瑜伽師地論略纂 12

English (machine translation) 12

Language: English

This chapter is the fifteenth chapter within the third section on training, and the ninth chapter within being able to train in this way. As for their intrinsic nature, the factors of bodhi are only thirty-seven; whatever can realize bodhi is called a factor of bodhi. The fifteen categories here are all such. Being explained extensively here, it is called the Chapter on the Factors of Bodhi. Question: Why is it explained after the Chapter on Offerings? The preceding Chapter on Offerings subsumes the skillful means of cultivation; the distinct practices that accomplish the present path through cultivation are called the factors of bodhi, and therefore it is explained next.

12.3

In the treatise's explanation of the four bases of shame and conscience, the fourth says: "If bodhisattvas generate shame over their own arising bad conduct that has a basis, following after them without abandoning them, know that this is called...", etc. "Bad conduct having a basis" means that from the third [basis], having committed an evil one repents, but having repented commits it again; the later deed relies upon the earlier deed, and therefore it is called having a basis.

12.4

In the treatise's explanation of the five defilements, the Dharma Master says: Regarding the substance, [as for] the defilement of life span, the Mahāyāna provisionally establishes the vital faculty based on the continuous sustaining non-death of the ālaya-vijñāna, and it is precisely this vital faculty that constitutes the substance of the defilement of life span. Second, regarding the defilement of sentient beings, the lower explanation says that failing to recognize parents, śramaṇas, or brāhmaṇas takes lack of faith as its nature; failing to recognize the heads of households and elders takes arrogance and conceit as its substance; lacking fear of the sins of this and future lives takes ignorance as its substance; and failing to cultivate wholesome [deeds] and the like takes indolence as its substance. Thus, five dharmas constitute the substance of the defilement of sentient beings—namely, lack of faith, conceit, arrogance, ignorance, and indolence. If [taken as] the simultaneous five aggregates, the five aggregates collectively constitute the substance. Third, regarding the defilement of affliction, excluding [wrong] views and the previous five, the remaining afflictions constitute the substance of this defilement. As for the defilement of view, this refers to the five views; examining the meaning of the lower text, it truly takes the false views within the inner teachings as its substance, which is incorrect knowledge. Regarding the defilement of the kalpa, it refers to famine and pestilence, which take two factors of touch as their substance; weapons [and warfare] take the four māras or the five aggregates as the substance of the kalpa. Distinguishing among the three realms, it is exclusively in the desire realm, and exclusively in Jambudvīpa. The three [calamities] of famine and the rest arise successively starting from [the human life span of] thirty, twenty, and ten years. As for the path that can remedy the five defilements:

12.5

As for the treatise's stating that "moreover, the bodhisattvas truly know the destruction and formation of the vessel worlds," this means knowing the twenty kalpas of destruction, the twenty kalpas of formation, and so forth.

12.6

As for the treatise stating that "moreover, the bodhisattvas, with regard to that world, with regard to the origin of the world," and so on, this is the contemplation of the world through eight kinds of aspects. "With regard to that world" refers to the truth of suffering. "With regard to the origin of the world" refers to the truth of origin. "The cessation of the world" is the truth of cessation. "With regard to the practices leading toward the origin of the world" means that craving is the truth of origin, and feeling can generate craving, so feeling is the practice leading toward origin. "The practices leading toward the cessation of the world" refers to the truth of the path. "With regard to the gratification and danger of that world" is to re-contemplate the truth of origin and suffering. "As well as the renunciation" is to re-contemplate the truth of cessation. Question: Why is the truth of origin re-contemplated three times, while the truth of suffering and the truth of cessation are re-contemplated twice? Explanation: Suffering and origin are deeply repulsive, so one contemplates them two or three times; cessation is exceedingly desirable, so one also re-contemplates it. Furthermore, of the former five contemplations among the four truths, only origin is re-contemplated in terms of the practice leading toward origin; this means that because craving is deeply repulsive, it is therefore re-contemplated. Previously, the four truths were contemplated separately; below, the four truths are re-contemplated. Gratification refers to the truth of origin, or perhaps the truth of suffering. Danger refers to the truth of suffering, or perhaps the truth of origin. Renunciation refers to the two untainted truths, forming a single contemplation.

12.7

As for the treatise stating "because bodhisattvas truly know the distinct types of transmigration of the world," this concludes the previous distinct types of transmigration, such as the five defilements. "And the distinct types of transmigration of the vessel world" concludes the previously mentioned twenty kalpas of formation, twenty kalpas of destruction, and so forth. "And the meaning of contemplating the world through eight kinds of aspects" concludes the previous eight aspects of contemplating the four truths. "And whatever ultimate truth there is of all worlds" concludes the previous [teaching that there are] only forms and the like. Question: Why is it called the ultimate truth? Explanation: If one does not know its meaning, and grasps it according to the name, this is conventional; once one knows that there is only its name and does not give rise to grasping, it is therefore called the world.

