瑜伽師地論略纂 3.83

3.83

In [the section on] creation by Īśvara and the like, the text also has four parts. In recounting their school: "person" (śitfu) means pudgala. "Man" (zhàngfu) means the puruṣa, because it can create. As for "Īśvara and the like": Īśvara is Maheśvara; "and the like" refers to what the Vijñaptimātratā mentions as Mahābrahmā, time, space, the ultimate limit, nature, space, self, and so on. In the verse, as for "the function has no real nature": this challenges that function of theirs, pointing out that logically it cannot be established, hence it is called having no real nature. The fourteenth fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā presents further variant positions, but for fear of prolixity I will not recount them. As for "if it has a function, then there would be no mastery over that function, while there would be mastery over the world": "function" means the required operation of Īśvara. For instance, because humans and gods have exquisite desires, one can say there is a function. But in the three bad destinies and the like, all lack useful implements; when these appear, how could there be mastery? Because in the hells and the like, there is no need for Īśvara to appear. As for "if it has no function": if without any need at Īśvara's part, he produces the world, then Īśvara would incur the fault of delusion and madness, and thus it is irrational. As for "if one uses only Maheśvara as the cause," etc.: Maheśvara has existed from beginningless time, and the produced dharmas would also have been accomplished from beginningless time; therefore, it cannot be that Īśvara produces all dharmas. Like two horns of an ox arising simultaneously, having one fruit and one cause would contradict correct logic. Thus the fourteenth fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā says: "Just as the substance of Īśvara is inherently permanent, so too would be the world; it should not arise anew, because they co-exist, so there is no use for new arising." As for "if one says that it also takes others as causes": because this cause cannot be apprehended, it is absent in both direct perception and inference, like the horn of a hare, so there is no separate entity. Sometimes good arises, or unwholesome arises; sometimes there is desire, or sometimes no desire; thus it is not Īśvara. The fourteenth fascicle of the Prakaraṇāryavācā, conceding [the premise], says: "If you also say that it slightly depends on other causes, then if those depended-upon causes have no cause, all worlds should also be like this; if they have other causes, the world would also be like this, arising from other causes, so what need is there for Īśvara?" There are further inquisitions there, but for fear of prolixity I will pause here.