瑜伽師地論略纂 3.72

3.72

「又若見少色少非色」者，彼計我有邊，計色非色二俱是我，但見少故，名為有邊；見彼二無量，便起第二計我無邊；見色我少，非色我無量，或翻見此，便計第三我亦有邊亦無邊；第四句翻此可知，文別義同，更無別理。或翻第三別有自體，謂得涅槃解脫之我，遠離二種，名非有邊非無邊。此四為先，死後皆生諸有想地，故十六論合難想、受所作我體無變異義。若無變異，云何有此變異不同？唯難想、受二所變異，無想俱非，故略不說。後二四句與無想八及俱非八，初執我同，但是死後，如前所說，生地有異，無多別故，略而不說。

Regarding "Furthermore, if one sees limited form and limited non-form": they posit that the self has an end; positing that both form and non-form are the self, but seeing merely what is limited, it is called "having an end." Seeing those two as immeasurable, one then gives rise to the second view, positing that the self is endless. Seeing that the form-self is limited while the formless-self is immeasurable, or reversing this view, one then posits the third [view], that the self both has an end and is endless. The fourth proposition can be known by reversing this; the phrasing differs but the meaning is the same, with no other distinct principle. Or, reversing the third, there is separately a distinct essence: namely, the self that attains nirvāṇa and liberation, being divorced from both types, is called "neither having an end nor endless." Having these four as antecedents, after death they are all born in the realms possessing ideation. Therefore, the sixteen treatises collectively refute the view that the substance of the self produced by ideation and feeling is without variation. If it is without variation, how could there be these differing variations? It only refutes the variations produced by the two of ideation and feeling; non-ideation and neither [ideation nor non-ideation] are therefore omitted and not discussed. The latter two sets of four propositions, along with the eight of non-ideation and the eight of neither, are identical to the initial grasping of the self; it is only that after death, as previously explained, their realms of rebirth differ; because there are not many distinctions, they are omitted and not discussed.