瑜伽師地論略纂 9

English (machine translation) 9

Language: English

First, one verse explains and presents one dhāraṇī, having seven gates; second, one verse clarifies the seven manaskāras in the first gate. First, clarifying the seven gates: 1. manaskāra; 2. detachment from desire; 3. extensive distinction of concentrations; 4. the two attainments; 5. the five superknowledges; 6. differences in rebirth; 7. the marks. These will be individually explained below. In this fourth dhāraṇī, this constitutes the essential nature.

9.3

In the second line of verse, “observing the truths” refers to the first two manaskāras; “penetrating in accordance with reality” is the manaskāra of detachment, because it can eliminate afflictions; “extensively distinguishing cultivation” refers to the remaining manaskāras; “having culmination as the last” is the seventh, the resultant manaskāra. Previously, in [fascicles] thirty-one, thirty-two, and so forth, the fourth, purification of obstacles, was clarified; now the fifth, cultivating manaskāra, is explained, which is the major section in the thirtieth [fascicle].

9.4

Where the treatise explains the second, detachment from desire, saying: “Question: Among these, what kinds of pudgalas in this very life ... arouse preparatory application, but not the supramundane path? There are four kinds of persons; the fourth person refers to all bodhisattvas who delight in realizing great bodhi in a future life, not in the present life”: this intention clarifies that bodhisattvas [attain] the Buddha path in a future life, not in the present life. Although the mundane path can arouse preparatory application in the present life, it is only to mature sentient beings within saṃsāra, for the sake of preparatory application on the mundane path. If this person directs their mind toward the future Buddha fruit, they arouse preparatory application on the supramundane path. Here it is according to the former meaning.

9.5

Where the treatise explains the manaskāra that discerns the characteristics among the seven manaskāras: it refers to being able to understand the coarse characteristics of the desire realm and the calm characteristics of the higher realms. In the Hīnayāna explanation, all six aspects must be practiced; now, in the Mahāyāna, a single aspect suffices and it is not necessary to complete all six aspects, bringing to mind any one kind among the six aspects.

9.6

Where the treatise explains the common characteristics among the third characteristics, saying, “All desires refer to the suffering of birth and so forth, up to the suffering of not getting what one seeks,” it does not mention the eighth, the suffering of conditioning (saṃskāra-duḥkhatā): here it is spoken according to what is commonly known in the world, spoken based on what is conventionally known to be suffering, not based on suffering in the ultimate sense. Based on suffering in the ultimate sense, all desires and phenomena have it, but because it is difficult to know, it is not mentioned.

9.7

Where the treatise explains discursive inquiry into the coarse category, saying, “like a skeleton, like congealed blood and flesh, like a grass torch, like a portion of charcoal fire,” and so forth: herein, “like a skeleton” means loathsome; “like congealed blood and flesh” means unreal and repulsive; “like a grass torch” means extinguishing in an instant; “like a small portion of fire” can burn mountains and marshes, so a small amount of desires can burn roots of goodness. Furthermore, it says: like charcoal where one part has fire and one part has no fire, it is repulsive. This meaning is not so. The first two manaskāras do not speak of severing afflictions, because the third, the manaskāra of detachment, can sever afflictions.

9.8

Where the treatise explains detachment, it says the initial path of abandonment arises. The question is asked: like the two ends of a balance scale where the dipping and rising are simultaneous, why is it that upon attaining the [manaskāra of] discerning characteristics, the mind of the form realm still has desire-realm afflictions that are not yet eliminated? It is explained: prior to discerning characteristics, although hearing and contemplation in the desire realm generate revulsion toward desire, they cannot accord with severing the afflictions of the lower realm; discerning characteristics and resolute faith can accord with detachment and sever desire of the lower realm; therefore, although discerning characteristics and resolute faith cannot sever afflictions, afflictions do not arise. Just as a person of the first fruit has not yet detached from desire through cultivation but attains the threshold stage (anāgamya), so too at this time with discerning characteristics: without yet having detached from the lower-grade afflictions and so forth, one attains discerning characteristics; when discerning characteristics arises, secondary afflictions do not arise, just as when a wholesome mind arises, an unwholesome mind does not arise—it does not arise not because of being severed. With the manaskāra of detachment, it does not arise because of being severed. In the first two manaskāras, they are therefore not yet severed; in the first two stages, desire and evil may intermittently arise.

9.9

Where the treatise explains the manaskāra of preparatory culmination among the latter two manaskāras, saying, “By this condition, from all afflictions bound to the desire realm, the mind attains liberation from bondage. This is by means of the preparatory application of temporary suppression and severance, not the ultimate, permanent destruction of seeds and so forth, up to: this is called the manaskāra of preparatory culmination”: herein, it explains that the six aspects suppressing afflictions do not attain realization of the higher uninterrupted path, and is thus called temporary suppression and severance. As for this suppression and severance, whether suppressing the manifest mind or suppressing seeds, both must be suppressed. How is this known? In explaining the first two manaskāras, it says: the second manaskāra is not intermingled with hearing and contemplation, and although afflictions do not arise, because it has not suppressed the manifest mind, it is not yet called the uninterrupted path; arriving at the third manaskāra, when suppressing the functional capacity of seeds to produce manifest fruits above, it is only then called the uninterrupted path. This is performed by contaminated practice. If it were uncontaminated practice, it would require severing seeds to be called the uninterrupted path. Although the manifest mind does not arise, it is still the preparatory path. Now here it is also like this: suppressing the manifest mind constitutes the preparatory path, and suppressing seeds constitutes the uninterrupted path.

