成唯識論述記 5

English (machine translation) 5

Language: English

The Treatise says: As for the subsequent immediately antecedent opening-and-guiding basis (samanantara-pratyaya / samanantarātīta-āśraya), [some say: The first five consciousnesses take only the sixth consciousness as their opening-and-guiding basis, because they operate in one single moment] and do not continue.

5.3

The Commentary states: This is the position of Nanda and his followers. The text is divided into three parts: 1. discerning the five consciousnesses; 2. discerning the sixth; 3. discerning the seventh and eighth. The present text is the first. This basis is placed at the end, hence it is again said to be 'subsequent'. The name 'opening-and-guiding basis' has already been explained above. This master's meaning is: as stated in fascicle one of the Yogācārabhūmi, etc., regarding the fourth of the six operations of the five consciousnesses: 'They cognize for only one single moment'; and fascicle three states: 'Furthermore, it is not the case that the bodies of the five consciousnesses arise simultaneously in two moments, nor do they arise successively without interruption.' Therefore, in the Mahāyāna, the five consciousnesses last for only one moment and definitely do not continue in succession. This is necessarily so from beginning to end. Fascicle three also states: 'Furthermore, after the five consciousnesses arise for one moment, immediately from this the mental consciousness definitely arises. Immediately from this, either there is distraction, or the auditory consciousness arises, or whichever of the remaining five consciousnesses arises,' and so forth. Therefore, we know that the five consciousnesses, both before and after within their own category and before and after with respect to others, do not continue in succession.

5.4

[Treatise:] They must [take] the sixth consciousness [as their opening-and-guiding basis].

5.5

The Commentary states: As cited several times before, they do not arise through their own power. Fascicle three also states: 'It is said that the visual consciousness and the like turn in accordance with the mental consciousness,' which also means they take only the sixth mental consciousness as their immediately antecedent basis. The seventh and eighth consciousnesses have no power in this regard; they do not induce these to arise and do not open and guide them; therefore, the first five consciousnesses each rely solely on the sixth.

5.6

[Treatise:] The sixth mental consciousness [takes the first six consciousnesses] as its opening-and-guiding basis.

5.7

The Commentary states: Because it is sometimes induced to arise by the five consciousnesses. Fascicle three states: 'Immediately after the five consciousnesses, the mental consciousness definitely arises,' which is proof of this; that is, the mental consciousness arises after the clear and distinct mind. Thus, taking itself and the five consciousnesses together among the eight consciousnesses, it takes the first six consciousnesses as its opening-and-guiding basis.

5.8

[Treatise:] The seventh and eighth consciousnesses [take only their own respective category] as their opening-and-guiding basis.

5.9

The Commentary states: Because they continue in their own stream and do not depend on the power of others to be induced to arise, they take only their own category as their basis. Question: When the wisdom of equality (samatā-jñāna) arises and so forth, why is it not this basis? Answer: That [wisdom] originally arises of itself; it is only caused to transform by the sixth consciousness, not induced to begin arising by it now; therefore, it is not this basis. That power is distant and indirect; this is the common view.

5.10

[Treatise:] There is an opinion: That explanation does not fathom the ultimate principle.

5.11

The Commentary states: This is Sthiramati's explanation. The text has two parts: 1. refutation; 2. setting forth the correct meaning. In the refutation, there are three parts: 1. general rejection; 2. specific refutation; 3. conclusion. This is the first, completely dismissing the previous position, hence saying that it 'does not fathom'.

5.12

[Treatise:] First, with respect to the first five consciousnesses, [at the stage of non-mastery, when hastily encountering an object, and when encountering an ordinary object, they operate for only one moment; it] may be as you have stated.

