瑜伽師地論略纂 3.70

3.70

「若言無者，有一想已，後種種想」等者，此下合難想、受作我無變異義，以有想十六見為難：十二見想作，四見受作。　一想者，八十七云：在空無邊處、識無邊處；種種想者，謂在下地。狹小想，即種種想；無量想，即是一想。無所有處亦是一想，非無量想，略故不說。又執少色為我，想為我所，想與彼合，名為少想，《瑜伽》故指在種種想地；執無量色為我，想為我所等，名無量想，《瑜伽》故指在於一想。然八十七云：如其次第，前二有後二，然逆次第，非順次第，義理推故。此難前想所作無變異我。「純有樂」等者，八十七云：有樂，在下三靜慮；有苦，在捺落迎；有苦有樂，在鬼、傍生、人、欲界天；不苦不樂，在第四靜慮已上諸地。此難前受所作無變異，又想論中八句。

Regarding the passage beginning, "If it is said to be non-existent, then having had a single ideation, there are afterwards diverse ideations," and so forth: from here below, [the text] collectively refutes the view that the self produced by ideation (saṃjñā) and feeling (vedanā) is without variation, presenting objections by means of the sixteen views of conscious existence (saṃjñi-vāda): twelve views concerning what is produced by ideation, and four views concerning what is produced by feeling. Regarding "a single ideation," Fascicle Eighty-seven states that it is in the Sphere of Infinite Space and the Sphere of Infinite Consciousness. "Diverse ideations" refers to [ideations] in the lower bhūmis. "Limited ideation" is precisely "diverse ideations"; "immeasurable ideation" is precisely "a single ideation." The Sphere of Nothingness is also "a single ideation" and not "immeasurable ideation"; it is not mentioned due to abridgment. Furthermore, grasping limited form as the self and ideation as belonging to the self, when ideation accords with that, it is called "limited ideation"; hence the Yogācārabhūmi points to its being in the bhūmis of diverse ideation. Grasping immeasurable form as the self and ideation as belonging to the self, and so on, is called "immeasurable ideation"; hence the Yogācārabhūmi points to its being in a single ideation. However, Fascicle Eighty-seven states: "In regular order, the former two have the latter two"; yet it is in reverse order, not direct order, as deduced by reasoned principle. This refutes the former [assertion] of an invariant self produced by ideation. Regarding the passage beginning with "purely having pleasure" and so forth: Fascicle Eighty-seven states that having pleasure is in the lower three dhyānas; having suffering is in the narakas; having both suffering and pleasure is among hungry ghosts, animals, humans, and the gods of the desire realm; neither suffering nor pleasure is in the fourth dhyāna and the higher bhūmis. This refutes the former [assertion] of invariance produced by feeling, and also [constitutes] the eight propositions in the treatise on ideation.