9.10

Regarding the seventh manaskāra, [where the text states:] "Immediately following this, by this cause and condition, one attains and enters the fundamental first dhyāna samādhi; the manaskāra associated with this fundamental first dhyāna samādhi is called the manaskāra of the fruit of culminating praxis": the meaning of the śāstra here is that the ninth path of liberation resides in the fundamental dhyāna, while the preceding nine unobstructed paths and eight paths of liberation all reside in the preparatory stage (sāmantaka). On this point there are two explanations. One explanation is: starting from the first dhyāna up to the third dhyāna, the nine unobstructed [paths] and nine [paths of] liberation may reside in the preparatory stage, or the ninth path of liberation may reside in the fundamental concentration. But from the fourth dhyāna upward, the ninth path of liberation is definitely in the fundamental concentration, while the preceding eight paths of liberation and nine unobstructed paths are in the preparatory stage. Why is this? Because from the third dhyāna downward, the fundamental [stage] possesses joy (prīti) and bliss (sukha), whereas the preparatory stage possesses equanimity (upekṣā). In the fundamental stage, whether roaming in contemplative review or severing defilements, there is never any feeling of equanimity; being a dull phenomenon, it is definitely absent, while bliss and joy are present because they are luminous and sharp. In the preparatory stage, whether severing defilements or roaming in contemplative review, there is luminous equanimity; only in roaming in contemplative review may there be joy and bliss, but joy and bliss are not present at the time of severing defilements. From the third dhyāna downward, two types of persons—those of sharp faculties and those of dull faculties—give rise to the unobstructed paths and the paths of liberation. For a person of sharp faculties, the ninth unobstructed path resides in the preparatory stage and is associated with equanimity; the ninth path of liberation resides in the fundamental concentration and is associated with bliss and joy. For a person of dull faculties, the ninth unobstructed path resides in the preparatory stage and is associated with equanimity; because their mind is dull, being unable to enter the fundamental concentration quickly and be associated with joy and bliss, their ninth path of liberation resides right in the preparatory concentration and is associated with equanimity. Now, when this text speaks of the seventh manaskāra entering the fundamental concentration, it refers to a person of sharp faculties who can enter the fundamental [concentration] quickly and be associated with bliss and so forth. With respect to these three dhyānas, if this seventh manaskāra resides in the preparatory stage as the path of liberation, it is associated with the feeling of equanimity; if it possesses the fundamental concentration as the path of liberation, it is associated with bliss and so forth. From the fourth dhyāna upward, the preceding eight paths of liberation and nine unobstructed paths are all in the preparatory stage; while the ninth path of liberation is necessarily in the fundamental concentration and never resides in the preparatory stage. This is the superior interpretation. Another explanation is: if one does not make such distinctions, the preceding nine unobstructed paths and eight paths of liberation reside in the preparatory stage, and the ninth path of liberation is in the fundamental concentration; this is true from the first dhyāna up to the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. What serves as proof for the former view? If one interprets it generally without further differentiating the first six manaskāras as the preparatory stage and the seventh as the fundamental, merely stating the place of the unobstructed paths and the paths of liberation, that can provisionally serve as proof. However, no explicit text has been seen, and differentiation is finer; hence the latter view takes this very text as proof. The former master harmonizes this text according to the explanation of sharp and dull faculties given above, and when we reach the sphere of empty space below, it will be explained in detail.

9.11

Regarding the śāstra's third round of explaining the manaskāras, which states: "Furthermore, the manaskāra of understanding the characteristics, with respect to what is to be severed, and so forth, up to the manaskāra of resolute conviction, properly generates praxis in order to sever and to attain": since the twenty-eighth [fascicle] states that the first two manaskāras are both the path of praxis, why does the present [text] speak only of resolute conviction as the proper praxis? The answer is: here it speaks in terms of the superior place, the place adjacent to the unobstructed path, and the place uninterrupted by hearing and reflection; therefore it speaks only of resolute conviction as the proper praxis. The earlier twenty-eighth [fascicle] discussed it according to the actual state of affairs, [wherein] understanding the characteristics should also be praxis. Another explanation is: this "properly generating praxis" does not necessarily exclude understanding the characteristics from being the path of praxis; because resolute conviction is superior in being adjacent [to the unobstructed path], it is definitively said to "properly generate praxis." It provisionally speaks of resolute conviction as the proper path of praxis without precluding understanding the characteristics, so in fact there is no contradiction, as harmonized in the Notes on the Abhidharma.

