瑜伽師地論略纂 3.45

3.45

上來四文，不覺為前難訖。自下第二、思覺為先難，有五又字，即為五段。數論執我體唯受者，勝論執我通作、受者，下破作用，隨義應悉。第二難中，「若無常者，此所作因，體是變異，執有我」等者，所作者，生義。所作之因，體是變異無常之法，我是作者，仍言有常而有所作，不應道理。《顯揚論》云：執我有所作，不應道理。不說有常，今但言執我有。有通二義：一、有常；二、有所作。常有，量云：我應非常有，有所作故，如麁地等。若是常者，我應無所作，以是常故，如虛空等。常是正難，無常設遮。

The preceding four passages conclude the objection based on non-deliberation being prior. From here onward is the second: the objection based on deliberate cognition being prior, which contains five occurrences of "furthermore" (又), constituting five sections. The Sāṃkhyas hold that the self's essence is solely an experiencer (bhoktṛ), while the Vaiśeṣikas hold that the self encompasses both an agent (kartṛ) and an experiencer; the refutation of agency below should be understood according to the sense. In the second objection, "If it is impermanent, then the cause of this that is produced is fundamentally a mutating entity; yet clinging to an existent self...": "what is produced" means arising. The cause of what is produced is fundamentally a mutating, impermanent dharma; while the self is the agent, to still claim that it is permanent and yet produces something is unreasonable. The Prakaraṇāryavācā states: "Holding that the self has agency is unreasonable." It does not explicitly mention permanence, but now only speaks of "holding that the self exists." "Exists" encompasses two meanings: first, having permanence; second, having agency. In terms of permanent existence, the syllogism is: "The self should not be permanently existent; because it has agency; like coarse earth and so forth." If it were permanent, the self should lack agency, because it is permanent, like space and so forth. Permanence is the primary target of objection; impermanence is a hypothetical refutation.