12.8

As for the treatise stating that "they can thoroughly keep far away from the fourteen defiling actions," the old [commentary] said that the six directions, the four bad friends, and the four good friends constitute the fourteen defiling actions. According to the Dīrgha-āgama, it is completely different from these six directions and the like. There are four of body and speech—killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, and false speech—and one does not commit evil based on these four; there are four causes of evil, namely, greed, anger, delusion, and fear, and one does not give rise to evil actions based on these four; and one keeps away from the six dharmas of squandering wealth, namely, addiction to liquor, gambling, licentiousness, infatuation with theatrical entertainments, harming one another through bad friends, and gradually complying with whatever they say. Among these six, each has six kinds, which cannot be cited in detail. Regarding "hiding the six directions," it is also as said in the Dīrgha-āgama: In the city of Rājagṛha there was the son of an elder named Singāla. Handed down across generations, in the early morning he constantly bowed to the six directions, bringing together the six spirits to constantly protect the family estate so that whatever was done would be successful. Suddenly, at that time he met the Buddha, who asked: "Is there such a Dharma?" He replied: "There is, but it is not the same as yours. Parents are the east; teachers and elders are the south; wife and children are the west; friends and relatives are the north; servants and attendants are the nadir; and śramaṇas of eminent virtue are the zenith." Within the six directions each has five matters, which cannot be cited in detail; it is explained at length as in that sūtra. By constantly hiding within these six directions, one does not give rise to arrogance or haughtiness; if one can abide in these six directions, it is therefore called hiding away. Regarding "keeping far away from the four bad friends," it is also as said there: first, a bad friend who seems affectionate, whom one yields to out of fear, but who truly has no affectionate intent; second, a bad friend of fine words, whose speech is compliant but whose intention is contrary; third, a bad friend of respectful compliance, whose mind, though respectful and compliant, nevertheless follows along with whatever wholesome or unwholesome actions are done, having no heart to admonish; fourth, a bad friend who is a companion in evil deeds, such as drinking liquor, gambling, debauchery, singing and dancing, and the like. Among these four, each has four kinds, which cannot be cited in detail. It is said that these four are hateful and one must keep far away from them.

12.9

Regarding "embracing the four good friends," it means that these four are worthy of intimacy and one should be intimate with them. As that sūtra says: first, a friend who restrains from wrongdoing, who restrains one in evil matters; second, a compassionate friend, who pities one in painful matters; third, a friend who benefits others, who shares with one in joyful matters; fourth, a companion friend, who is united with one in wholesome matters. Within each one there are four kinds, which cannot be cited in detail; it is explained at length as in that sūtra.

12.10

As for the treatise stating "as explained in the Singālaka-sūtra," this is translated as "topknot-holder," meaning the topknot on the head. Alternatively, śikhā means "topknot" and laka means "holding a topknot"—that is, holding a topknot. This is one of the eight names, as in the Dīrgha-āgama, or perhaps his childhood name as an ordinary being.

12.11

As for the treatise stating that "bodhisattvas accomplish such dharmas as are truly to be known in their world and as are truly to be turned in their world," this concludes above what is truly to be known through feeling, concluding the truths of conditions and so forth. The above eight aspects should correspond to and conclude the text below.

12.12

Fascicle Forty-Five

12.13

Regarding the treatise's explanation of the four reliances, according to various sūtras and treatises, the order is not uniform. As in the Nirvāṇa-sūtra, the order is explained by tracing from fruit back to cause. Namely, suchness is the fruit; one may rely on the true fruit, but cannot rely on a person. Then, the wisdom that takes suchness as its object is called the meaning; one may rely on this meaning, but cannot rely on words. Then, because of this wisdom, subsequent attainment arises to preach the Dharma; one may rely on this wisdom, but cannot rely on consciousness. Having heard the Dharma, one may rely on the explicit meaning, but cannot rely on the non-explicit meaning. Furthermore, tracing conversely from cause to fruit, one takes the Dharma as the realization of suchness, and wisdom is the causal meaning; taking suchness as the fruit, one may rely on the explicit meaning. That is, one first contemplates the cause, and only afterward contemplates wisdom, not relying on consciousness. Now, these five layers cannot be recorded in detail; the present text represents the third layer of explanation, which can be known from the text.

12.14

Regarding the treatise's "relying on the explicit sūtras, not relying on the non-explicit," and so forth: the term "meaning of original nature" refers to the substance of the nature of all dharmas. To say that consciousness has eight kinds is the original nature of consciousness. Because the non-explicit teachings of the Hīnayāna do not speak of this, they are also unable to explicitly understand its original nature.

12.15

Regarding the treatise's explanation of relying on wisdom and not relying on consciousness, and so forth: hearing and reflection are wisdom; why does one not rely on them? Explanation: Although they are wisdom, they are distracted wisdom; because they are not yet complete, they cannot be relied upon. If that is so, worldly [wisdom] should not be relied upon. Explanation: It also cannot be relied upon; for now they are contrasted among the three prajñās. As for what is not relied upon now, the treatise speaks only of hearing and reflection, but within the true wisdom cultivated [through meditation], there are also those that are not relied upon.

12.16

As for the treatise stating "it is not that one only recognizes the meaning of dharmas through hearing and reflection, and does not truly realize wisdom," and so forth: this means that it is not that hearing and reflection merely recognize the meaning of dharmas and do not rely on true realization wisdom. Furthermore, it is not that this passage on hearing and reflection does not rely on the rest, but rather that because hearing and reflection merely recognize the meaning of dharmas, one does not further rely on true realization wisdom.