5.13

The Commentary states: Below is the specific refutation, which has four parts: 1. refuting the five consciousnesses; 2. refuting the sixth; 3. refuting the manas; 4. refuting the eighth. In refuting the five consciousnesses, first there is a concession, followed by a retraction; this is the concession. The former master held that the five consciousnesses arise for only a single thought-moment; now this is refuted first, hence it says 'first, as for the previous five kinds of consciousnesses,' etc. This means that the five consciousnesses have three states in which, for the most part, they can arise for one moment: 1. the state of non-mastery; 2. the state of hastily encountering an object; 3. the state of encountering an ordinary object. The term 'state' in the first applies to the latter two places; the term 'encountering' in the second runs through the third; the term 'object' in the last also applies to the second. If in these three states, it may be as you say; but outside these three states, in other cases, they should continue in succession.

5.14

Below, under the retraction, there are three retractions; first, inverting the state of non-mastery.

5.15

[Treatise:] If it is in the state of mastery, [or when purposefully observing an object, or when encountering an eminent object, why would they not continue in succession?]

5.16

The Commentary states: Overturning the first stage—here there are two explanations. According to the incorrect view, it is because in the first bhūmi one is also able to transform the five vijñānas. If one takes the correct view, this stage is from the eighth bhūmi onward, where one is capable in all respects of operating spontaneously; here, because one can also obtain the mutual functioning of the five sāsrava sense faculties, and the anāsrava excellence does not belong to the preceding stages. However, because this raises what is superior, it speaks of the Tathāgatas. Next, the word "and so forth" is intended to subsume others: only great bodhisattvas can begin to do so, while others cannot. That is to say, the World-Honoured Buddhas have mastery over objects: their transformations are all accomplished; they hear sounds with the eye, and their sense faculties function mutually. Without needing discrimination, they constantly cognize this; hence it is called "spontaneous." There are no further doubts or hesitations; hence it is said to be "determinate." With nothing left unknown, there is no searching; they constantly and determinately cognize. Why should the groups of these five vijñānas not be continuous? The first and third fascicles and so forth of the Yogācārabhūmi say: if one is not determinate regarding this, an intention to search arises in the mind after the five vijñānas, because it was not previously determined; the Buddhas have already determined beforehand, and therefore have no searching. That treatise also says: the preceding three minds are indeterminate, but the minds of the Buddhas are wholesome and therefore lack searching; also, the Buddhas should lack the abrupt mind. If, based on the arrival of the object at this time, one hypothetically speaks of it as existing because this object is now seen for the first time—if all has already been seen and thus lacks searching, having already been seen completely it lacks the abrupt mind. Then at the time of the Buddhas' abrupt mind, it is also called determinate, also called defiled or pure, and also called outflowing, possessing the four meanings at one time. However, there are only three: regarding the objects of other people there is something unknown, and therefore their minds proceed before and after; the Buddhas are not like this, for it is not the case that they are first indeterminate and only later determinate. Therefore, to clarify the five minds: in the stage of mastery, one overturns the first stage of non-mastery; the five may be interrupted [in ordinary beings], but in the Buddhas they are continuous. The above was entirely an objection confronting principle with concrete cases. Next it should further be stated that, not being a flaw of the initial [moment], after the outflowing mind they can also be continuous.

5.17

Treatise: The outflowing five vijñānas […] continue across multiple mind-moments.

5.18

The Commentary states: Below, up to the citation of the Great Treatise stating that they do not arise mutually continuing two vijñānas, overturns the second [case of] abruptly encountering an object. First the principle is set forth; next proof is cited; finally it is re-established. This meaning is also like that in the stage of non-mastery. As for the outflowing of the five vijñānas: among the five minds, since it is the third, determinate [mind], and the fourth, defiled or pure [mind], they are induced and generated by the attention of the sixth, the mano-vijñāna. It is like gazing upon a Buddha statue: focusing exclusively on one object without ceasing to gaze is called "the duration before giving it up." The mental and visual vijñānas are both not given up; how could one not allow them to continue across multiple mind-moments? This sets forth the principle. Next the text of the treatise is cited.

5.19

Treatise: Therefore the Yogācārabhūmi says: […] should be known to be likewise.

