瑜伽師地論略纂 15.23

15.23

論破無心所唯心實中，此破經部師唯有心王一法，受、想、行心非別有體。今破之曰且說五蘊不成，無別想、受、行故，違經失也。設計有一心，前後分位別有受、想等，非一剎那中有受、想等。今破：若有無皆失。有生者，由此心相異故，便應同時得有實教，何故初剎那唯名識，第二念名受，三念名想？一心得有想異，故知由俱時心所法故，所以如此。應如緣可緣境，初念等即應名受，心知所緣故，如第二念。心無者，有分別位別，虛勞其功。計有別位量：汝言第二念心應不名受，作用無別故，如初念心。若計如六識，非俱時分位別有六，彼不同此，所依等別故，此心、心所法一處俱起，故不為例。「若言轉變」等者，如文可知。又心因緣、無心因緣無差別等者，前計云心分位立受、想、行心者，其心分位別因緣不可得。如起心緣一可愛境，初念即應起貪，乃至一切時未離此境已來應爾，何故初念名識，第二名受，第三名想？差別因緣無故。若無心所法，於一剎那心無差別因緣。言「若汝復謂以識為先，亦不應理」等者，外救云：何謂計貪與心俱？如緣可愛境時，初念名識，第二名貪，後貪染初念心何妨？今破云：差別因緣不可得故，緣一可愛故。　「燈明喻」者，燈明及炷喻同時心、心所法，貪等染心也。

In the treatise's refutation of [the view that] there are no mental factors (caitta) and that only mind (citta) is real, this refutes the Sautrāntikas, who hold that there is only the single phenomenon of the primary mind (cittarāja) and that the minds of feeling, conception, and volition do not have separate substances. Now, refuting it, [the treatise] says that, for one thing, the five aggregates cannot be established, because there would be no distinct conception, feeling, or volition, which is the fault of contradicting the scriptures. If it is postulated that there is one mind, and that its sequential states are distinctively feeling, conception, and so on, rather than feeling, conception, and so on existing within a single moment, now we refute this: whether [they are held to] exist or not exist, both involve error. If [such states] arise, then because this mental mark is distinct, a real teaching ought to exist simultaneously. Why would the first moment be termed only 'consciousness', the second moment 'feeling', and the third moment 'conception'? A single mind would contain distinct conceptions; thus we know that it is due to simultaneously existing mental factors that this is so. Just as in cognizing an object that can be cognized, the first moment and so on ought to be termed 'feeling' because the mind is aware of the cognitive object, just like the second moment. If [such a distinct] mind does not exist, then to distinguish separate states is merely wasted effort. A formal inference against the postulation of distinct states: 'The mind of the second moment, according to you, should not be termed feeling, because its function is not distinct, just like the mind of the first moment.' If it is postulated that, as with the six consciousnesses, it is not simultaneous but has six distinct states, that is not like this case: because their bases and so forth are distinct, whereas here mind and mental factors arise together at one locus; hence it cannot serve as an analogy. The statement, 'If it is said to be transformation,' etc., can be understood from the text. Furthermore, regarding the statement that there is no distinction between mental conditions and non-mental conditions, etc.: the earlier postulation said that the minds of feeling, conception, and volition are established according to states of the mind, yet distinctive conditions for those states of the mind cannot be found. For instance, when a mind arises taking an agreeable object as its cognitive condition, greed should arise in the very first moment, and so on throughout all times until one departs from this object; why should the first moment be called consciousness, the second feeling, and the third conception? Because there are no distinct conditions. If there are no mental factors, in a single moment of mind there can be no distinct conditions. As for the statement, 'If you again say that it is preceded by consciousness, this too is unreasonable,' etc.: the opponent's counter-defense says, 'Why do you say that we hold greed to be simultaneous with mind? Just as when one takes an agreeable object as a cognitive condition, the first moment is called consciousness, the second is called greed, so what is to prevent the subsequent greed from defiling the mind of the first moment?' Now we refute this: 'Because distinct conditions cannot be found, since they take the one agreeable object.' Regarding the 'analogy of the lamp flame': the flame and the wick symbolize the simultaneous mind and mental factors, with greed and so forth defiling the mind.