12.17

In the treatise's general conclusion, it says that it briefly reveals four layers, namely: the explained meaning, the correct principle, the Great Master, and the true realization wisdom of the wisdom resulting from cultivation. These are matched in order to the former four reliances. The second, the Great Master, corresponds to the above "relying on the Dharma and not relying on the person." Regarding "relying on the Dharma and not relying on the person," what is called the Great Master? Although he is the Great Master here—the Great Master meaning the Buddha—what he says must also not simply be believed, but must abide in the Dharma. Furthermore, if what the Great Master says were not the correct principle, it is therefore with the words "Great Master" that it concludes "rely on the Dharma and not on the person."

12.18

In the treatise's explanation of the four unobstructed knowledges: as for the Dharma, because it is the teaching that can express, the treatise says "with regard to all dharmas and all distinct approaches," where "distinct approaches" are the distinct approaches of what can express. The wisdom of how things are and the wisdom of the extent of things—these are all the objective domains that are cognized; relying on cognizing these, one obtains the wisdom resulting from cultivation. This wisdom that can express is the substance of the unobstructed knowledge of dharmas. The unobstructed knowledge of meaning is the meaning expressed by the preceding dharma. Therefore, in the dharma that can express, there is the phrase "distinct approaches," while in the meaning that is expressed, there is discussion of "distinct characteristics"; they are distinct. Thus, obtaining wisdom regarding what can express is called the unobstructed knowledge of dharmas; obtaining mastery regarding what is expressed is called the unobstructed knowledge of meaning. As the fourteenth fascicle of the Samuccaya says: Unobstructed knowledge of dharmas is [unobstructed] regarding all distinctions of names—that is, relying on ignorance and the like, unobstructed wisdom regarding distinct names such as unknowing, unseeing, non-clear-observation, and so forth. Unobstructed wisdom of meaning is characteristics and purport. "Characteristics" refers to specific and general characteristics. "Purport" refers to distinct meanings and so forth.

12.19

In the treatise's explanation of etymology, it merely has the explanation and exegesis of the words of all dharmas. As the Samuccaya also says, it refers to the regional dialects and sounds, meaning the conceptual speech of sentient beings of immeasurable kingdoms and towns. Explaining the speech of various regions means that being destructible is named "world," and so on. Proclaiming with a single voice so that sentient beings each attain understanding according to their kind, and so forth, is called diverse speeches and sounds.

12.20

In the treatise's explanation of unobstructed eloquence, this speaks only of all kinds and categories of all dharmas; as the Samuccaya states, "all kinds and categories" refers to the eloquence of various distinct expressions such as real existence, provisional existence, conventional existence, ultimate existence, and so on. In terms of how things are and the extent of things, it is the same as before.

12.21

In the treatise's comparison of the four types of eloquence, it says: "Above this, there is nothing that can skillfully and truly manifest right complete enlightenment by oneself, much less skillfully reveal it without inversion for others." The intention here is definitely that only these four types of eloquence can manifest right complete enlightenment and reveal it without inversion for others; apart from these four types of eloquence, above them there is no manifestation of complete enlightenment and the like. This is the intention here.

12.22

The treatise explains the two kinds of bodhipākṣika dharmas of the Mahāyāna and the Śrāvaka, calling them the principles of the two vehicles. The bodhisattva truly knows the nirvāṇa of the śrāvaka in order to subdue śrāvakas and to possess knowledge of all aspects; therefore, within it, they do not realize or grasp it. In the principle of the Mahāyāna, it is distinct from the Śrāvaka.

12.23

Regarding the treatise's statement, "Bodhisattvas are able to abide in practicing contemplation of the body with respect to their bodies, neither conceptualizing the existence of an intrinsic nature regarding their bodies, nor conceptualizing all varieties as completely lacking an intrinsic nature, and furthermore, with respect to their bodies, they truly know the ineffable intrinsic nature and reality (dharmatā)," and so forth: "Neither conceptualizing the existence of an intrinsic nature" means that through conceptualization of the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), one does not conceptualize the body as existent. "Nor conceptualizing the absence of an intrinsic nature" means that one does not conceptualize the other-dependent (paratantra) and fully accomplished (pariniṣpanna) natures as non-existent. Concerning "furthermore, with respect to their bodies, they truly know the ineffable intrinsic nature and reality" and so forth: this re-explains that in the fully accomplished [nature], conceptualizations of verbal expression do not arise; true suchness (tathatā) is the ineffable intrinsic nature and reality. If we follow the subsequent text where such bodhisattvas do not conceptualize suffering and so on with respect to the body and other dharmas, then "nor conceptualizing all varieties as completely lacking an intrinsic nature" refers solely to contemplating the other-dependent [nature]. The "ineffable intrinsic nature and reality" is the fully accomplished [nature]. Now, being free from verbal expression, verbal expressions do not correspond to it, which is unlike the other-dependent [nature]; therefore, the subsequent text states that it is the reality (dharmatā) of the four truths, and reality is true suchness. Thus, not conceptualizing the existence of an intrinsic nature pertains to the imagined [nature]; not conceptualizing all varieties as completely lacking an intrinsic nature pertains to the other-dependent [nature]; and being free from the verbal intrinsic nature and reality pertains to the fully accomplished [nature]. If one accords with the wondrous wisdom of the boundless principles of conceptual designation, that is the subsequent wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna). This is precisely the difference between the bodhisattvas' contemplation of the factors of awakening (bodhipakṣa-dharma) and that of the two vehicles. Herein, the extensive differentiation of the factors of awakening follows the conventional interpretation; only the wisdom, meaning, and function of the Buddha stage are divided as simultaneously having virtuous qualities and wisdom, together forming the four smṛtyupasthānas where contemplation of the body is simultaneous. A detailed critique states: this interpretation is incorrect; they are all operated by the wondrously observing wisdom (pratyavekṣā-jñāna), exactly as stated in the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra.