5.20

The Commentary states: Only after the third, the determinate indeterminate mind, does the fourth, the defiled or pure mind arise, which induces the arising of the outflowing mind of the five vijñānas and so forth. In the first fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi, when the five vijñānas arise, three minds can be found, etc.; this passage is easily understood, as explained in the first volume of notes on that treatise. The sequence of the five minds is as explained in a separate chapter. "Yet they do not rely on their own power of discrimination" indicates the meaning that they are induced and generated by the mano-vijñāna; the text is easy to comprehend. Having cited the treatise:

5.21

Treatise: Its intention definitely shows that […] both proceed in continuity.

5.22

The Commentary states: Below it is re-established. It is not that the groups of the five vijñānas perish in a single mind-moment such that one could say the five vijñānas arise in mutual succession. If they explain that the five vijñānas are definitely interrupted, if so, why say that they turn in continuity and arise in alternating succession? It is not that the eye-consciousness ceases and there is only mano-vijñāna, after which the eye[-consciousness] arises again, that could be called continuity.

5.23

Treatise: Since at the time of the eye-consciousness […] arise in mutual succession.

5.24

The Commentary states: The treatise master objects: Since at the time of the eye-consciousness there is no absence of the mano-vijñāna, and after the five vijñānas cease the mano-vijñāna subsequently arises, if so, this is the continuous arising of the mind; how could one say it is the continuity of the five vijñānas? If, as at the time of the eye-consciousness there were no mano-vijñāna, and at the time of the mano-vijñāna there were no five vijñānas, because they would arise alternately, they could mutually continue each other. Since this is not the case, it is not that "two vijñānas arise in mutual succession" that is termed continuity. This is the second objection: using principle to establish the teaching.

5.25

Next is the third: overturning encountering a non-superior object, an objection using the teaching to establish the principle.

5.26

Treatise: If one encounters an intensifying object […] the gods of sportive forgetfulness, and so forth.

5.27

The Commentary states: The text below has three parts: first stating the thesis; next citing proof; finally establishing by principle. This is the first. If one encounters a medium object, because it cannot torment the body or usurp the mind, one might concede temporarily giving up the five vijñānas so they do not continue, even if one concedes they do not continue. If one encounters a superior object that torments the body and usurps the mind, or torments and usurps both body and mind, then the groups of the five vijñānas must also be continuous, because the object is intensifying; this stage is precisely in the stage of non-mastery. What are these like? As for citing present phenomena: it is like the hot hells, because the fire intensifies; "the gods of sportive forgetfulness, and so forth" includes the gods corrupted by wrath: generally speaking, these are the upper four heavens of the desire realm, without distinct places, but characterized only by joy or resentment. In the fourth tetralemma of the fifth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi it says: the devas of the desire realm, without specifying their places. As in the hundred and ninety-ninth fascicle of the Vibhāṣā, there are two explanations: one says they dwell on the terraces of Mount Meru; the second says they are the Trāyastriṃśa gods. If based on the Yogācārabhūmi, they are the upper four desire heavens, because the lower two heavens can kill one another. In these wholesome and unwholesome persons, the condition is strong and hard to relinquish; therefore the groups of the five vijñānas definitely have continuity. In explaining the text "only a single mind-moment," this is based on the abrupt [mind], because the object is indifferent.

5.28

Furthermore, citing scripture establishes it.

5.29

Treatise: Therefore the Yogācārabhūmi says: […] is called the mental faculty.

5.30

The Commentary states: The fifty-second fascicle says, because the text's words generally apply to the six vijñānas, one clearly knows that they serve mutually as conditions.

5.31

Treatise: If before and after the five vijñānas […] equal and immediate condition.

5.32

The Commentary states: Below is the establishment by principle; the text is easy to understand. If the five vijñānas are interrupted, then before and after there would definitely be only mano-vijñāna. That third fascicle says that after the abrupt mind of the eye-consciousness there is definitely the searching mano-vijñāna, and after this there is sometimes distraction, or the arising of consciousnesses like the ear[-consciousness]; it does not allow the arising of the ear-consciousness after the eye-consciousness. Because it is said here that after the eye-consciousness there is only mano-vijñāna, and it does not say that the five vijñānas arise, then the fifty-second fascicle should say: if this one mano-vijñāna is the condition for those six vijñānas, up to those six vijñānas being the condition for that one mano-vijñāna, because before and after there is definitely only the mind.

