成唯識論述記 3.812

3.812

The Commentary states: Just as the root consciousness in the causal stage is associated only with the sensation of equanimity, because it perpetually operates spontaneously, because it does not make discriminations, because it is devoid of alteration, and because it is unshakable—as stated in the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra: it is unshakable, unlike the other wisdoms. Relying on which dhyāna does this wisdom arise? Some say it extends to the four formless realms and the six stages of the form realm, because discursive anāsrava extends to these stages. That which gives rise to actual manifestation is only the fourth dhyāna, because it mostly relies on divine abodes. Because this wisdom mostly gives rise to great compassion, and great compassion is only in the fourth dhyāna. This is the root of virtues, and virtues mostly rely on the fourth dhyāna, as stated in the seventh fascicle of the Samuccaya and the fourteenth of the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā. Some say it extends to the lower six dhyānas, because no reasoning precludes it. In the form realm there is a mind that takes all as objects, but not in the formless realm. Even if the formless realm could be universal, it could not take all as objects thought-moment by thought-moment; therefore, it exists only within the six stages of the form realm. However, one perpetually abides in that fourth dhyāna because it is preeminent; although it exists in lower stages, it is still only with the sensation of equanimity, because the sensation of equanimity is tranquil, unshakable, and unalterable. Fascicle sixty-three states that the ālayavijñāna is accompanied by the sensation of equanimity and operates uninterruptedly through the stages of the three sensations; the remaining three sensations should be known as induced by reflective thought, not being innate and brought into manifestation by occasional attention; that innate sensation is extremely subtle, so it is difficult to distinguish. The "three sensations" mentioned here are pain, pleasure, and equanimity. As for "the others," in this Buddhabhūmi it parallels the causal sensation of equanimity, so it cannot give rise to the two sensations of pleasure and joy, since these are induced by reflective thought. Some say it exists exclusively in the fourth dhyāna, and is completely absent in the other stages. Fascicle sixty-nine states that the Tathāgata's virtues mostly rely on the fourth [dhyāna], as in entering the path of vision. Inferring from this, among these three explanations, the first interpretation is superior: although both the form and formless realms possess this wisdom, and cultivation increases its seeds, it definitely does not manifest in actual operation, just like the conventional wisdoms on the borders of the three categories, because it does not alter and is unshakable. Even if it extends to the ten stages, existing in the anāsrava stages, there is no logical obstruction; this being merely discursive contemplation presents no logical contradiction. This is the second general section, determining the gate of association.