eighth as an object, but not having yet directly apprehended it, it is called "taking the evolving consciousnesses as object"; later, entering the perception of truth, they take the ālayavijñāna as object. The ālayavijñāna is not an object for the two vehicles.
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- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation
Linked texts (1)
- 瑜伽論記 — Classical Chinese