5.33

Treatise: Since this is not the case […] there is the meaning of continuity.

5.34

The Commentary states: This concludes the five vijñānas. Above was the first part, refuting the doctrine that the groups of the five vijñānas have no continuity, where the five vijñānas of oneself and others have no equal and immediate condition.

5.35

Below is the second part: refuting [the view that] the sixth, the mano-vijñāna, relies on the preceding five vijñānas, and does not take the seventh and eighth as its basis of opening and guiding. There are two parts.

5.36

Treatise: When the five vijñānas arise […] serves as the basis of opening and guiding.

5.37

The Commentary states: That is to say, the third fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi states that the groups of the five vijñānas turn in accordance with the mano-vijñāna; and the sixty-seventh fascicle, the Pramāṇasamuccaya, and so forth say that simultaneously with the five vijñānas there must be the mano-vijñāna. This very mano-vijñāna can induce the arising of the second, searching mano-vijñāna, taking the mano-vijñāna of its own category in the previous moment as its equal and immediate condition. Why rely on the five vijñānas? If in the previous moment the five vijñānas alone arose, and only afterward did the searching mind of the mano-vijñāna arise, it could be as they say, that the five serve as the condition for the mind. Since this is not the case, one knows that the mano-vijñāna does not take the five vijñānas as its basis of opening and guiding, because the five vijñānas themselves lack superior efficacy. The first part refutes the mind using the five as its basis.

5.38

Treatise: In mindless sleep […] serve as its basis of opening and guiding.

5.39

The Commentary states: Below this is the second part, posing an objection regarding the sixth, the mano-vijñāna, to make it take the two vijñānas, the seventh and eighth, as its basis. In the five mindless states, the sixth vijñāna is interrupted; whether there is a seventh in this cessation absorption and so forth is as commonly explained. In these five states, only the two vijñānas, the seventh and eighth, are continuous. When later emerging from the mindless state, the seventh and eighth vijñānas should serve as the basis for the sixth, the mano-vijñāna; because that [sixth] was previously interrupted, while these are constantly continuous. Just as when in meditation the ear hears sound and so forth, although the mind does not cognize the same object, it nevertheless serves as the basis for the ear-consciousness, because the mind previously existed, while this ear[-consciousness] arises intermittently. In the five mindless states, taking the seventh and eighth vijñānas as identical to that meditative mind, and taking this interrupted mind as identical to that ear-consciousness, therefore in principle it must be so.

5.40

Treatise: If they use the previous […] how could that be so?

5.41

The Commentary states: Objecting to the previous master's explanation: regarding that cessation absorption and so forth, the fifth fascicle of the Abhidharma-samuccaya takes the previously ceased mind as the equal and immediate condition, because there is no intervening mind of its own kind in between; relying solely on its own category as its basis, it does not rely on the other seventh and eighth. Although the substance of the five vijñānas is interrupted, because there is not a single mind of their own kind intervening, it should be like that mind, not taking the mind as a condition. Since for their five vijñānas this is not conceded to be so, taking the preceding mano-vijñāna as the equal and immediate condition and not taking the five vijñānas of their own category as condition, why in that cessation absorption and so forth should the sixth, the mano-vijñāna, be like that? That is to say, the mano-vijñāna does not rely on the five vijñānas, and also the sixth takes the seventh and eighth as conditions; by analogy it is the same as the five vijñānas using the mind as their basis.

5.42

Below is the third part: the objection that the sixth is the basis for the seventh, since those previous seventh and eighth each served as condition for themselves.

5.43

Treatise: At the time the wisdom of equality […] serves as its basis of opening and guiding.

