瑜伽師地論略纂 9.48

9.48

In refuting Īśvara as the cause, the treatise says: "If one uses solely that Īśvara as the condition, then conditioned formations and that Īśvara should both be fundamentally existent; why would they arise in an instant?" The intent of this refutation is: if Īśvara is fundamentally existent, then whenever Īśvara exists, conditioned formations also exist; since conditioned formations are simultaneous with Īśvara, we know that conditioned formations are also fundamentally existent. If they are fundamentally existent, they are eternal and should not be called 'conditioned formations' (saṃskāra), because in their doctrine conditioned formations are not fundamentally existent. Having seen this refutation, the opponent then establishes further: "Īśvara is inherently fundamentally existent, whereas conditioned formations arise only afterward." Therefore the treatise next says, "If it is said that Īśvara exists first," and so forth. Seeing this change of thesis, the treatise master pursues the refutation further: if conditioned formations arise only after Īśvara, then conditioned formations are not produced solely by Īśvara, but also employ other conditions; therefore the treatise next says, "These other conditioned formations do not arise with Īśvara alone as condition," and so forth. If they used Īśvara as condition, then since conditioned formations would exist when Īśvara exists, both should be fundamentally existent; if conditioned formations arise only afterward, then they are initiated afterward through desire and prayer. If conditioned formations take desire and prayer as cause, why would Īśvara alone be the cause? Therefore the treatise next says, "If it is said that Īśvara acts according to his desires, exertion, and prayers," and so forth. Having tentatively granted desire as the cause, the treatise must question and refute it further; therefore the treatise next says, "If so, does this desire have a cause?" and so forth. Supposing that desire has a cause and takes Īśvara as cause, then since Īśvara is fundamentally existent, desire should also be fundamentally existent; whenever Īśvara exists, desire would exist, and thus it is refuted as with conditioned formations earlier; therefore the treatise next says, "If it is said to have a cause, such as taking Īśvara as its cause," and so forth. Supposing the view that desire takes Īśvara as cause has been refuted, there would then be another cause, not taking Īśvara as cause. If so, and desire has a distinct cause, just as conditioned formations earlier distinctly took desire, exertion, and prayer as cause, now it is said that it again takes desire, exertion, and prayer, having a distinct dharma apart from Īśvara as its cause; in that case, conditioned formations arise from distinct causes—why need one falsely postulate a useless Īśvara? Therefore the treatise next says, "If it is said that this desire has another cause," and so forth.