9.12

Regarding the śāstra's statement: "The manaskāra of examination can, with respect to what has been attained, free [one] from excessive pride and stably settle one's mind": why is it that when severing the superior grade it is not said that one is freed from excessive pride, nor is it said that one is freed from excessive pride after the severing of the third grade, but rather it is said that one is freed from excessive pride at the severing of the middle grade? The meaning is: the afflictions of the first six grades are coarse and easy to recognize, while the afflictions of the last three grades are subtle and difficult to discern. Having severed the coarse afflictions of the preceding superior and middle grades, not knowing that the inferior grade of afflictions remains, one gives rise to excessive pride, supposing that all nine grades have already been exhausted and that one has attained the fundamental concentration. Now, in order to abandon this pride, the abandonment of excessive pride is stated after severing the middle grade of afflictions, not after the superior grade.

9.13

Regarding the śāstra's statement: "Furthermore, the manaskāra of understanding the characteristics and the manaskāra of resolute conviction are collectively termed the conformant manaskāra, which operates in association with the antidote of revulsion": the intent here is to subsume them under the forty manaskāras, as well as under the four antidotes. The forty manaskāras are explained as in the previous eleventh fascicle. Among the forty, the conformant manaskāra corresponds to the twenty-fifth manaskāra. The conformant manaskāra feels revulsion toward the objective support and conforms to the severing of afflictions; thus the first two manaskāras are conformant. Furthermore, [the text states:] "The manaskāra of separation and the manaskāra of culminating praxis are termed antidotal manaskāras, operating in association with the antidote of severing." The antidotal manaskāra corresponds to the twenty-sixth. The antidotal manaskāra means that by this means one properly abandons all afflictions; because these two are unobstructed paths, they are subsumed under the antidotal manaskāra. Furthermore, [the text states:] "The manaskāra of gathering joy is termed an antidotal manaskāra and a manaskāra conforming to purity." The manaskāra conforming to purity corresponds to the twenty-seventh. The manaskāra conforming to purity refers to cultivating the six recollections, namely the recollection of the Buddha and so forth. The manaskāra of gathering joy, because it severs the middle grade of afflictions, is termed an antidotal manaskāra; because it clearly takes the six recollections as its objective support to cultivate a distinct joy and contemplates pure nirvāṇa, the Buddha, and so forth, it is also termed purity. Because it distinctively takes these as its objective support, it is not clarified together in one place with separation and the like. Moreover, because the preceding separation and the like do not subsume the manaskāra conforming to purity, these two are subsumed together. Question: Why are the four antidotes not subsumed here? The meaning is: because they are implicitly indicated. This speaks of severing afflictions; modeled on separation and the like, one should know that they are antidotes. If so, why does it not say "associated"? The meaning is: an antidote is prajñā, whereas a manaskāra is mind. The previous text also subsumed antidotes, and the mind is associated with prajñā, hence it is called "associated." Here it only clarifies manaskāra and does not clarify the antidote; lacking prajñā, it does not say "associated." Furthermore, [the text states:] "The manaskāra of examination is termed the manaskāra conforming to examination"; this corresponds to the twenty-eighth manaskāra. The manaskāra conforming to examination refers to examining whether the afflictions have been severed or not, or examining the principles of the phenomena previously realized. In comparison with the preceding, this is also the antidote of distant remove, the enduring antidote, and so forth, but now they are omitted for brevity. In comparison with the preceding separation, it is its advancing path, hence it is called the antidote of distant remove; in comparison with the manaskāra of gathering joy, it is the path of liberation, hence it is the enduring antidote. Now, because it is explained after gathering joy, it is not said to be subsumed under antidotes, as they were already mutually un-subsumed earlier. This is harmonized in detail in the Notes on the Abhidharma.

9.14

Regarding the śāstra's statement: "Thus, the remaining four kinds of manaskāras should be known to be subsumed within the six manaskāras, namely the conformant manaskāra, and so forth": the meaning is that the four manaskāras are outside the seven manaskāras, hence they are called "remaining." All four manaskāras are manaskāras among the forty manaskāras; now they are subsumed within the six among the six manaskāras, hence it says "subsumed within the six manaskāras." Question: Why is the mutual subsumption with the seventh manaskāra not explained here? The explanation is: the seventh manaskāra is the fruit, whereas these four manaskāras and the previous six are all causes; causes can be mutually subsumed, but not the fruit, so the seventh manaskāra is not subsumed. Here, using the seven to subsume the forty, it only subsumes four. Later in that eleventh fascicle, using the forty to subsume the seven, within the seven there is the meaning of completely subsuming the forty manaskāras. Now, using the seven to subsume the forty, rather than the forty to subsume the seven, they are incomplete and not subsumed. There are differences; verify them.

9.15

Regarding the śāstra's explanation of the first dhyāna as coarse, which states: "The nature of coarse mental speech is called vitarka": there are two explanations. One says: the names of phenomena are expressed by verbal speech; their essence is coarse mind. Vitarka can deliberate on phenomena in a manner resembling verbal speech, hence it is called having the nature of mental speech. Furthermore, spoken names are verbal names, while reflective thought is a mental name; because vitarka is the name for reflective thought, it is called mental speech. In the Hīnayāna, vitarka and vicāra are associated with the fundamental [dhyāna]. Someone says: "Now in the Mahāyāna it is not so; vitarka and vicāra exist only in the preparatory stages." This is not correct. Elsewhere it is also said: "Within samādhi there is no vitarka or vicāra." There is no vitarka or vicāra that generates speech, but it is not that there is no subtle vitarka or vicāra. Furthermore, this is to set up factors for the fundamental dhyāna to distinguish it from the first five factors of the formless [attainments].

