瑜伽師地論略纂 15.120

15.120

論云「又有諸見，妄計自在、世主、釋梵及餘總類為常為恒，無有變易，如是邪見亦迷苦諦」者，此謂計梵王為常，不從我見後生，故是邪見。　問曰：此卷初云遍常論、一分常論等皆是邊見，即計梵王為常，如何此中乃言邪見？答曰：二說。若起我見，計梵王為我，後計為常，此常見我後生故，邊見收，如前文；此中約非我見後生者，此非常見故，邪見收，亦無違也。　問曰：凡夫伏修不伏見，此見是，何色界我見下界起耶？若是欲界我見等，如何緣色生？答曰：此我見是欲界繫，緣名為境故，得緣彼生。名者名字，聞彼名故而緣。又名者四蘊也，即是此心之相，離心無別體，故言緣名。　問曰：若爾，與欲見何別？答曰：至下緣境中更當知，廣釋差別二說。此遍常論皆名邪見，非我見後生，故前文言是邊見。及《梵網》、《對法》等云邊見攝者，似常見，體是邪見。夫言邊見，必我見後生故，故此中次前文云「即用如是我見為依止，於五蘊見我斷常」。斷常二見即唯我後起，此遍常論不緣為我，故非邊見，亦無此地薩迦耶見。不同經部緣壞而生，不同薩婆多緣有而起，此中以依他性為依止，計有遍計所執故。戒取中言隨順此見，即見取根境。此見隨法，即俱有心法等。又前為見取因，後為見取果也。　疑中云「此及所餘」者，謂此外道及餘有情於苦猶預，皆迷苦者也。　嗔中但有緣見云言，故知大乘見道之瞋，唯緣見起；緣有情事者，是修道嗔。又此且得緣見而生，非事中無。　問曰：何故集、道二諦下邊無邊見也？若

The treatise says: "Furthermore, there are various views that falsely grasp Īśvara, the Lord of the World, Śakra, Brahmā, and other general categories as permanent, eternal, and unchanging; such wrong views also err concerning the truth of suffering." This means that grasping King Brahmā as permanent does not arise subsequent to the view of self, and therefore it is a wrong view. Question: At the beginning of this fascicle it is said that the theory of universal permanence, the theory of partial permanence, and so forth are all extreme views; this being a grasp of King Brahmā as permanent, why is it called a wrong view here? Answer: There are two explanations. If one produces a view of self, grasping King Brahmā as self, and subsequently grasps him as permanent, this view of permanence arises subsequent to [the view of] self and is therefore subsumed under extreme view, as in the earlier text. Here, it is treated as not arising subsequent to the view of self; since this is not [properly] a view of permanence [rooted in self], it is subsumed under wrong view, so there is no contradiction. Question: Ordinary beings subdue [defilements abandoned by] cultivation but do not subdue [those abandoned by] seeing; of what [realm] is this view? Does a view of self belonging to the form realm arise in the lower realm? If it is a view of self belonging to the desire realm, how can it arise taking the form [realm] as its cognitive object? Answer: This view of self is bound to the desire realm; because it takes a name as its cognitive object, it can arise taking that [realm] as its object. "Name" means a verbal designation; because one hears their name, one takes it as an object. Furthermore, "name" refers to the four aggregates, which are precisely the nimitta of this very mind and have no separate substance apart from the mind; therefore it is said to take a name as its cognitive object. Question: If so, what distinction is there between it and a desire [realm] view? Answer: This will be further understood below under the discussion of cognitive objects, where two explanations of the differences are explained in detail. All these theories of universal permanence are termed wrong views; they do not arise subsequent to the view of self, which is why the earlier text said they are extreme views. And where the Brahmajāla-sūtra, the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and so forth say they are subsumed under extreme view, they resemble the view of permanence, but their substance is wrong view. Now, when an extreme view is spoken of, it must arise subsequent to a view of self. Therefore, the text immediately preceding this says: "Relying precisely on such a view of self, one sees the five aggregates as annihilated or permanent with respect to the self." The two views of annihilation and permanence arise solely after [the view of] self; these theories of universal permanence do not take [the aggregates] as a self, so they are not extreme views, nor is there a satkāyadṛṣṭi of this bhūmi here. This is unlike the Sautrāntikas, where it arises taking what is perishable as its object; nor is it like the Sarvāstivādins, where it arises taking what exists as its object; here, relying on paratantra-svabhāva, one falsely grasps parikalpita-svabhāva. The phrase in [the discussion of] the grasp of precepts and vows, "conforming with this view," refers to the root and cognitive object of the grasp of views. "Conforming dharmas of this view" refers to the co-arising mental factors and so forth. Moreover, the former is the cause of the grasp of views, and the latter is the fruit of the grasp of views. In [the discussion of] doubt, where it says "this and the rest," it refers to these non-Buddhists and other sentient beings who vacillate regarding suffering, all of whom err concerning suffering. In [the discussion of] anger, it only mentions taking views as its cognitive object; hence we know that in the Mahāyāna, anger of the path of seeing arises solely by taking views as its cognitive object; that which takes the affairs of sentient beings as its cognitive object is anger of the path of cultivation. Moreover, here it is stated provisionally that it can arise taking views as its cognitive object, not that it is entirely absent in matters of affairs. Question: Why is there no extreme view under the two truths of origination and the path? If