5.44

The Commentary states: This reveals that the name manas applies generally to the anāsrava. Although the transformation of the six vijñānas to obtain manas is called the seventh, it is not actually the seventh, because it does not extend to the pure. Otherwise, it would contradict the sūtras. In the initial mind of the first bhūmi, the wisdom of equality associated with the seventh vijñāna is induced and generated by the preceding mind-moment of the supreme worldly dharmas, the contemplation of the two emptinesses, and the sāsrava mind; therefore the seventh should take the sixth as its basis. Only at this time must it be generated by being induced by the sixth; thus by analogy to other times when the wisdom of equality arises, the meaning should also be like this.

5.45

Below is the fourth part: the objection that the eighth takes the sixth and seventh as basis. There are two parts within this: first, an objection regarding the vijñāna in the fruition state.

5.46

Treatise: The great mirror wisdom associated […] are induced and generated by skillful means.

5.47

The Commentary states: This vijñāna exists only in the vajropama-samādhi; regarding this there are two explanations, as explained previously. Before this stage one has obtained the two wisdoms; therefore at this time the eighth takes the sixth and seventh as basis, because at other times they are absent.

5.48

Treatise: Moreover, the vipāka mind […] associated wholesome minds.

5.49

The Commentary states: This is the second, an objection using the vijñāna in the causal state. The third fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that the vipāka mind relies on the defiled manas. In Asvabhāva's view, the defiled manas is the sixth; in Vasubandhu's view, the defiled manas is perhaps the seventh mind; hence one knows that the eighth also relies on the sixth and seventh. This is said with respect to pṛthagjanas and a portion of śaikṣa bodhisattvas taking birth, as in the fifth fascicle of the Abhidharma-samuccaya: for those who have the power of vows, this requires the assembly of great bodhisattvas on the ten bhūmis, in order to cross over sentient beings, whether through mortal birth or transformational birth, also taking the wholesome minds of the two wisdoms as condition, whereby the eighth is able to arise. This explanation applies generally to the first bhūmi, or is said to be on the eighth bhūmi; the former explanation is superior.

5.50

Treatise: Since it is so, it must be that […] are entirely without exhausting the principle.

5.51

The Commentary states: Since there are three proofs, one knows that the eighth takes the sixth and seventh as basis; because of the preceding, all eight vijñānas have proofs of error.

5.52

The third concludes by stating that what was spoken by them is completely without exhausting the principle.

5.53

Treatise: One should explain that the five vijñānas […] as basis of opening and guiding.

5.54

The Commentary states: Below, concluding with the correct view and returning to the doctrine: the five vijñānas can all take the preceding six vijñānas as their basis, because they continue themselves and because they are induced and generated by the other, being able to arise immediately next. As the third fascicle of the Great Treatise says, "neither do the five vijñānas arise without interval"; this is stated in terms of the majority of abrupt minds.

5.55

Treatise: The sixth mano-vijñāna […] as basis of opening and guiding.

5.56

The Commentary states: It does not require induction by the five, and therefore uses the preceding [mind] of its own category as its basis of opening and guiding. In the five mindless states, sometimes the seventh and eighth serve as its basis, by analogy with giving the five their basis.

5.57

Treatise: The seventh, manas, […] as basis of opening and guiding.

5.58

The Commentary states: As when giving rise to the initial anāsrava mind of the Mahāyāna, it also takes the sixth as its basis of opening and guiding.

5.59

Treatise: The ādāna-vijñāna […] due to what was said before.

5.60

The Commentary states: When the eighth [consciousness] first gives rise to the mirror-like wisdom, or when ordinary beings (pṛthagjana) first take birth and so on, taking the preceding sixth or seventh [consciousness] as the opening-and-guiding basis does not contradict reason in any of these cases. Because of the reasoning stated previously, it concludes by establishing the thesis. The mention of 'ādānavijñāna' is because it extends to the undefiled (anāsrava). The four conditions (pratyaya) here will be explained in detail below.

5.61

Treatise: There is another opinion: This explanation is also not reasonable.