9.16

Regarding the śāstra's explanation of the category subsuming vitarka and vicāra, "subsumed by external āyatanas" refers to the dharmāyatana.

9.17

Regarding the śāstra's statement: "if abiding in the predominant": this refers to the lower bhūmi abiding in the predominance of suffering.

9.18

Regarding the śāstra and sūtra's explanation of obtaining the joy and bliss born of separation: "'Separation' means having already obtained the manaskāra of culminating praxis; 'born' means that it is immediately born taking this as cause and taking this as condition; 'joy and bliss' means having already obtained the sought-after purpose": this is stated in terms of a person of sharp faculties whose ninth path of liberation enters the fundamental dhyāna, hence it says they generate joy and bliss. If it is a person of dull faculties, their ninth path of liberation resides in the preparatory concentration, and only afterward can they enter the fundamental stage and generate joy and bliss.

9.19

Regarding the śāstra's statement: "and can properly abide for up to seven days and seven nights": this clarifies that entering the concentration one can abide for up to seven days and seven nights. Why does it not speak of a longer time, but only of seven days and so forth? Because in that desire realm, solid food lasts for seven days. If one exceeds seven days, upon emerging from concentration the body will disintegrate; therefore, one cannot remain for a long period. Furthermore, this provisionally refers to the time after which one then enters the cessation attainment (nirodhasamāpatti), not precluding many months and years. If one emerges from concentration after exceeding seven days, the body disintegrates; if one emerges from concentration within seven days, the body does not disintegrate. Now, discussing the time of non-disintegration, it merely says seven days. Question: If one enters the cessation attainment after exceeding seven days, should one die upon emerging from concentration? The meaning says: Not so. If one enters concentration for a long time, because the power of concentration sustains it, one does not die. Now also, upon emerging from concentration, because one immediately enters a concentration with mind, one also does not die. Question: If one also emerges from the cessation attainment, since the cessation attainment does not sustain the body, does it disintegrate or not? Answer: It disintegrates.

9.20

Regarding the śāstra's explanation of the second dhyāna, which states: "The so-called concentration means having already obtained the manaskāra of culminating praxis": this differs from the first dhyāna. That one is called "born of separation," while this one is called "born of concentration." In that one, obtaining initial separation from the bonds of the desire realm is called "born of separation"; in this one, because one has previously already obtained concentration, it is called "born of concentration."

9.21

Regarding the śāstra's explanation of the third dhyāna, which states: "Below the third dhyāna, there is no such bliss or uninterrupted equanimity": below this there is bliss whose essence is joy; the gladdening of body and mind is bliss. Now in the third dhyāna, the gladdening of mind is also called bliss; because bliss is supreme, it says that the lower stages have no such bliss. Although there is equanimity in the internal practice of the lower stages, it is not distinctly designated with that name; furthermore, because it is interrupted, it is not uninterrupted equanimity, hence it says there is none. It is not that interrupted equanimity is also absent so as to be called having no equanimity.

9.22

The treatise, explaining the fourth dhyāna, states: "Furthermore, because the types and force of the antidotes here are similar, the antidote that abandons pleasure is briefly not stated; only the abandonment of pleasure effected by the antidote is spoken of." Here, equanimity, mindfulness, and correct knowledge are called the antidotes; the pleasure of the third dhyāna is called that which is countered. In the sūtras only the abandoned pleasure is stated, without mentioning the capable abandoners—equanimity, mindfulness, and correct knowledge—because the third dhyāna has already explained the antidotal dharmas of equanimity, mindfulness, and so forth, and these are similar to the antidotal dharmas of this fourth dhyāna; hence they are termed "types." Their names and essences are similar, so it says "types." Both can eliminate defilements, being similar in both places, so it says "their force is similar." "Briefly not stated": this explains the reason why the sūtra does not explicitly elucidate the antidotes of the fourth dhyāna.

9.23

The treatise states: "Because one repeatedly cultivates this very [equanimity, and so forth], one is able to discard the superior pleasure of the stage of the third dhyāna, which prevented emancipation from the third dhyāna; therefore, it is said: 'because pleasure is abandoned.'" Here, the pleasure bound to the third dhyāna binds the practitioner, preventing emancipation from the third dhyāna so that one cannot attain that higher fourth absorption. Now, repeatedly cultivating equanimity, mindfulness, and so forth, one is able to discard this absorption's pleasure.

