瑜伽師地論略纂 14.65

14.65

論解有分別心、無分別心，同緣現在不中云「由三因故」等者，如《集量》、《理門論》云：五識唯現量，同時意識亦爾。今此中五識雖明了現量，不名有分別，不與尋伺等相應故；第六雖與五同緣現量，名為分別，以與尋伺相應故。若同緣現在，可得明了；若彼五識後意識，則不明了，緣過去故，如緣百千劫事，則不明了。如第五十一卷中破。今此第一因既言極明了，故知緣現在故，得有明了，非五識有緣過去復得明了。第二因與五同時，既於五境作意，故知亦緣現在。第三因「二依資養故」者，眼識有四依根，意識有五依根：四與眼同，第五加自。此謂意識依自根及眼根二依資養，方能緣現在；若唯依一自依，即緣境不明了。此據散，非定境。因此依眼為門取境名資養，非同眼識依根名資養。又如眼等善惡識起，必由意引方得；由意資眼識故，得有善惡，方知意眼同緣。

Regarding the treatise's explanation of whether conceptual and non-conceptual minds cognize the present simultaneously, stating 'due to three causes,' etc.: As the Pramāṇasamuccaya and Nyāyamukha state, the five consciousnesses are exclusively direct perception (pratyakṣa), and the simultaneous mental consciousness is likewise. Now, here, although the five consciousnesses are clear and direct perceptions, they are not called conceptual because they are not associated with vitarka and vicāra; although the sixth [mental consciousness] cognizes direct perceptions together with the five, it is called conceptual because it is associated with vitarka and vicāra. If they cognize the present simultaneously, clarity is attainable; but the mental consciousness that follows those five consciousnesses is not clear because it cognizes the past, just as when cognizing events of hundreds of thousands of kalpas, it is not clear, as refuted in the fifty-first fascicle. Now, since this first cause states 'extremely clear', we know that because it cognizes the present, clarity is attained; it is not that the five consciousnesses cognize the past and yet attain clarity. The second cause is being simultaneous with the five: since manaskāra is directed toward the five objects, we know that it also cognizes the present. The third cause is 'being nourished by two supports': the eye consciousness has four supporting faculties, and the mental consciousness has five supporting faculties: four are the same as the eye, and the fifth adds its own. This means that mental consciousness can only cognize the present when nourished by the two supports of its own faculty and the visual faculty; if it relies solely on its own single support, its cognition of the object is not clear. This is based on the distracted state, not on the meditative state. Taking the object by using the eye as a gateway is called 'nourishing'; it is not like the eye consciousness relying on its faculty being called 'nourishing'. Furthermore, when wholesome or unwholesome consciousnesses such as the visual [consciousness] arise, they must be induced by the mental [consciousness] to occur; because the mind nourishes the visual consciousness, wholesome and unwholesome arise, from which we know that the mental and visual [consciousnesses] cognize the same object.