瑜伽師地論略纂 13.13

13.13

The treatise says: "Why is it that without the ālayavijñāna, [it would not be reasonable that] consciousnesses do not operate simultaneously..." This second reason does not directly establish the eighth consciousness; rather, relying on external objections, it then refutes Hīnayāna attachments and establishes its own school. Here there are two parts: first, the question; second, the direct explanation. "Why is it that without..." and so forth is the first. If one interprets this in accordance with what comes before and after, this text seems slightly contradictory. Why is this? For example, in the preceding text: if the eighth exists, an āśraya that is upātta can be found; if the eighth does not exist, an āśraya that is upātta cannot be found. Now, if one follows that interpretation, one should say: if the eighth exists, initial arising can be found; if the eighth does not exist, initial arising cannot be found—then such a statement would arise. But in general one should say: in the Hīnayāna there is no eighth [consciousness], so the various consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously. The Mahāyāna doctrine, however, states that when the conditions of sense faculties and cognitive objects are complete, all five consciousnesses arise; on what condition would only one consciousness arise initially? If the eighth consciousness exists, one accepts that the various consciousnesses arise simultaneously; therefore, if the eighth exists, there is no initial arising, and this is reasonable. Since you [in Hīnayāna] have no eighth consciousness, yet hold that there is an initial arising, this is not reasonable. Now the Hīnayānist asks: "Why is it that without the eighth consciousness, initial arising would not be reasonable?" One should simply follow the text directly; one must not construct interpretations modeled on what comes before or after. This concludes the question. In the direct explanation there are two parts: first, positing a hypothetical external objection; second, providing the direct explanation based on the objection. Because the separate arising of the various consciousnesses in Hīnayāna is readily understood, its text is clear. In the reply there are three parts: first, a general reply followed by a challenge, explaining the reason. The first [part] and the challenge are clear. In the third, the direct explanation, it says: "It is possible for two consciousnesses to operate simultaneously," meaning that in the Mahāyāna the various consciousnesses also have occasions of arising separately. The rest of the text is readily understood. Here one should formulate a syllogism: At the time when the visual consciousness arises with its three conditions complete, the auditory and other consciousnesses whose three conditions are also complete should also appear and arise (thesis); because their three conditions are complete (reason); just like the visual consciousness that appears and arises (example). In your prior objection, fearing that consciousnesses would arise simultaneously, you did not accept that the eighth exists; now, having established that the various consciousnesses arise simultaneously, you should accept that the eighth exists. This explains and establishes it by turning [the objection] around. Regarding the third reason in the treatise, the opening question and so forth are as previously analyzed in the text. This reason is also not a reason directly establishing the eighth; when external opponents raised an objection in explaining the doctrine, the opponents turned back with a question, and through resolving their objection, [the treatise] turns back to establish the mūlavijñāna. That is, the external Hīnayāna posits that consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously, and when the mental consciousness takes visible forms as its object, it does so after the visual consciousness. Now we refute this: this consciousness taking past visible form objects as cognitive objects should not be clear. One should formulate a syllogism: After visual consciousness and the like, the scattered mental consciousness taking as its object the immediately past visible forms introduced by the eye and so on should not be clear (thesis). This phrasing excludes the meditative mind and the solitary mental consciousness that takes distant objects as cognitive objects at present; here it refutes specifically the immediately past mental consciousness, excluding the distant mental consciousness. The reason is: Because it is included in an unstable state and takes the past as its object. This phrasing also excludes the meditative mind. Like the scattered mind taking as its object things from a hundred thousand kalpas in the past—this also excludes the meditative mind. Furthermore, because it is unclear, it should not be clear; the thesis, reason, and example are as before. The meaning of this text is as in the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā-chao.