9.24

The treatise states: "Owing to these causes and conditions, whether what was abandoned previously or what is abandoned now, they are collectively stated as 'abandonment of pleasure, abandonment of suffering, the previous cessation of grief and joy.'" The abandonment of pleasure is called "abandoned now"; the remaining feeling faculties are called "abandoned previously." Therefore, in the repetitive counteraction below, it states that even upon entering the first dhyāna, the feeling of grief ceased. Here, as in the eleventh fascicle above: Why is the faculty of suffering said not to be abandoned in the first dhyāna? Because that category of dauṣṭhulya has not yet been abandoned. If the body is in the lower realm, that is admissible; but for what reason, when born in the first dhyāna, is the faculty of suffering not active even though it is not yet abandoned? Because the various sufferings subsumed under its counterpart companion, the faculty of grief, have already been abandoned by that [stage], yet that dauṣṭhulya cannot yet be abandoned. If the faculty of suffering were abandoned in the first dhyāna, then when the practitioner enters the first two dhyānas, there would be no distinction between the states effected by feeling; since both have joy and pleasure, there would be no distinction; but because dauṣṭhulya is not yet abandoned, a distinction is said to exist; and the sūtra states that by emerging from the various feelings, there is definitely a distinction. Question: Merely by the abandonment or non-abandonment of vitarka and vicāra, would one not obtain a distinction? Why must it require the abandonment of the faculty of suffering to state that there is a distinction? Meaning: Vitarka and vicāra, relative to joy and pleasure, are not mutual obstacles; thus one cannot state a distinction in joy based on the abandonment of vitarka and vicāra. The joy of the first dhyāna possesses the faculty of suffering, so superior benefit is not yet spoken of; the joy of the second dhyāna has already abandoned suffering, so its joy is pure and superior. If one were to state a distinction based on the presence or absence of vitarka and vicāra, the presence or absence of dharmas would be boundlessly varied—could its dhyāna be distinguished? Now, turning the objection around: the feelings of pleasure and joy should have no distinction, because the faculty of suffering, being the same [nature] as joy, pleasure, and so forth, is a mutual obstacle of feeling. If one does not take the abandonment of the faculty of suffering as the distinction between the joy of the first and second dhyānas, the feelings such as joy and pleasure of the first and second dhyānas should have no distinction, because suffering was already abandoned earlier at the time of the first dhyāna. This abandonment is of dauṣṭhulya; its seeds are not said to be abandoned, for an arhat still possesses them.

9.25

The treatise, explaining the sphere of infinite space, states: "All differential perceptions that occur in those various aggregates—namely, the perceptions of drink, food, vases, clothing, pendant adornments, up to mountains, forests, and so forth—one proceeds without paying attention to any of these," and so on. This is based on a body situated in the desire realm: when relying on the sphere of space to dispel perceptions of matter, one also dispels the material objects of the desire realm; therefore, it speaks of dwellings, gardens, and so on, not that a body born in the form realm wishing to enter space has these perceptions.

9.26

The treatise states: "It should be known that here, relying on the preparatory [stage] up until one has not entered the higher fundamental absorption, one takes only space as object; if one attains the fundamental, taking space as object, one also grasps all the aggregates belonging to one's own stage. Furthermore, in the preparatory [stage], one also takes all the aggregates of the lower stage as object." Commentary: Above the fourth dhyāna, the ninth path of liberation and the seventh manaskāra are present only within the fundamental absorption. At that single kṣaṇa when one first attains the path of liberation, one takes only the aggregates of one's own stage as object; with the mind of the second kṣaṇa, one can take the aggregates of higher and lower stages as object. Here it is spoken of in terms of the very first kṣaṇa of the path of liberation; therefore it says "also grasps all the aggregates belonging to one's own stage." In the preparatory absorption, because the preceding nine uninterrupted paths take only the lower stage as object to generate revulsion, it says "also takes all the aggregates of the lower stage as object"; the preceding eight paths of liberation also take the aggregates of higher and lower stages as object. Here it is spoken of in terms of the uninterrupted path; therefore it says "also takes the aggregates of the lower stage as object," yet it does not exclusively preclude the preparatory and fundamental stages from taking only higher, lower, and their own stages' aggregates as object. In the preparatory absorption, the eight paths of liberation are not discussed; the treatise discusses the nine uninterrupted [paths], and therefore states that they take lower aggregates as object. In the fundamental absorption, it speaks of the first kṣaṇa and conceals the second kṣaṇa onward; therefore it states that it "also grasps all the aggregates belonging to one's own stage." Thus the text of the treatise does not say "takes only the aggregates of one's own stage as object," but says "also grasps." These uninterrupted and liberation paths are explained as above under the first dhyāna. If there are contradictions with the Prakaraṇāryavācā and the second fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya[-vyākhyā], they are explained there by the Great Master.

9.27

The treatise, in explaining the pinnacle of existence, has three parts: First, directly clarifying the desire to advance to the higher absorption, generating a perception of renunciation out of revulsion for the sphere of nothingness; that is, from "Furthermore" down to "one is then able to discard the perception of the sphere of nothingness." Second, explaining the name "neither perception nor non-perception." Within this there are two parts: first, explaining "not with perception"; second, explaining "not without perception." From "Owing to these causes and conditions, when previously entering the absorption of the sphere of nothingness" down to "namely, either the perception of having something or the perception of having nothing" clarifies "not with perception." From the sphere of consciousness downward is the perception of having something; the sphere of nothingness is the perception of having nothing; therefore it is said to be "not with perception"—that is, neither having the perception of having something nor the perception of having nothing. Now in the pinnacle of existence, one does not have the previous two perceptions. Within "not with perception," the two "not with perception" are concluded; now within "not without perception," it is also because it is not the two non-perceptions. In the second major section, the second part then clarifies "not without perception." Non-perception is of two kinds: first, the absorption of non-perception; second, the absorption of cessation. In both of these absorptions, the mind is entirely extinguished. The pinnacle of existence is now not like this; therefore it is said to be "not without perception"—that is, it is not the two absorptions of non-perception, because subtle perception exists within the pinnacle of existence. Third, clarifying that at the time of the pinnacle of existence, one transcends the lower sphere of nothingness, and so on, as well as the preparatory [stage] of its own place, and enters the fundamental: namely, from "at this place, when generating decisive resolution" downward.

