瑜伽師地論略纂 7.5

7.5

自相有法，文分為三：初標列、次別釋、後結成。　「勝義相有」，謂即真如，根本智得，非安立相。　「相狀相有」，即依他性。　「現在相有」，唯現在世，非於去來。　現在有中要具四義，方是自相有法。謂諸假法略有三種：一、聚集假，如瓶盆等；二、相續假，謂於三世立一有情，于今不斷，義即是彼；三、分位假，謂不相應等。今非此三，故自相有。　「一、於是處，名可得」者，謂依他性。後得智證雖離名言，以名詮之，立名相順，非知真如不順於名，故名可得，簡圓成實性。　「事可得」者，簡所執性，雖有其名，無體事故。　「此名於此事，非不決定」者，簡分位假，此名唯目於此事故。如所見青等，名定目彼，非如熱病見青謂黃。熱病患時，其名不定，迷亂故然，名不決定。亦如瞋等，名常決定；非如忿等，後轉變時便失彼名。由彼無常，不決定故，名不決定。初不決定，心分位假；後不決定，境分位假。又二不定，翻顯於定，非分位假。　「此名於此事，無礙隨轉」者，謂色等名，若聚若散，名常隨轉；非如瓶等，於聚集處，其名隨轉，於離散處，名即退還。返顯名於無礙隨轉，簡聚集假。　「現在相有者」，簡相續假，若現已生，為未來因，為過去果，方是自相有法。

For phenomena existent by intrinsic characteristic (svalakṣaṇa), the text is divided into three: first, marking out and listing; second, distinct explanation; third, concluding establishment. "Existence by ultimate characteristic" refers to suchness (tathatā), which is attained by fundamental knowledge (mūlajñāna) and is unconstructed in characteristic. "Existence by phenomenal characteristic" refers to the other-dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva). "Existence by present characteristic" refers solely to the present time, not the past or future. To exist in the present, it must possess four meanings before it qualifies as a phenomenon existent by intrinsic characteristic. Conventional phenomena (prajñaptidharma) are briefly of three kinds: first, nominal aggregations, such as pots and bowls; second, nominal continuities, such as designating a single sentient being across the three times, which continues uninterrupted until now, meaning it is that; third, nominal states, such as the non-associated formations. Now, since it is not these three, it exists by intrinsic characteristic. Regarding "first, at this locus, a name is obtainable": this refers to the other-dependent nature. Although the realization of subsequent knowledge (pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna) is free from names and words, when expressing it through names, establishing a name conforms with it; it is not like realizing suchness, which does not conform to names; hence a name is obtainable, which excludes the consummate nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva). Regarding "a real thing is obtainable": this excludes the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), for although there is a name, there is no real entity. Regarding "this name is not indeterminate regarding this real thing": this excludes nominal states, because this name designates solely this real thing. Just as the blue color seen is determinately designated by that name, unlike someone afflicted with fever who sees blue and calls it yellow. When afflicted with fever, the name is indeterminate; because of confusion and disorder, the name is indeterminate. It is also like anger, whose name is constantly determinate; unlike rage, which, when transforming later, loses that name. Because of its impermanence and lack of determination, the name is indeterminate. The first indeterminacy is a nominal state of mind; the second indeterminacy is a nominal state of the object. Moreover, the two indeterminacies, by contrast, reveal determinacy, which is not a nominal state. Regarding "this name conforms unobstructed to this real thing": the names of matter (rūpa) and so forth conform constantly whether aggregated or dispersed; it is not like a pot, whose name conforms where it is aggregated, but where it is dispersed, the name is withdrawn. Revealing conversely that the name conforms unobstructed excludes nominal aggregations. Regarding "existent by present characteristic": this excludes nominal continuities; only if it is already arisen in the present, serving as a cause for the future and an effect of the past, is it a phenomenon existent by intrinsic characteristic.