瑜伽師地論略纂 7.5

7.5

For phenomena existent by intrinsic characteristic (svalakṣaṇa), the text is divided into three: first, marking out and listing; second, distinct explanation; third, concluding establishment. "Existence by ultimate characteristic" refers to suchness (tathatā), which is attained by fundamental knowledge (mūlajñāna) and is unconstructed in characteristic. "Existence by phenomenal characteristic" refers to the other-dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva). "Existence by present characteristic" refers solely to the present time, not the past or future. To exist in the present, it must possess four meanings before it qualifies as a phenomenon existent by intrinsic characteristic. Conventional phenomena (prajñaptidharma) are briefly of three kinds: first, nominal aggregations, such as pots and bowls; second, nominal continuities, such as designating a single sentient being across the three times, which continues uninterrupted until now, meaning it is that; third, nominal states, such as the non-associated formations. Now, since it is not these three, it exists by intrinsic characteristic. Regarding "first, at this locus, a name is obtainable": this refers to the other-dependent nature. Although the realization of subsequent knowledge (pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna) is free from names and words, when expressing it through names, establishing a name conforms with it; it is not like realizing suchness, which does not conform to names; hence a name is obtainable, which excludes the consummate nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva). Regarding "a real thing is obtainable": this excludes the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), for although there is a name, there is no real entity. Regarding "this name is not indeterminate regarding this real thing": this excludes nominal states, because this name designates solely this real thing. Just as the blue color seen is determinately designated by that name, unlike someone afflicted with fever who sees blue and calls it yellow. When afflicted with fever, the name is indeterminate; because of confusion and disorder, the name is indeterminate. It is also like anger, whose name is constantly determinate; unlike rage, which, when transforming later, loses that name. Because of its impermanence and lack of determination, the name is indeterminate. The first indeterminacy is a nominal state of mind; the second indeterminacy is a nominal state of the object. Moreover, the two indeterminacies, by contrast, reveal determinacy, which is not a nominal state. Regarding "this name conforms unobstructed to this real thing": the names of matter (rūpa) and so forth conform constantly whether aggregated or dispersed; it is not like a pot, whose name conforms where it is aggregated, but where it is dispersed, the name is withdrawn. Revealing conversely that the name conforms unobstructed excludes nominal aggregations. Regarding "existent by present characteristic": this excludes nominal continuities; only if it is already arisen in the present, serving as a cause for the future and an effect of the past, is it a phenomenon existent by intrinsic characteristic.