瑜伽師地論略纂 3.115

3.115

疑中，「唯用分別異覺為體」者，《唯識》二說。一云：疑體即慧，毘助末底，是疑義故；末底、般若，義無異故；猶豫簡擇，是疑義故。此名分別異覺為體，故疑即慧，是彼證文。二云：不然，別有自性，五見世俗，不說疑故，毘助若南，智應識故。由慧不決，名為分別異覺為體，性非即慧。

Regarding 'having solely differentiated cognition through discrimination as its essential nature' under doubt, the Vijñaptimātratā has two explanations. The first says: The essence of doubt is simply prajñā, because *vi-* assisting *mati* gives the meaning of doubt; because there is no difference in meaning between *mati* and *prajñā*; and because vacillating selection is the meaning of doubt. This is called having differentiated cognition through discrimination as its essential nature; hence, that doubt is simply prajñā is its textual proof. The second says: That is not so; it has a distinct intrinsic nature of its own, because doubt is not spoken of among the conventional worldly five views, and because *vi-* assisting *jñāna* means cognition would be consciousness. It is called having differentiated cognition through discrimination as its essential nature due to the indecisiveness of prajñā; its nature is not simply prajñā.