瑜伽師地論略纂 3.44

3.44

徵破中有二：初別申十難、後總結之。　一、不覺為先難，難先任運知有我。　二、「世間所作，為以覺為因」下，思覺為先難，難前作意思量，「亦知有我」下，合難二。　三、「為即於蘊施設有我」下，於蘊假設難。　四、「所計之我，為即見者等相」下，於彼立為難。　五、「為與染淨相應」下，建立染淨難。　六、「為與流轉相相應」下，生死涅槃難。　七、「為由境界所生若苦若樂」下，作受解脫難。　八、「又汝今應說自所欲，為唯於我說為作者」下，施設有作難。　九、「又汝應說自意所欲，為唯於我建立於我」下，施設言說難。　十、「計我之見，為善不善」下，施設眾見難。　下結之中有十故字，應配此文。初難有四，又字即分為四。初難云「為即於所見事起薩埵覺」者，此師本計離蘊有我，故計所見色等為我，是顛倒覺，遮即蘊計。此違教失，無別比量。或即蘊計師云：執有我見，沈淪生死，言無我見，能證得涅槃。故於色等此有我者，名為顛倒。若彼異蘊計有我者，我有形量等，不應道理。彼離蘊我，或如身量、或如芥子，故有形量。此難我有色不成。　「有勝劣者，受用。剎帝利等者，想用。或愚智者，行用。或能取境界者，識用。故離蘊外，無別此能。」總立量云：離蘊之我應無形量等，互許離蘊故，如兔角等。　第二難云：「為唯由此法自體起此覺」等者，此意問：於所覺境自體起我覺，為於餘處？若於所覺法自體起我覺者，汝如何說即蘊計我名為顛倒？於所見色有形量等起我覺故，色即是我，故非離色而別有我，執色為我，故非顛倒。量云：汝執色我心應非顛倒，許順所緣故，如他心智等。　「若由餘體起此覺」等者，謂亦由心等起形量我覺，即於一切境界法起形量覺，非唯緣色；亦應緣色得有我勝劣等覺，非唯緣受等起於彼覺。境心二種便成雜亂，一色等境亦是受、想、行等覺因。量云：汝宗色等應是受等，起勝劣等覺故，如受等。餘一切量，准此應知。　第三難中，「若不緣起者，即非撥現量者，現量現見遠杌為人，便於無情起有情覺故。」不起者，名非現量。此中亦有世間相違，略故不說。此意難云：汝計緣色等得起受等覺，皆是真覺，非為倒覺；故於遠杌執為人覺，亦應非倒。此既顛倒，返成於無我妄起薩埵覺，計有於非情起薩埵覺故。　第四難云：「若取現量義者，唯色等蘊是現量義，我非現量義，不應理」者，義者境也。彼宗計我非現量境，今言現境是設遮，破唯五蘊是現量義，彼此共成。我非境義，汝宗自述；今言現境，乃是違宗。「此覺若取比量境」者，此我之覺，童稚上起，彼未能思，不能比度，不應率爾我覺得生。量云：嬰孩我覺應不得生，無思度故，如石女兒。總立量云：汝我俱非現比量境，無同喻故，如兔角等。