9.28

The treatise, explaining the two mindless absorptions, states: "Thus, the one in training has already departed from greed for nothingness," and so forth. This is based on eradicating defilements and attaining realization. As in the notes to the ninth fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya[-vyākhyā] harmonizing the peaceful abiding and so on, it is explained in detail in those notes. As for texts in other places stating that the absorption of cessation is first generated only in the desire realm, this refers to relying on teaching: when first training, one must rely on the desire realm; later, when it first arises, it may also be obtained in the form realm. Just as a person of the third fruit who had not yet obtained this absorption previously in the desire realm obtains it only after being born in the form realm, this absorption can then first arise, yet this is because they previously first heard this teaching in the desire realm, and only later gave rise to it in the form realm.

9.29

The treatise, in explaining the five supernormal knowledges, states that the knowledge of death and rebirth can also be prajñā associated with the divine eye, because when taking future events after death as objects, it is also observed with the eye-consciousness through the supernormal power of death and rebirth.

9.30

The treatise mentions "tula cotton": the cocoon of the wild silkworm is called tula cotton.

9.31

The treatise, in explaining the twelve perceptions, mentions that the first five perceptions are the methods for cultivating the supernormal knowledge of psychic power, and the remaining four successively cultivate the methods for each of the supernormal knowledges. In cultivating psychic power, the fourth, cultivation of body and mind, means that both body and mind can be transformed. If it is changing, it is bodily action; if it is conjuring, it is the mind of conjuration.

9.32

The treatise, fifth, explaining the perception of decisive resolution, states: "resolving the far to be near" means compressing what is long into short. "Resolving the near to be far" means extending what is short to be long. Resolving coarse and subtle forms is transforming bodily shape and substance. Mutually converting earth and water is transforming the four great elements. Here only the two transformations of visible matter and sound are stated, without discussing the remaining sensory dusts, as explained in detail in the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra.

9.33

The treatise states: "exercising mastery in altering a portion of the derived matter of the four great elements in the Brahma world." "A portion of derived matter" refers to the two kinds, visible matter and sound; hence it is called "a portion." Because it does not alter touch, the five sense faculties, and so forth, but only external objects, it is called "a portion." Furthermore, according to what is transformed by absorption, it is only a portion of two aspects and cannot transform everything in the Brahma world; hence it is called "a portion."

9.34

The treatise, in explaining the method for cultivating the supernormal knowledge of the divine ear, states: "or wide and long places." First, a marketplace; second, a place where children play: these are called wide and long places. Furthermore, because the place is broad, long, and vast, the crowd is also boundless, meaning to take what is multitudinous. The heaven of the first dhyāna is called Brahma, Brahma meaning pure: because it is first departed from desire, it obtains the name pure. The second dhyāna is called Light: because it is first departed from vitarka and vicāra, it obtains the name Light. The third dhyāna obtains the name Pure: because it obtains superior pleasure, superior pleasure is called pure. In the fourth dhyāna, ordinary beings and noble ones jointly inhabit three heavens: the first gets its name from Cloudless, the rest are named according to the increase in merit, and the five names of the anāgāmin heavens.

9.35

The treatise, explaining the formless realm, states: "within the common character of beings who conform to practice." In the formless realm, there is no distinct place for receiving retribution; conforming to the three grades of practice, one directly receives this retribution; hence they are called "gods who conform to practice."

9.36

The treatise states: "However, the actions of their abiding have their distinctions." This means that the actions performed while abiding in the three grades have their distinctions.

9.37

Fascicle Thirty-Four

9.38

The treatise states: "Having understood each of the four aspects of the truths, this is called the manaskāra of understanding the characteristics." Here, using the seven manaskāras to delineate up to the stages of having training and beyond training: understanding characteristics and decisive resolution are before the path of seeing—that is, understanding characteristics is in the five mental stabilizations and the general and specific characteristics of the smṛtyupasthānas; decisive resolution, below in the text, is in the four wholesome roots; from detachment onward is above the path of seeing; detachment is up through the sixteen minds of the path of seeing; examination is in the path of cultivation up to prior to the diamond[-like samādhi]—all examination and cultivation of what is abandoned or unabandoned is the manaskāra of examination; from the diamond[-like samādhi] backward, up to abandoning the eight grades of defilements of non-perception, all are called gathering pleasure—that is, all uninterrupted paths within the path of cultivation are this; culmination of preparatory practice is in the diamond-like mind; the fruit of culmination is in the stage beyond training. Now, wishing to clarify what is prior to the path of seeing, it states: "this is called the manaskāra of understanding the characteristics." Below "This is like...", it explains the sequence among the various stages; the treatise explains it itself, and one will know it by checking it.

