成唯識論述記 6.522

6.522

The Commentary states: Regarding the twenty propositions, fascicle one of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: as in grasping form as self, self possessing form, form belonging to self, and self being within form. There are four for each aggregate, making twenty propositions for the five aggregates; within the twenty propositions, five are views of a self, and fifteen are views of what belongs to a self. Why are five views of a self and fifteen views of what belongs to a self? Because of what belongs to a self as associated, what belongs to a self as attendant, and what belongs to a self as unseparated; therefore fifteen kinds are what belongs to a self, as widely explained with questions and answers in fascicle one of the Abhidharmasamuccaya. Discriminating the mode of activity in reference to the aggregates, but not discriminating the locus from which they arise, there are twenty propositions. 'Discriminating the mode of activity in reference to the aggregates': 'mode' refers to the cognitive mode of activity, which is the cognitive mode of activity of self and what belongs to a self. 'What' refers to what belongs to a self: as when merely discriminating the cognitive mode of activity of self and what belongs to a self with respect to the aggregate of form, without discriminating the locus from which this stated 'what belongs to a self' arises; for what belongs to a self must arise subsequent to the view of a self. Here, regarding the three [kinds of] belonging stated with respect to the aggregate of form, one does not discriminate by saying, 'Grasping which aggregate as a self does this belonging to a self rely on, and from which does it arise?'; one merely discriminates generally the modes of self and what belongs to a self. Question: Neither does one discriminate which 'what belongs to a self' the self that grasps form arises from; why only say that one does not discriminate the locus? Answer: The self is the fundamental root; it does not arise from another. When stating that form is the self, the discrimination is already complete; it is not that its locus of origin is not discriminated. What belongs to a self must arise subsequent to the view of a self, so they are not the same. The sixty-two views and so on should be understood by analogy with this. Regarding the sixty-five, fascicle ten—at the end of the chapter on Supreme Mundane Dharmas in the first [part] of the Saṃyuktābhidharma-hṛdaya-śāstra (or Vibhāṣā)—discriminates them according to aggregates, dhātus, āyatanas, and so on. The word 'and so on' here encompasses āyatanas and dhātus. For instance, taking form as the self, each of the remaining four aggregates has three [relations of] belonging, namely being my ornament, my servant, and my utensil, thus making twelve; form as one self makes a total of thirteen. Thus across the five aggregates there are sixty [views of] what belongs to a self and five views of a self. These are all discriminating the mode of activity in reference to the aggregates, and also discriminating the locus from which they arise. Moreover, these are arisen through conceptual discrimination, not innate, because the innate self is not individually conceived. What proves this? Fascicle fifty-eight states: The twenty propositions of satkāyadṛṣṭi are all abandoned through seeing suffering, relying purely on conceptual discrimination, not on innate [afflictions]. Although the sixty-five views lack a direct text, by analogy with the twenty propositions they are also purely conceptually discriminated. This is because all of these arise only after purposive mental attention and discriminating modes of activity in reference to the aggregates, etc. However, grasping the aggregates collectively as a self also extends to conceptual discrimination, as stated in the Prakaraṇāryavācā. This is discussed based on all ordinary persons (pṛthagjana), not that a single person possesses all these views.