In the interrogation and refutation, there are two parts: first, stating the ten objections separately; second, concluding them as a whole. 1. The objection based on non-deliberation being prior, which challenges the previous assertion that one spontaneously knows there is a self. 2. Beginning with "Is worldly action caused by deliberation...", the objection based on deliberate cognition being prior, which challenges the previous assertion of deliberate reflection; and beginning with "one also knows there is a self", it combines the refutation of both. 3. Beginning with "Is a self hypothetically designated based on the aggregates...", the objection regarding hypothetical designation upon the aggregates. 4. Beginning with "Is the imputed self the characteristics of a seer and so forth...", the objection regarding positing [the self] upon those [aggregates]. 5. Beginning with "Is it associated with defilement and purification...", the objection regarding the establishment of defilement and purification. 6. Beginning with "Is it associated with the characteristics of saṃsāra...", the objection regarding saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. 7. Beginning with "Is either suffering or pleasure produced by objects...", the objection regarding acting, experiencing, and liberation. 8. Beginning with "Furthermore, you should now state your own position: is the self alone described as the agent...", the objection regarding the designation of an agent. 9. Beginning with "Furthermore, you should state your own intention: is 'self' established solely in reference to the self...", the objection regarding the designation of conventional speech. 10. Beginning with "Is the view that imputes a self wholesome or unwholesome...", the objection regarding the designation of manifold views. In the concluding section below, there are ten occurrences of the word "therefore," which correspond to these passages. The first objection has four parts, marked by four occurrences of the word "furthermore" (又). The first part states: "Does the cognition of a sentient being arise in reference to the very entity that is seen?" This master originally postulated that the self exists apart from the aggregates, and thus postulating that seen form and so forth are the self is an inverted cognition, which refutes the view that [the self] is identical to the aggregates. This is a flaw of contradicting scriptural teaching; there is no separate syllogism. Alternatively, the proponent of the identical-aggregates view says: "Clinging to the view of self leads to sinking in saṃsāra; speaking of the view of selflessness enables one to realize nirvāṇa. Therefore, [positing] that this self exists on form and so forth is called inverted. If they postulate a self separate from the aggregates, that the self has spatial dimensions and so forth would be unreasonable. Their self separate from the aggregates is either the size of the body or like a mustard seed, and therefore possesses spatial dimensions." This challenges the assertion that the self possesses form as unproven. "Possessing superiority and inferiority is the function of sensation. Being a kṣatriya and so forth is the function of conception. Being foolish or wise is the function of volition. Being able to grasp objects is the function of consciousness. Therefore, apart from the aggregates, there is no separate capability of this kind." The overall syllogism is stated: "The self separate from the aggregates should be devoid of spatial dimensions and the like; because both parties accept that it is separate from the aggregates; like a rabbit's horn." The second objection states: "Does this cognition arise solely from the intrinsic nature of this dharma..." This means to ask: does the cognition of a self arise from the intrinsic nature of the cognized object, or elsewhere? If the cognition of a self arises from the intrinsic nature of the cognized dharma, how can you say that postulating a self as identical to the aggregates is inverted? Since one gives rise to the cognition of self toward seen form that has spatial dimensions, form is precisely the self, and thus there is no separate self apart from form; clinging to form as the self is therefore not inverted. The syllogism is: "Your cognition that takes form as the self should not be inverted; because it is accepted to conform to its ālambana; just like knowledge of another's mind." In "If this cognition arises from another entity...", it means that the cognition of a self possessing spatial dimensions would also arise from the mind and so forth, which means that the cognition of spatial dimensions would arise in reference to all objective dharmas, not solely by taking form as its condition; one should also be able to have cognitions of the self's superiority and inferiority by taking form as its condition, and not only give rise to those cognitions by taking sensation and so forth as conditions. The two categories of object and mind would then become confused, and a single object such as form would also be the causal condition for cognitions of sensation, conception, volition, and so forth. The syllogism is: "In your system, form and so forth should be sensation and so forth; because they give rise to cognitions of superiority, inferiority, and so forth; just like sensation and so forth." All other syllogisms should be understood by analogy with this. In the third objection, "If it does not arise conditionally, it would deny direct perception (pratyakṣa), for through direct perception one actually sees a distant post as a person, and thereby gives rise to the cognition of a sentient being toward an inanimate object." What does not arise is called non-direct-perception. Here there is also a contradiction with worldly consensus, but it is omitted for brevity. The meaning of this objection is: you postulate that giving rise to cognitions of sensation and so forth by taking form as a condition are all true cognitions and not inverted cognitions; therefore, the cognition of clinging to a distant post as a person should also not be inverted. Since this [post-cognition] is inverted, it conversely proves that one falsely gives rise to the cognition of a sentient being toward what is selfless, because of postulating [a sentient being] and giving rise to the cognition of a sentient being toward inanimate objects. The fourth objection states: "If it apprehends an object of direct perception, only the aggregates of form and so forth are objects of direct perception, while the self is not an object of direct perception, which is unreasonable." "Artha" (義) means object (viṣaya). That system posits that the self is not an object of direct perception; now stating that it is a direct-perception object is a hypothetical refutation, demonstrating that only the five aggregates are objects of direct perception, which is established mutually between both parties. That the self is not such an object is their own system's assertion; now stating it is an object of direct perception contradicts their own school. As for "If this cognition apprehends an object of inference (anumāna)", this cognition of self arises even in young infants; since they are not yet capable of deliberate reflection and cannot infer, the cognition of self should not abruptly arise in them. The syllogism is: "The cognition of self in an infant should not be able to arise; because it lacks deliberate reflection; like the child of a barren woman." The overall syllogism is stated: "Your self is neither an object of direct perception nor of inference; because of the absence of a concordant example; like a rabbit's horn."