9.39

The treatise states: "As explained in detail in the Saptasūryodana-sūtra." This is the Kalpa-sūtra; because it speaks of the events of the seven suns, it is named the Saptasūryodana-sūtra.

9.40

The treatise, explaining the seventh among the eight causes and conditions of transformation, dried by wind: "namely, when a great wind blows and fans wet clothes, wet ground, crops, and dense forests, parching and withering them." This means that when there are wet clothes, or sometimes wet ground, crops, and so forth, a great wind fans them, making them parched and withered. Parched (chū jí fan): as the world says, "this is completely parched."

9.41

The treatise, explaining the fifteen kinds of produced transformations, in the eighth, transformation of cold and heat, states "dry speech." This means that due to heat, when speaking it is dry; as worldly people say "dry speech," this is a transformation of moisture.

9.42

The treatise says: "Because of contacting a contact agreeable to pleasant feeling, when one experiences the pleasure arisen with the contact of pleasure as condition, one can by oneself cognize the stage of pleasant feeling." Here it mentions pleasant contact for the time being, not yet having mentioned painful [contact] and the like; therefore it says, "Because of contacting a contact agreeable to pleasant feeling," which excludes painful and other feelings. Regarding "when one experiences the pleasure arisen with the contact of pleasure as condition": the condition of pleasant contact is the object—that which is capable of producing pleasant contact. The intention here is to say that when one experiences the pleasure arisen from the object of contact agreeable to pleasure, one can by oneself know this stage of pleasant feeling.

9.43

In explaining the sixteen kinds of alterative natures, the treatise concludes by saying: "The former six kinds are matters of appropriation; the latter ten kinds are matters of bodily requisites. The six kinds that are matters of appropriation" refer to: first, land; second, gardens; third, mountains; fourth, waters; fifth, activities; sixth, storehouses. The ten kinds of bodily requisites are: first, drink; second, food; third, conveyances; fourth, clothing; fifth, ornaments; sixth, dancing, singing, music, and the like; seventh, perfumes and garlands; eighth, utensils; ninth, light and dark; tenth, male and female. According to the preceding enumeration, drink and food were each one matter; in the present explanation, drink and food are combined into one, which is why they are merged as a single kind.

9.44

The treatise says: "Having thus observed the impermanence of alteration by the power of predominant manaskāra of direct perception"—this recapitulates and concludes the preceding. Up to "one should correctly infer," and so forth, it clarifies that while the gross destruction of the various forms and the like is easy to know, momentary arising and ceasing are difficult to know because they are subtle. Now, wishing to explain this, it first opens the topic. From "How does one infer?" down to "Therefore, conditioned formations must certainly have momentary arising and ceasing," it clarifies that because of the presence of minor, subtle arising and ceasing, there can be gross alterative arising and ceasing, not that one knows the existence of gross arising and ceasing from seeing minor arising and ceasing. From "Because they exist due to the combination of various conditions" down to "Having arisen, they perish naturally without waiting for conditions of destruction," it clarifies and resolves an implicit objection that ceasing has conditions. The implicit objection asks: "Is it known whether arising and ceasing both have conditions or not?" Now it resolves this: these dharmas have arising because of the combination of various conditions; arising thus has conditions, but [dharmas] perish naturally without waiting for conditions, meaning that the dharma of ceasing has no conditions.

9.45

From "All such conditions of alteration can cause conditioned formations..." down to "...not that all of them do not arise at all," the treatise clarifies and resolves an implicit objection. The implicit objection says: "For instance, the scorching sun turns a green leaf yellow; is it not by the sun that the green is made not to appear? Thus the sun is the condition for the destruction of the green." Now it resolves this: "The sun can alter the green to yellow; how can you say that the sun is the condition of alteration in this way? This sun is the condition for the subsequent arising of the yellow color, not the condition for the destruction of the preceding green color. Why is this? Because worldly people, after the preceding green color has ceased, directly see the subsequent yellow color arise; this yellow is dissimilar to the green, and the arising of this yellow can be established as existent. Therefore we know that the sun serves as a condition for the arising of yellow, not as a condition for the ceasing of green. If, after the green was destroyed by the scorching sun, the subsequent yellow did not arise, one could say that the sun served as a condition for the ceasing of green, and that ceasing had conditioned arising; but since the subsequent yellow indeed arises, it is clear that the sun serves as a condition for the arising of the subsequent yellow, not as a condition for the destruction of the green, and not that all of them are rendered unattainable. If, after the green ceased, all subsequent dharmas were entirely unattainable, then the sun would be the condition for the destruction of the green." This is the explanation by contraposition.

9.46

The treatise says: "Or there are conditioned formations that, having been destroyed, even any remaining shadow is entirely unattainable." This is the opponent's objection: "If, after this ceases, another dharma arises, it could be explained as before. But if, after this dharma ceases, no other dharma arises, what then? For instance, when boiling down water, in the end there is no water; when fire burns the world, in the end there are no ashes. Fire boils down water; the fire that boils the water thus serves as a condition for the exhaustion of the boiled water, and so forth. Therefore we know that the dharma of ceasing can indeed have conditions."