12.24

Regarding the treatise's explanation of śamatha and vipaśyanā: Herein, the bodhisattva briefly has four practices, which should be known as śamatha. First, "the preliminary practice for the ultimate and conventional wisdoms" is the preparatory samādhi prior to the non-conceptual wisdom and the subsequent wisdom; that is, the samādhi concurrent with the preparatory wisdom (prayogika-jñāna). Question: How is it known that the "conventional wisdom" here is the subsequent wisdom? Answer: In the preceding general heading, there are two wisdoms: 1. the true wisdom that accords with reality; 2. the wondrous wisdom of designated conventions. Therefore, we know that the conventional wisdom here is the subsequent wisdom. Second, "the fruit of the ultimate and conventional wisdoms" is the samādhi concurrent with the fundamental wisdom and the subsequent wisdom, which is the fruit of the preceding preparatory samādhi; hence the samādhi concurrent with the two wisdoms is itself the fruit. Another explanation is: it is the samādhi of equivalent outflow produced after the two wisdoms; therefore it is called "the fruit of the ultimate and conventional wisdoms," meaning the fruit belonging to the two wisdoms. Question: Why does it not clarify the samādhi concurrent with the two wisdoms? Answer: The third and fourth samādhis below are precisely the samādhis concurrent with the two wisdoms. Third, "effortlessly functioning amid all notions of conceptual proliferation": "functioning" means functioning to eliminate, meaning that the fundamental wisdom is able to eliminate all notions of conceptual proliferation. If interpreted according to the former explanation of the fruit of the two wisdoms, this explains the activity and function of the samādhi concurrent with the fundamental wisdom; if interpreted according to the latter explanation, this directly clarifies the samādhi concurrent with the fundamental wisdom. Fourth, "with respect to such ineffable bare entities, owing to having no signs and making no conceptual discriminations, the mind is tranquil, heading toward the one single taste of real nature of the equality of all dharmas": this states that the fundamental wisdom contemplates the other-dependent [nature] without conceptualizing the existence of an intrinsic nature, and thereby enters the meaning of the single taste of true suchness. If based on the former explanation, it twice explains the activities and functions of the two wisdoms; if based on the latter explanation, it re-clarifies the activities and functions of the two wisdoms. The third directly clarifies the essence, and this one now clarifies its function. In terms of stages: the first is in the path of preparation prior to the bhūmis; the second is from entering the bhūmis up to before the seventh bhūmi; the third is from the eighth bhūmi up to the ninth bhūmi; the fourth is practiced on the tenth bhūmi, entering the Buddha stage.

12.25

Regarding the treatise's explanation of vipaśyanā: "There are four practices, which should be known as vipaśyanā." "Namely, being the preliminary practice for the path of the four practices of śamatha" is the first, which is the preparatory wisdom; it is the preliminary wisdom among the four preceding śamathas, belonging to defiled hearing and contemplation. In general, regarding the wisdom preliminary to the four śamathas, in truth the contemplation concurrent with the first śamatha is the preparatory wisdom, which is also included in this first category. "Free from the grasping of superimposition" is the second, and "free from the grasping of deprecation" is the third; these are the non-conceptual wisdom, being free from the two extremes. "And according with... up to the principles of conceptual designation" is the fourth, the subsequent wisdom. These four wisdoms are present on every bhūmi; assigning them individually is somewhat difficult.

12.26

Regarding the treatise's explanation that internal and external accomplishments each have six kinds: since they are stated as two distinct categories, internal and external, how can the internal contain the meaning of accomplishing sentient beings, while the external contains the meaning of self-accomplishment? Answer: Although external sentient beings are spoken of within the internal, the intent focuses on the mind of the bodhisattva, and hence it is called "internal"; within the external, the meaning lies with sentient beings, and does not reside in internal self-accomplishment.

12.27

The treatise says "not eating for one month," which is a view of the non-Buddhists. Throwing oneself from a cliff or leaping into fire are the views of the Nirgranthas.

12.28

The treatise says "Brahmanic vaidyaka mantras": here it means "spells of wisdom" (vidyā-mantra). "Ultimate purity" means the untainted, supramundane purity.

