瑜伽師地論略纂 13.19

13.19

論云「處無心定不應道理乃至不離身故」者，此有二義：一、違比量；二、違聖教。諸部之中，有許有二意識：一、麁；二、細。細者，此定有之。今此中破，如薩婆多不立細識者。應立量云：入無心定，應如捨命（宗），識離身故（因），由如死屍（喻）。又違聖教，如文可知。薩婆多救：六識不離身者，識得不離故。名識不離身者，亦應識得不離身故，不名滅心定。應立量云：汝立滅心定應非滅定（宗），識得不離故（因），如有心定（喻）；又汝無心定必定有心（宗），有識得故（因），如有心定（喻）。此非薩婆多正救。彼正救云：入定雖無識，後出定時，其識必生，言識不離身。應立量破云：汝立滅心定必定有心（宗），言識不離身故（因），如有心定（喻）。彼作決定相違言：滅心定等決定無心，以寂靜故，猶如涅槃。今應與作有法自相相違過故，令彼不成：汝立滅心定應非是定，以寂靜故，由如涅槃。若言命根等在，名不爛壞，應破命根云：先破四相，四相定非實有，非二量知故，如兔角等。以此為喻，破彼命根。上來破薩婆多訖。若立有心者，應破量云：第六意識，無想定等諸位中應無（宗），在此位中，於六識內隨一攝故（因），如五識等（喻）。又若有識，決定有觸，若有觸，必有受、想，如何乃言此定有識？此量既成，小執破訖，違經違理，故成第八。又如無色界應有滅定等量，思之。

Regarding the treatise's statement, "abiding in the mindless absorption is unreasonable, [...] because [consciousness] does not depart from the body," there are two meanings: first, it contradicts inference; second, it contradicts sacred teaching. Among the various schools, some accept two types of mental consciousness: first, coarse; second, subtle. The subtle one is present in this absorption. Here, the refutation addresses those such as the Sarvāstivādins who do not posit a subtle consciousness. One should formulate an inference: "Entering the mindless absorption should be like abandoning life (thesis), because consciousness has departed from the body (reason), just like a corpse (example)." Furthermore, it contradicts sacred teaching, as is clear from the text. The Sarvāstivādins defend themselves: "The six consciousnesses do not depart from the body because the acquisition (prāpti) of consciousness does not depart." If it is called 'consciousness not departing from the body' on such grounds, then because the acquisition of consciousness does not depart from the body, it should also not be called 'the absorption of the cessation of mind'. One should formulate an inference: "The absorption of cessation that you posit should not be an absorption of cessation (thesis), because the acquisition of consciousness does not depart (reason), just like an absorption with mind (example)." Again: "Your mindless absorption must possess mind (thesis), because it has the acquisition of consciousness (reason), just like an absorption with mind (example)." This is not the Sarvāstivādin's correct defense. Their correct defense states: "Although there is no consciousness upon entering the absorption, when emerging from the absorption later, its consciousness will definitely arise; hence it is said that consciousness does not depart from the body." One should formulate an inference to refute them: "The absorption of cessation that you posit must possess mind (thesis), because it is said that consciousness does not depart from the body (reason), just like an absorption with mind (example)." They construct a counter-inference showing a conclusive contradiction (viruddha-avyabhicārin): "The absorption of cessation and the like are definitely devoid of mind, because of tranquility, just like nirvāṇa." Now, one should point out the fallacy of contradicting the essential nature of the subject (dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana) against them, rendering their argument unestablished: "The absorption of cessation that you posit should not be an absorption (thesis), because of tranquility (reason), just like nirvāṇa (example)." If they say that because the life-faculty and so forth remain, it is called 'undecayed', one should refute the life-faculty by saying: first refute the four characteristics [of conditioned phenomena]; the four characteristics are definitely not substantially existent, because they are not known through the two means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), just like a rabbit's horns and the like. Using this as an example, one refutes their life-faculty. The above refutation of the Sarvāstivādins is complete. If someone posits that it has mind, one should refute them with the inference: "The sixth mental consciousness should be absent in the states of the absorption without conceptualization and the like (thesis), because, within this state, it is subsumed under any one of the six consciousnesses (reason), just like the five consciousnesses and so forth (example)." Furthermore, if there is consciousness, there is definitely contact (sparśa); if there is contact, there must be sensation (vedanā) and conceptualization (saṃjñā). How then can one say that this absorption possesses consciousness? Since this inference is established, the lesser vehicle's clinging is completely refuted; it contradicts both sūtras and reason, and therefore the eighth consciousness is established. Moreover, an inference such as whether the formless realm should have the absorption of cessation should be considered.