瑜伽師地論略纂 13.19

13.19

Regarding the treatise's statement, "abiding in the mindless absorption is unreasonable, [...] because [consciousness] does not depart from the body," there are two meanings: first, it contradicts inference; second, it contradicts sacred teaching. Among the various schools, some accept two types of mental consciousness: first, coarse; second, subtle. The subtle one is present in this absorption. Here, the refutation addresses those such as the Sarvāstivādins who do not posit a subtle consciousness. One should formulate an inference: "Entering the mindless absorption should be like abandoning life (thesis), because consciousness has departed from the body (reason), just like a corpse (example)." Furthermore, it contradicts sacred teaching, as is clear from the text. The Sarvāstivādins defend themselves: "The six consciousnesses do not depart from the body because the acquisition (prāpti) of consciousness does not depart." If it is called 'consciousness not departing from the body' on such grounds, then because the acquisition of consciousness does not depart from the body, it should also not be called 'the absorption of the cessation of mind'. One should formulate an inference: "The absorption of cessation that you posit should not be an absorption of cessation (thesis), because the acquisition of consciousness does not depart (reason), just like an absorption with mind (example)." Again: "Your mindless absorption must possess mind (thesis), because it has the acquisition of consciousness (reason), just like an absorption with mind (example)." This is not the Sarvāstivādin's correct defense. Their correct defense states: "Although there is no consciousness upon entering the absorption, when emerging from the absorption later, its consciousness will definitely arise; hence it is said that consciousness does not depart from the body." One should formulate an inference to refute them: "The absorption of cessation that you posit must possess mind (thesis), because it is said that consciousness does not depart from the body (reason), just like an absorption with mind (example)." They construct a counter-inference showing a conclusive contradiction (viruddha-avyabhicārin): "The absorption of cessation and the like are definitely devoid of mind, because of tranquility, just like nirvāṇa." Now, one should point out the fallacy of contradicting the essential nature of the subject (dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana) against them, rendering their argument unestablished: "The absorption of cessation that you posit should not be an absorption (thesis), because of tranquility (reason), just like nirvāṇa (example)." If they say that because the life-faculty and so forth remain, it is called 'undecayed', one should refute the life-faculty by saying: first refute the four characteristics [of conditioned phenomena]; the four characteristics are definitely not substantially existent, because they are not known through the two means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), just like a rabbit's horns and the like. Using this as an example, one refutes their life-faculty. The above refutation of the Sarvāstivādins is complete. If someone posits that it has mind, one should refute them with the inference: "The sixth mental consciousness should be absent in the states of the absorption without conceptualization and the like (thesis), because, within this state, it is subsumed under any one of the six consciousnesses (reason), just like the five consciousnesses and so forth (example)." Furthermore, if there is consciousness, there is definitely contact (sparśa); if there is contact, there must be sensation (vedanā) and conceptualization (saṃjñā). How then can one say that this absorption possesses consciousness? Since this inference is established, the lesser vehicle's clinging is completely refuted; it contradicts both sūtras and reason, and therefore the eighth consciousness is established. Moreover, an inference such as whether the formless realm should have the absorption of cessation should be considered.