12.29

Regarding the treatise's explanation of the skillful means of accommodation and reconciliation: from "namely, bodhisattvas... up to being able to accommodate entry into the door of samādhi that universally takes all as its object" clarifies accommodation; from there below clarifies reconciliation. "Accommodation" means according with them; "reconciliation" means explaining the scriptures. First, one accommodates them to give rise to delight, using skillful means to establish connections. In accommodation, first is pleasant speech (priyavādita), which is agreeable words. Next is giving (dāna), which is "also actively applying nearby giving and adapting," and so forth. "Nearby giving and adapting" means giving in accordance with circumstances to draw them close. Or, "nearby giving" means practicing the means of gathering through giving to draw them close; "adapting" means the means of gathering through beneficial conduct (arthacaryā) or identity of action (samānārthatā)—by giving material wealth and acting as companions in their undertakings, one dispels the resentment that has arisen. From "giving rise to love and reverence" downward clarifies beneficial conduct.

12.30

The treatise says "manifesting supernormal powers, reading minds, and revealing instruction," which are the three miracles (prātihārya).

12.31

The treatise says, "Furthermore, being able to provide instruction and admonition to accommodate entry into the door of samādhi that universally takes all as its object," and so forth: this means there is a samādhi that can universally take all as its object, which is the samādhi that serves as the basis for the wisdom of all modes (sarvākārajñatā); if anyone seeks to enter it, in order to accommodate them, one provides instruction and admonition. This is the meaning here.

12.32

In the treatise's explanation of reconciliation, it says: "One says to them: 'This sūtra does not say that all dharmas are completely non-existent; it only says that the expressed intrinsic nature of dharmas is completely non-existent,'" and so forth: it does not say that the two natures such as the other-dependent completely lack nature; it says that the intrinsic nature expressed by the imagined nature is non-existent.

12.33

The treatise says, "Although there are all entities that can be spoken of, relying upon which various verbal expressions operate, nevertheless the expressible intrinsic nature of what is spoken of, from the perspective of ultimate truth, is not its intrinsic nature," and so forth: although there are entities that can be spoken of, such as the other-dependent, and relying upon these entities imagined verbal expressions arise, because the intrinsic nature expressed by such verbal expressions is like a hare's horn, from the perspective of ultimate truth it is not like the intrinsic nature of verbal expressions grasped by imagination. When it says "there is no entity," it means there is no imagined entity; it does not mean there is no other-dependent entity.

12.34

The treatise says, "Just as in space numerous forms and activities of form can be found, accommodating all forms and activities of form," and so forth: this simile compares true suchness to space, and the imagined [nature] to form and so on. As explained below, it merely dispels all the apparent forms and activities of form of the imagined nature, and realizes the space-like nature of true suchness.

12.35

The treatise says, "Furthermore, like an illusion or a dream, they do not truly exist as they appear," and so forth: above, it clarified the simile of true suchness being like space, and activities of form being like the imagined [nature]; from here below, it illustrates that the other-dependent [nature] is like an illusion and the like. What is grasped through imagination does not exist, like grasping a real person; but its nominal resemblance is not non-existent, which is the other-dependent [nature].

12.36

The treatise says, "Such dharmas are not like the verbal habits of foolish ordinary beings..." Downward from here, it summarizes the preceding explanation that the other-dependent and fully accomplished natures exist, while the imagined nature does not. In terms of the ineffable intrinsic nature of the ultimate truth, these two natures are not non-existent, preserving both natures. "Through this skillful means, one awakens to and enters the principle that all dharmas are neither existent nor non-existent, like an illusion or a dream, their nature non-dual": this summarizes the three natures above. Saying that the imagined [nature] is also neither existent nor non-existent means: "not existent" because it is like a hare's horn; "not non-existent" because deluded sentiment exists. The other-dependent is also like this: "not existent" because it is not like the imagined; "not non-existent" because a nominal dream exists. The fully accomplished is also like this: "not existent" as it is not the imagined; "not non-existent" because it exists in the ultimate sense. "Neither grasping the slightest part nor abandoning the slightest part," and so forth: neither grasping the imagined nor abandoning the two natures, neither depreciating the two natures nor superimposing existence upon the imagined; this is called being free from ruin.

12.37

The treatise says: "There are four kinds of dhāraṇī: 1. dharma; 2. meaning (artha); 3. mantra; 4. capable of obtaining patience (kṣānti)." As explained below, dharma-dhāraṇī takes dharmas as its object, namely the expressive names and words, with mindfulness and wisdom as its essence. Artha-dhāraṇī has the same essence as dharma, differing only in its object. What is that difference? It takes the expressed meaning as its object, namely the boundless meaning and import, so it resides solely in the mental domain. Mantra-dhāraṇī takes samādhi as its essence; relying on samādhi, one retains mantras so that they are not forgotten, taking mantras as its object. The dhāraṇī capable of obtaining patience takes non-conceptual wisdom as the essence of patience, which directly realizes true suchness. "Capable of obtaining patience" refers to the preparatory wisdom, which possesses the capacity to retain mantras and thereby attain the realization of true suchness. The Dharma Master says: this takes non-conceptual wisdom as its essence. If so, why is it called "capable of obtaining patience"? Because in the path of preparation one retains and contemplates this mantra, one swiftly attains true wisdom and realizes true suchness; hence the subsequent text places it in the stage of practicing through resolute faith (adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi).

