瑜伽師地論略纂 3.83

3.83

自在等作中，文亦有四。敘宗中，「士夫」即補特伽羅。　「丈夫」即神我也，能造作故。　「自在等」者，自在即大自在天，等謂《唯識》所云大梵、時、方、本際、自然、虛空、我等。　頌中，「功能無體性」者，難彼功能，理不成熟，名無體性。《顯揚》十四更有轉計，恐繁不述。　「若有用者，則於彼用無有自在，而於世間有自在」者，用謂自在，所須作用且如人天有妙欲故，可言有用。三惡趣等，諸無用具，此等現前，如何自在？於地獄等，不須自在現前故。　「若無用者」，於自在天都無所須而生世間，是則自在乃有癡狂愚癡之過，故非道理。　「若唯用大自在為因」等者，大自在天無始已有，出所生法亦無始成，故非自在天能生諸法。如牛兩角俱時出生，一果一因，便違正理。故《顯揚》十四云：如自在體本來常有，世間亦爾，不應更生，以俱有故，無用新生。「若言亦取餘為因」者，此因不可得故，現、比二量等此因無，如兔角等，故非別有。有時起善、或起不善，有時有樂欲、或時無樂欲，故非自在。《顯揚》十四縱有因云：若亦言少待其餘因者，此所待因若無有因，一切世間亦應如是；若有餘因，世間亦爾，從餘因生，何須自在？彼更有徵，恐繁且止。

In [the section on] creation by Īśvara and the like, the text also has four parts. In recounting their school: "person" (śitfu) means pudgala. "Man" (zhàngfu) means the puruṣa, because it can create. As for "Īśvara and the like": Īśvara is Maheśvara; "and the like" refers to what the Vijñaptimātratā mentions as Mahābrahmā, time, space, the ultimate limit, nature, space, self, and so on. In the verse, as for "the function has no real nature": this challenges that function of theirs, pointing out that logically it cannot be established, hence it is called having no real nature. The fourteenth fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā presents further variant positions, but for fear of prolixity I will not recount them. As for "if it has a function, then there would be no mastery over that function, while there would be mastery over the world": "function" means the required operation of Īśvara. For instance, because humans and gods have exquisite desires, one can say there is a function. But in the three bad destinies and the like, all lack useful implements; when these appear, how could there be mastery? Because in the hells and the like, there is no need for Īśvara to appear. As for "if it has no function": if without any need at Īśvara's part, he produces the world, then Īśvara would incur the fault of delusion and madness, and thus it is irrational. As for "if one uses only Maheśvara as the cause," etc.: Maheśvara has existed from beginningless time, and the produced dharmas would also have been accomplished from beginningless time; therefore, it cannot be that Īśvara produces all dharmas. Like two horns of an ox arising simultaneously, having one fruit and one cause would contradict correct logic. Thus the fourteenth fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā says: "Just as the substance of Īśvara is inherently permanent, so too would be the world; it should not arise anew, because they co-exist, so there is no use for new arising." As for "if one says that it also takes others as causes": because this cause cannot be apprehended, it is absent in both direct perception and inference, like the horn of a hare, so there is no separate entity. Sometimes good arises, or unwholesome arises; sometimes there is desire, or sometimes no desire; thus it is not Īśvara. The fourteenth fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā, conceding [the premise], says: "If you also say that it slightly depends on other causes, then if those depended-upon causes have no cause, all worlds should also be like this; if they have other causes, the world would also be like this, arising from other causes, so what need is there for Īśvara?" There are further inquisitions there, but for fear of prolixity I will pause here.