瑜伽師地論略纂 13.61

13.61

「答：由彼意識亦緣去來識為境界，世現可得」等者，此世間相違。過未之識，十八界攝，意緣之時，非法處收，但是當曾六識界攝。緣過未世亦爾，雖假說名法，非法處收。緣空花等心亦起，此境亦非法處收，亦得假名緣法起意。應立量云：去來二世，意所緣境，諸色等法，非法處收，緣去來世識故，以意識之所行故，如去來世所緣六識。　問云：此是所緣緣不？答曰：影像當必唯識，三世攝故，是所緣緣。此本質無法，非是因果，影像可成因果。今就外執破，非大乘中影像不有諸識可行。　「有性安立有性，無性安立無性」等者，有性之法悉彈多。此云宗主行云意不自有業用，能持自體，令他識不行，自識得行。無性之法不能自有作業，唯有持，他識不行等，故名無性。緣無不知無故，便違自宗。廣大言論中無我觀，此無我本質無，如正智，即緣彼無，顯得真如；如加行智，即亦有影像當心。據本名無，影像言有。今以本質破外人，若影像是依他性，是何性攝？答：不相應中法同分攝。此乃與心同種，心之相分義，名法同分。非謂乃言緣無我境，直照本質，更不變生，即是無法攝。應同前解第一。言「共相觀」者，此就加行道語，或真如諸法共故名共，非能緣之心依共。又後得智上作此觀，故名共相。雖非如正智，亦名共相，心證解故名定。飲食等中言自相觀者，非自相、共相中自相，此是總言，共中說自。自者，自體相，即飲食自相，非如五識一一證知名自相。若言無我緣苦諦，苦諦即無我等者，此是苦有，何名我無？獨緣一切法我無，此何處攝？故知緣無。一一中皆應立量云：緣無色境，意識應轉，意所取故，如無我等。第五云言論中，本質亦無故，今時破，非大乘人心影像中自不變為生滅等相。應立量云：過去、未來應無有生，現在不收故，如兔角等；去來二世必不有滅，以無生故，如龜毛等。

Regarding 'Answer: Because that mental consciousness also takes past and future consciousness as its objective domain, as is visibly found in the world,' and so on: this contradicts worldly experience. Past and future consciousness is subsumed under the eighteen dhātus; when cognized by the intellect, it is not gathered under the sense-sphere of dharmas, but is only subsumed under the six consciousness-elements of the future and past. Cognizing the past and future times is also like this: although provisionally called dharmas, they are not gathered under the sense-sphere of dharmas. When the mind cognizing sky-flowers arises, this objective support is likewise not gathered under the sense-sphere of dharmas, yet it may also provisionally be called 'the intellect arising from cognizing a dharma'. One should formulate the syllogism: Phenomena such as material forms that are objective domains of the past and future periods cognized by the intellect are not gathered under the sense-sphere of dharmas, because they cognize past and future consciousness, because they are objects of activity of the mental consciousness, just like the six consciousnesses that are cognized objects of the past and future periods. Question: Is this an objective condition or not? Answer: The cognitive reflection must certainly be consciousness-only; because it is subsumed under the three periods, it is an objective condition. This original referent is a non-existent phenomenon and is neither cause nor effect, whereas the cognitive reflection can constitute cause and effect. Here we refute external attachments; it is not that in the Mahāyāna, the cognitive reflection does not exist as an accessible object for the consciousnesses. As for 'existent natures are established as existent natures, substanceless natures are established as substanceless natures,' and so forth: existent phenomena are siddhānta. This means the doctrinal authority practices... [meaning that] the mind does not have its own function, but can uphold its own substance, preventing other consciousnesses from operating, while its own consciousness can operate. Substanceless phenomena cannot have their own operations; they only have upholding, preventing other consciousnesses from operating, and so forth, and hence are called substanceless. Because in cognizing non-existence one does not know non-existence, one contradicts one's own school. In the vast discourse, the contemplation of non-self: this non-self lacks an original referent. Like fundamental non-conceptual wisdom, it directly cognizes that non-existence, revealing true thusness; like preparatory wisdom, it also has a cognitive reflection present to the mind. In terms of the original referent it is called non-existent, but in terms of the cognitive reflection it is called existent. Now we use the original referent to refute the outsider: if the cognitive reflection is dependent nature, under what nature is it subsumed? Answer: It is subsumed under the commonality of dharmas among the non-associated. This is of the same seed as mind, meaning the objective image of mind, termed the commonality of dharmas. It does not mean that cognizing the objective domain of non-self directly illuminates the original referent without transforming and generating [a reflection], thereby being subsumed under non-existent phenomena. It should follow the first explanation above. As for the 'contemplation of common characteristics', this speaks in terms of the path of preparation; or because true thusness is common to all phenomena it is called common, not that the cognizing mind relies on commonality. Furthermore, because this contemplation is produced on subsequently attained wisdom, it is called common characteristics. Although not like fundamental wisdom, it is also called common characteristics; because the mind directly realizes and understands it, it is called absorption. In speaking of 'contemplation of specific characteristics' with respect to food and drink, it is not the specific characteristics of specific versus common characteristics; this is a general statement, speaking of the specific within the common. 'Specific' refers to the characteristics of the entity itself, namely the specific characteristics of food and drink, not that each of the five consciousnesses directly realizes and knows it as a specific characteristic. If one says that non-self cognizes the truth of suffering, and that the truth of suffering is non-self, this means suffering exists—how could it be called the non-existence of self? Cognizing solely the non-existence of self in all phenomena—where is this subsumed? Hence we know that it cognizes non-existence. In each case one should formulate the syllogism: The mental consciousness should operate when cognizing the domain of non-material phenomena, because it is grasped by the mind, just like non-self and so on. In the discourse of Fascicle Five, the original referent is also non-existent; hence it is refuted at this time, not that in the Mahāyāna, people's mental reflections do not themselves transform into characteristics of arising and cessation. One should formulate the syllogism: Past and future must not possess arising, because they are not included in the present, just like rabbit horns; the two periods of past and future definitively do not possess cessation, because they lack arising, just like turtle hair.