12.38

In the treatise's explanation of the dhāraṇī capable of obtaining patience, it says: "Ripening natural and firm causal practice": this means that prior to the bhūmis, this patience is called the cause; because it is unshakeable, it is called "unshakeable causal practice." "Endowed with wondrous wisdom": this means ripening the wondrous wisdom that tends toward the supramundane; or, being endowed with wondrous wisdom within the unshakeable causal practice. "Dwelling alone in a secluded and quiet place": this speaks of the dwelling place. "Silent and free from speech": free from verbal clamor. "Having never possessed possessions": this means minimizing affairs and possessing no extraneous material requisites. "Walking while seeing the road": this means when one should not walk, one only walks when the signs of dawn appear, hence it says "walking while seeing the road." Moreover, the place where one walks must show the correct path, unblemished by faults; absence of faults is called a wilderness. Correct principle must be called the "road"; walking in accordance with correct principle is called "walking while seeing the road." "Eating with moderation" and so on can be understood.

12.39

The treatise says: "Regarding the phrases of mantras taught by the Buddha for attaining bodhisattva patience, one is able to contemplate them carefully. The words of the mantra are..." and so on: this means this mantra has no meaning, but only names. Bodhisattvas prior to the bhūmis recite this meaningless mantra wishing to eliminate conceptual grasping: this is only a name, so where is there any meaning? Thus one knows that all dharmas have only falsely conceptualized names and no truly grasped meaning; therefore, one cannot give rise to grasping based on names. Because of this contemplation, one is immediately able to enter true contemplation and realize bodhisattva patience.

12.40

The śāstra states: "There is merely no referent; understanding the meaning of this phrase as it truly is refers to the so-called absence of a referent." This explains that the aforementioned absence of a referent is the meaning of pariniṣpanna-svabhāva. That is to say, beneath this dhāraṇī there is nothing denoted; because there is nothing denoted, one can realize pariniṣpanna-svabhāva. It is simply because beneath this dhāraṇī there is nothing denoted, understanding as it truly is that beneath this phrase there is the so-called absence of a referent, that one realizes pariniṣpanna-svabhāva.

12.41

The śāstra states: "Things of this kind are not determinate" because they involve error and mistake. "Nor are they firmly abiding" because there is regression. "Nor are they vast" because their retention has limits, unlike what is boundless.

12.42

Where the śāstra explains the five kinds of vows and says regarding the second, rebirth: "in accord with benefiting sentient beings in the good destinies," it is asked: Why does it not speak here of rebirth in the bad destinies in accord [with benefiting sentient beings]? The commentary explains: There are two meanings. First, the good destinies have many benefits, while the bad destinies have few benefits, so they are omitted and not discussed. Second, it accords with the eight aspects [of a Buddha's life], which exist only in the good destinies. Furthermore, in the bad destinies there is no mastery to transform [others] as a king and so forth. Moreover, when speaking of the good destinies, the intention implies rebirth in the bad destinies as well; speaking from the superior state, it discusses only the good destinies.

12.43

Where the śāstra explains the three samādhis, stating: "What is a bodhisattva's emptiness samādhi?" and so forth: here, the intention of emptiness, if in the path of seeing with characteristics, belongs only to the two modes of activity under suffering. The text's meaning for wishlessness, because it contains the words "afflictions" and so forth, belongs only to the four modes of activity of origination and two modes of activity of suffering. The text's meaning for signlessness, because it contains the words "eternal cessation and tranquility," belongs only to the four [modes] under cessation. If according to other passages, there are many textual distinctions. One text is as stated before. Furthermore, wishlessness also subsumes the four modes of activity under the path, the rest being as before. Another text holds that signlessness subsumes the four modes of activity under the path, whereas wishlessness does not, the rest being as before. Another text holds that the three truths are as explained in the initial interpretation before, and the four modes of activity under the path are subsumed across the three gates of liberation, as in the second fascicle of the *Prakaraṇāryavācā*. Another interpretation holds: if regarding the severance of delusion, the practice of emptiness applies across the four truths; the rest can be known. Here, if one reconciles the different implicit intentions of the various texts, it is as in the *Notes on the Abhidharma[-samuccaya]*, and the principle may be inferred accordingly. Furthermore, the intention of the text of this śāstra is to distinguish and establish these three gates of liberation in terms of their meaning and function during true contemplation: if severing delusion, it is solely the practice of emptiness; if simultaneous, there are also the senses of wishlessness and signlessness. The text on signlessness has words such as "afflictions," seeming to apply only to the four modes of activity of origination and two modes of activity of suffering; yet based on the later section on addition and subtraction, wishlessness is established generally over conditioned phenomena, so wishlessness applies to the three truths. Moreover, this is a general statement; if speaking of the present intention, it is as explained before.

