瑜伽師地論略纂 13.12

13.12

Where the treatise states: 'Furthermore, a category subsumed under the non-obscured indeterminate maturation (vipāka) of the six collections of consciousness is not found: this is the third reason,' this means that although there is vipāka within the six consciousnesses, it arises only in a single moment. Alternatively, among various minds, that which is produced from vipāka as a uniform category throughout before and after is definitively not found; only that which is of a uniform category of vipāka before and after without alteration can perform the sustaining, and that is true vipāka. Now, the maturational mind within the six consciousnesses arises only for a single moment and is not uninterrupted; since it is not of a uniform category, it is vipākaja (produced from maturation) and cannot be designated as capable of appropriating. One should establish the inference: 'The six kinds of sensory evolving consciousnesses are not true vipākaja (thesis), because they are intermittent (reason), like wind, sound, and the like (example).' This inference not being clear, one should formulate another separately: 'Since a uniform category of non-obscured indeterminate vipāka cannot be found among the six kinds of sensory evolving consciousnesses, they cannot sustain the body (thesis), because they possess the meaning of being intermittent (reason); the example and so forth are the same as before.' Or one should establish the inference: 'The mind produced from vipāka among the six sensory evolving consciousnesses cannot appropriate (thesis), because it is intermittent (reason), like wind, sound, and the like (example).' The treatise saying 'a category of vipāka is not found' is precisely this statement of the reason 'because of being intermittent.' In response to their pressing objection: 'If the maturational mind within the six consciousnesses is vipākaja, not true vipāka, and cannot sustain, why does your school state that neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is born from vipāka? Since it is born from vipāka, it should not be appropriated'—the exposition says: vipākaja is of two kinds: first, born from vipāka seeds; second, born from a continuity of vipāka. That which pertains to the sixth consciousness and so forth is born from vipāka seeds and is called nominal vipāka. Like the visual sense-faculty, it is not true vipāka. The eighth consciousness is born from a continuity of vipāka, because the preceding moment and the succeeding moment are both vipāka. Now, that whose preceding moment and succeeding moment are both vipāka can sustain, not the six kinds of consciousness; hence there is a difference. Relying on this text, one master says: 'The desire realm possesses a sixth maturational mind.' Another master says: 'This is merely refuting an assertion.' Furthermore, regarding another external assertion: 'In your school the seventh consciousness should be able to sustain the body; what need is there for an eighth?,' one should establish the inference: 'Our seventh consciousness cannot sustain the body (thesis), because it is not of the nature of vipāka (reason), like the six kinds of sensory evolving consciousnesses and so forth (example).' Furthermore, another external assertion states: 'It is not that a single consciousness sustains all sense-faculties; each individual consciousness can sustain its own sense-faculty.' This should now be refuted, so the fourth reason says: 'Furthermore, the six collections of consciousness operate dependent on separate supports... up to... is the fourth reason.' Herein there are two: first, directly refuting according to the assertion; second, granting the assertion and pressing the objection. That is to say: when the visual consciousness arises, the remaining sense-faculties such as the auditory that lack consciousness would rot and decay (thesis), because there is no consciousness capable of sustaining them (reason)—for according to the Hīnayāna school, the consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously—like a dead corpse (example). 'Even if appropriation were conceded, this too would be illogical': this cites the assertion and presses the objection. That is, the external opponent asserts that when visual consciousness arises, it does not merely sustain the visual sense-faculty alone, but can also sustain the other sense-faculties such as the auditory. Now, provisionally conceding this, it is said: 'Even if appropriation were conceded, this too would be illogical, because consciousness is distant and separate.' We now establish the inference: 'The visual consciousness definitively cannot sustain the auditory and other sense-faculties (thesis), because consciousness is distant and separate (reason), like another person's eight consciousnesses being unable to sustain [one's own] bodily sense-faculty and the like, or like a dead corpse and so forth.' Furthermore, an inference may be jointly established: 'The sense-faculties lacking consciousness should be without appropriation (thesis), because consciousness is distant and separate (reason), like a dead corpse (example).' Having already pressed the objection that they lack appropriation, they should consequently be subsumed under non-sentient things. The inference is established: 'The sense-faculties lacking consciousness should be subsumed under non-sentient things (thesis), because they lack appropriation (reason), like a dead corpse (example);' furthermore: 'When the visual and other consciousnesses arise, they should not mutually appropriate one another (thesis), because their supports are distinct (reason), just as when visual consciousness arises it does not rely on the other sense-faculties (example).' This inference has a fallacy: the fallacy of the non-establishment of what is to be proved in the concordant example (sādhyāprasiddha). As in the previous assertion that the body-consciousness sustains its own sense-faculty, if so, it would incur the fallacy of repeated appropriation (sakṛd-upādāna); hence the fifth reason should incur the fallacy of repeated appropriation. Its text is intelligible. Herein there is an inference: 'Since there would be appropriation and non-appropriation, during the time of non-appropriation it should not be subsumed under sentient beings (thesis), because of the absence of appropriation (reason), like a dead corpse and so forth (example).' It may also be said: 'The six kinds of sensory evolving consciousnesses should be non-appropriating (thesis), because the minds of the three natures are intermittent and not of a uniform category (reason), like sound, flame, and the like (example).' This also has a fallacy. By the above five reasons, since the sustaining by the six consciousnesses is illogical, one accepts that the eighth consciousness can sustain the body. The concluding text is clear.