9.47

The passage from the treatise saying, "They too serve as conditions successively and reciprocally, up to doing such actions," is the treatise master's explanation. Now the explanation is: this is the same as the previous explanation. The fire that boils down water merely serves as a condition for the dharmas that arise successively afterward; when in the end there is no water, it is not by the fire that there is now no water. When there is now no water, its potency naturally ceases to exist, leaving the fire with no condition for subsequent arisen dharmas; therefore the dharma of ceasing here likewise has no condition. Now one raises an objection in aid: "Could not the sun serve both as a condition for the arising of the yellow and as a condition for the ceasing of the preceding green?" Answer: "It is not so. If a single condition could cause both arising and ceasing, then because arising and ceasing are mutually contradictory, how could a contradictory condition be one? If the conditioning cause capable of producing were one, the produced dharmas should not be contradictory, and should also be one. Furthermore, if the dharma of ceasing had a condition, the condition would be capable of producing an existent dharma, and what exists would be ceasing itself; with ceasing being the condition, if there is a condition then it can produce, and thus a condition produces arising—what does it have to do with ceasing? Therefore we know that the dharma of ceasing ceases spontaneously."

9.48

In refuting Īśvara as the cause, the treatise says: "If one uses solely that Īśvara as the condition, then conditioned formations and that Īśvara should both be fundamentally existent; why would they arise in an instant?" The intent of this refutation is: if Īśvara is fundamentally existent, then whenever Īśvara exists, conditioned formations also exist; since conditioned formations are simultaneous with Īśvara, we know that conditioned formations are also fundamentally existent. If they are fundamentally existent, they are eternal and should not be called 'conditioned formations' (saṃskāra), because in their doctrine conditioned formations are not fundamentally existent. Having seen this refutation, the opponent then establishes further: "Īśvara is inherently fundamentally existent, whereas conditioned formations arise only afterward." Therefore the treatise next says, "If it is said that Īśvara exists first," and so forth. Seeing this change of thesis, the treatise master pursues the refutation further: if conditioned formations arise only after Īśvara, then conditioned formations are not produced solely by Īśvara, but also employ other conditions; therefore the treatise next says, "These other conditioned formations do not arise with Īśvara alone as condition," and so forth. If they used Īśvara as condition, then since conditioned formations would exist when Īśvara exists, both should be fundamentally existent; if conditioned formations arise only afterward, then they are initiated afterward through desire and prayer. If conditioned formations take desire and prayer as cause, why would Īśvara alone be the cause? Therefore the treatise next says, "If it is said that Īśvara acts according to his desires, exertion, and prayers," and so forth. Having tentatively granted desire as the cause, the treatise must question and refute it further; therefore the treatise next says, "If so, does this desire have a cause?" and so forth. Supposing that desire has a cause and takes Īśvara as cause, then since Īśvara is fundamentally existent, desire should also be fundamentally existent; whenever Īśvara exists, desire would exist, and thus it is refuted as with conditioned formations earlier; therefore the treatise next says, "If it is said to have a cause, such as taking Īśvara as its cause," and so forth. Supposing the view that desire takes Īśvara as cause has been refuted, there would then be another cause, not taking Īśvara as cause. If so, and desire has a distinct cause, just as conditioned formations earlier distinctly took desire, exertion, and prayer as cause, now it is said that it again takes desire, exertion, and prayer, having a distinct dharma apart from Īśvara as its cause; in that case, conditioned formations arise from distinct causes—why need one falsely postulate a useless Īśvara? Therefore the treatise next says, "If it is said that this desire has another cause," and so forth.

9.49

The treatise says: "Thus, briefly by the power of three kinds of predominant manaskāra... up to... by the power of inferential manaskāra." As the citation of the sūtra explaining impermanence at the beginning of the previous fascicle generates pure faith, this is "by the predominant power of the manaskāra of pure faith" here. As the eight conditions, the fifteen kinds of alteration, the sixteen kinds of alteration, and so forth explained before are all directly perceived, this is the second, "by the predominant power of the manaskāra of direct perception" here. As momentary arising and ceasing in the inference that ceasing all has conditions just preceding this can be inferred, this is "by the predominant power of inferential manaskāra" here. All of these are the three kinds of manaskāra here.

9.50

The treatise says: "Among the five aspects capable of conforming to the cultivation of impermanence mentioned before, the two aspects of alteration and destruction have already been explained. How does one further contemplate impermanence through the aspect of separation?" At the beginning of the fascicle it was said that one enters the truth of suffering through ten aspects; among the four aspects under suffering, in the first five aspects one enters impermanence. Among these five aspects, the first, the aspect of alteration, is the alterations explained previously through the eight conditions, the fifteen kinds, the sixteen kinds, and so forth; the second, the aspect of destruction, is the aspect of destruction explained previously through inferring that there is momentary arising and ceasing; thus it says, "the two aspects have already been explained." Now comes the third: "How does one further contemplate impermanence through the aspect of separation?"

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瑜伽師地論略纂 — Classical Chinese