12.44

The śāstra states: "In this way, the bodhisattva diligently trains in the three kinds of samādhi"—this encourages training. "And understands this establishment as it truly is"—this concludes the previous direct explanation of the three gates of liberation, and also concludes the meaning of neither increasing nor decreasing. "Awakens to and enters into other samādhis of active characteristics as they truly are"—by understanding these gates of liberation explained here, one awakens to and enters into the other active characteristics as they truly are, being fully able to understand them. "Awakens to and enters into the principle of arrangement as it truly is"—this is the initial awakening to and entering into the true three gates of liberation. "Understands the principle of cultivation as it truly is"—this encourages the cultivation of the methods of samādhi. Therefore, the subsequent re-explanation states: "namely, the assemblies of śrāvakas among them diligently train"—this is the practice of training; "and fully realize"—this is awakening and entering. There are further distinct explanations, which can be understood upon reflection.

12.45

Fascicle Forty-six: Factors of Awakening, Part 17-3

12.46

The śāstra states: "Furthermore, there are four kinds of dharmoddāna"—this means 'saying', that is, what the World-Honoured One constantly recited and spoke. If this uddāna means 'subsuming the scattered', it subsumes the prose discourses by means of brief verses. Here it says 'saying', referring to constant recitation and speaking; this meaning seems to be an *udāna* (unsolicited discourse). As for the intrinsic nature of these four kinds, when extracting the truths by the substantial nature of phenomena, they are conditioned and unconditioned, and are known accordingly.

12.47

Where the śāstra explains uddāna through three meanings, stating "the meaning of being associated with phenomena": this signifies impermanence and so forth, yet it is not associated with conditioned phenomena. Furthermore, this track of practice can lead to a great birth, bringing about superior fruits of humans and devas with outflows, because it brings about birth in an outflow-free pure land. Furthermore, it can bring about birth in the form and formless realms, which is called a great birth. Furthermore, it can attain birth in the true Dharma, which is called a great birth. Moreover, if discussed in contrast to transcending the peak of existence, this great birth is indeed a birth with outflows.

12.48

The śāstra states: "Right here, the intrinsic nature of the formations of the previous moment ceases and perishes, and immediately without interval, formations that did not exist before have their momentary intrinsic nature arise, which is correctly viewed as arising, and so forth, up to correctly viewed as cessation": If based on the Hīnayāna, arising is in the future, and the other three characteristics are in the present; now, based on the Mahāyāna, the three characteristics of arising and so forth are in the present, while cessation is in the past. As distinguished in the passage immediately preceding, the statement that what previously did not exist now exists is called arising; to exclude the unconditioned, it states that the unconditioned exists, yet it exists originally, whereas now conditioned phenomena exist, previously non-existent and now existent, while that [unconditioned] exists originally; saying that the previous moment is immediately followed by the subsequent, a category not present before arises. If with a single material phenomenon the previous thought-moment ceases and the subsequent thought-moment arises, these are extremely similar; why does it speak of "not present before"? The commentary explains: If it did not speak of similarity, it would be that very phenomenon. If it were that very phenomenon, then that single phenomenon's sublime activity would be permanent and eternal, and there would be no cessation. Because it is not the very substance of the previous moment's phenomenon, the expression "similarity" is used. As for abiding, there are two explanations in the Mahāyāna: One says that the present ability to produce a subsequent fruit is called abiding. If so, how can the final mind-moment of an arhat be called abiding, since it cannot produce a subsequent mind-moment? The commentary explains: Because of this difficulty, there are two explanations. Now the śāstra says that when formations have arisen, immediately not yet destroyed, they are correctly viewed as abiding; they cannot abide by having arisen and then paused over time. If so, abiding and arising would occur at different times, which is why the Hīnayāna distinguishes this statement. Now the Mahāyāna should say: When formations have arisen, immediately not yet destroyed—as in the fifty-second [fascicle], they may also pause during the stage of arising, which is established as abiding. As for difference: if one says that the alteration and destruction of this arisen phenomenon is called difference, this too is incorrect, because it would be a different thought-moment from the time of arising. If it were not yet altered at the time of arising and only later called difference when altered, then arising and difference would be at different times. Now one should say: with respect to the cessation of the previous, the momentary intrinsic nature of these arisen formations merely arises as distinct and different, which is called difference; that is, being different from the previous thought-moment is in all cases called difference. By this reasoning, arising and difference are simultaneous. As for cessation: if it were in the present simultaneously with difference and called cessation, then cessation would be a non-existent phenomenon, whereas abiding and difference are existent phenomena; how could an existent phenomenon simultaneously have a non-existent phenomenon? Therefore, this śāstra says: "From after the moment these formations arise, the momentary intrinsic nature of these very formations that have arisen ceases and perishes, which is correctly stated as cessation." That is, because when the existent phenomenon is gone, only upon reaching the past time is the characteristic of cessation established; thus arising and cessation are like light and darkness and are not simultaneous. It is asked: If so, then a single moment does not have the four characteristics. The commentary explains: The cessation of this phenomenon is the very time of the arising of this phenomenon, like the two ends of a balance scale, equal and level; therefore, a single moment has both arising and cessation. If so, why does it not speak of cessation first and then speak of arising? The commentary explains: Because it speaks from the beginning; since in the beginning there must be arising, all cessations are not prior, and arising occurs only after the final cessation. Question: The sūtras all speak of three conditioned characteristics; what are the three? The commentary explains: There are two meanings: first, subsuming abiding into difference; second, subsuming difference into abiding. As for subsuming abiding into difference: because abiding resembles the unconditioned. Furthermore, if one hears that phenomena have abiding, the mind revulsing conditioned phenomena will not be fierce; now saying there is only difference makes conditioned phenomena deeply revulsive. Because there is difference, unlike the unconditioned which has abiding, the characteristic of abiding is subsumed into the characteristic of difference. If according to the Hīnayāna, because difference can destroy the arisen phenomenon, its functional efficacy among characteristics is superior, whereas abiding can produce the subsequent arisen phenomenon and has no efficacy regarding cessation; therefore, abiding is subsumed into difference. The second explanation is subsuming difference into abiding. Because difference has efficacy in its own moment, having arisen and not yet destroyed, it is called abiding, and thus has efficacy; difference follows from being different from the previous phenomenon and has no efficacy in its own thought-moment, so difference is subsumed into abiding. Furthermore, difference accords with the characteristic of cessation and its intrinsic nature is not apparent, so difference is subsumed into abiding. If so, why is difference not subsumed into cessation? The commentary explains: Difference is an existent phenomenon, whereas cessation is a non-existent phenomenon; one is past and one is present; although their aspects bear similarities, it cannot be subsumed into the characteristic of cessation. See the notes on the fifty-third fascicle of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī and the third fascicle of the Maulī Bhūmi below.

