瑜伽師地論略纂 3.29

3.29

若相異者，性相實有，不應道理。此實說言，三世相異，離現在外者，去來二世性相實有，不應道理。量云：去來性相應非實有，異現在故，猶如兔角。大乘真如非定異現在，故無不定過。或因云現在無為所不攝故，宗、喻同前。

If their characteristics are different, that their nature and characteristics are substantially existent does not stand to reason. This actually means that if the characteristics of the three times are different, existing apart from the present, then that the nature and characteristics of the past and future times are substantially existent does not stand to reason. The formal inference is: "The nature and characteristics of the past and future should not be substantially existent; because they are different from the present; like the horns of a hare." In the Mahāyāna, tathatā is not definitively different from the present, so there is no fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). Or the reason may be: "because they are not subsumed under the unconditioned in the present," with the thesis and example being the same as before.