12.49

The śāstra states: "Why is this? When formations arise, only such formations are found, and there are no other separate arising, abiding, aging, and cessation; when such formations abide, age, and cease, only such formations are found, and there are no other separate arising, abiding, aging, and cessation." Why are these different? The reason the four characteristics are cited subsequently is to subsume phenomena and negate phenomena. If pointing to phenomena reciprocally, it only says 'formations arise' up to 'formations abide, age, and cease'. If negating phenomena, that is, negating a separate entity for the four characteristics, because the negation universally covers the phenomena, all four characteristics are cited. It is asked: Why does it not speak solely of arising when negating arising, and likewise for abiding and cessation? The commentary explains: Because within abiding there is also arising, and when there is arising there is also abiding and so forth; thus great arising produces eight phenomena and so forth; therefore, the negation is a universal negation.

12.50

The śāstra states: "Because upon such investigation they cannot be found: namely, if separate from those formations such as form..." and so forth; below, this refutes that the arising which produces form should also have an arising, which is the 'secondary arising' of the Hīnayāna.

12.51

The śāstra states: "If one says they are identical, positing arising as a real entity becomes pointless; saying there is a separate arising that is a substantial entity is unreasonable." This refutes secondary arising. If secondary arising were identical with primary arising, positing primary arising as a real entity would be pointless. Why is this? Primary arising produces material phenomena, existing separately from form; secondary arising produces primary arising, and should also have a separate entity. If secondary arising produces primary arising and the two arisings are said to be one, then primary arising produces material phenomena and would also be one with arising. Therefore, saying that a separate arising exists as a substantial entity is pointless and unreasonable.

12.52

The śāstra states: "If one says they are distinct, then it would not be that the arising of formations produces [formations]; that the arising of formations produces [formations] is unreasonable." That which is not the arising of formations producing [formations] is secondary arising; that which is the arising of formations producing [formations] is primary arising. If you say that primary arising and secondary arising are distinct, then secondary arising should also be like primary arising and be able to produce form. Primary arising produces material phenomena and can also produce secondary arising; if secondary arising produces primary arising, it should also produce material phenomena; therefore, secondary arising, not being the arising of formations that produces [formations], if able to produce material phenomena, should be primary arising, the arising of formations that produces [formations]. Therefore, that the two arisings are distinct is unreasonable.

12.53

Regarding the treatise's statement, "If cessation has a distinct intrinsic nature and is truly mature, then this cessation should have arising and perishing": Dharma Master [Shentai] states that the preceding text finished one layer of refutation, and the following specifically refutes the characteristic of cessation. The Commentary says: This is not so. If one has not yet resolved the secondary arising of that [primary] arising by analogy with the other characteristics, below adducing the subsequent cessation to refute it is all a single turn. What our school maintains is that cessation is non-existent, without a distinct maturation. If you say that there is a distinct characteristic of cessation, because this cessation would be conditioned, it should distinctively have arising and cessation. If, when cessation is produced by arising, all phenomena should naturally cease without requiring exertion, just like entering the absorption of cessation; since the characteristic of cessation has arisen, the seventh and eighth consciousnesses together with their associated mental factors should also all cease, because cessation has arisen. Since the two are in contradiction, the rest must cease. Since they do not cease, it clearly demonstrates what we maintain: when this phenomenon is non-existent, it is called cessation; cessation does not distinctively have an arising that arises it. Because the characteristic of cessation would exist, being produced by arising, it could obstruct and could produce, and therefore the rest must cease. That the phenomenon of cessation has cessation is to be known by analogy with this.

First 53 of 214 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

瑜伽師地論略纂 — Classical Chinese