5.62

The Commentary states: In this there are three parts: first, a general repudiation of the former [view]; next, an explanation of its own thesis; and finally, a general conclusion of what is correct. This is the first passage; this is Dharmapāla's explanation. Why is that?

5.63

Treatise: The 'opening-and-guiding basis' refers to […] [it must be capable of serving as] the equal-and-immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya).

5.64

The Commentary states: Below is the explanation of its thesis, and its intended meaning has four parts: 1. revealing the essence and meaning; 2. refuting the prior errors; 3. setting forth the correct principle; 4. resolving contradictory objections. Below is the first part. The 'opening-and-guiding basis' differs from the equal-and-immediate condition among the four conditions: whatever is an opening-and-guiding basis must be an equal-and-immediate condition; but there are cases that are equal-and-immediate conditions yet not opening-and-guiding bases, namely the mental factors (caitasika) of the same category that ceased in the preceding moment. An opening-and-guiding basis refers to a 'dharmic entity having an object (sālambana)': that is, if a dharma's essence has an object, this excludes form (rūpa), non-associated formations (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra), unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta), and so on; having an intentional object and having efficacy, it is capable of inducing and generating [the next moment]. 'Being devoid of a master' excludes all mental factors and the like, because they are not masters. It must be a master and have efficacy to be able to serve as a basis. 'Capable of acting as an equal-and-immediate condition' excludes other consciousnesses of a different category acting as the basis for this consciousness, or later minds of the same category of consciousness acting as the basis for preceding minds, or minds that, although simultaneous, cannot serve as a basis for mental factors, because in all these cases they do not open and guide. Therefore it is said: an equal-and-immediate condition applies solely to the same category.

5.65

Treatise: This, with respect to what is subsequently generated […] and not mental factors and the like.

5.66

The Commentary states: The sovereign mind (cittarāja) of the preceding moment, with respect to the subsequent mind and mental factors, is capable of clearing a path for them and guiding them to arise; therefore it serves as this basis. This belongs solely to the mind, not to mental factors, form, or non-associated formations, for they are all devoid of such efficacy; nor is it unconditioned dharmas, because they lack prior and posterior. Therefore it says again 'equal'. This is the first part, explaining the essence and meaning of the basis.

5.67

Treatise: If this [consciousness] and that [consciousness] […] served as the opening-and-guiding basis.

5.68

The Commentary states: Below is the refutation of the previous errors. There are two kinds: 1. the objection that multiple consciousnesses would not be co-arising; 2. the objection that form and mind would be indistinct. Below is the first objection. To say that this and that serve as this basis is because there must be the efficacy of opening and guiding. Since the eight consciousnesses within a single body are admitted to arise simultaneously, how could a consciousness of one's own category serve as the opening-and-guiding basis for a consciousness of another category? Clearing a path for it and guiding it to arise requires an efficacious mutual obstruction. Where another presently arises, it does not obstruct my path, unlike one's own preceding mind; how could another consciousness serve as a basis for this one? For the Sarvāstivādins, the six consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously, and because minds mutually obstruct each other, they can mutually serve as bases. Now, since they arise simultaneously, there should be no opening and guiding.

5.69

Treatise: If they were permitted to serve as bases […] minds would not arise side-by-side.

5.70

The Commentary states: If they mutually served as bases, because they would mutually obstruct each other, like the minds of different schools such as the Hīnayāna, there could be no simultaneous arising, because for the Sarvāstivādins and others, they do not arise simultaneously and are thus capable of being conditions. This is the second point, objecting to the mutual relationship of prior-and-posterior basis.

5.71

Treatise: Furthermore, in a single body […] form and so on should also be thus.

5.72

The Commentary states: Below is the second part: the objection that form and mind would be indistinct. In this there are two: 1. objecting that there is no distinction; 2. resolving the contradiction. This is the first. The number of the eight consciousnesses co-arising is variable, as stated in the fifty-first fascicle [of the Yogācārabhūmi] and elsewhere. The eighth consciousness co-arises with one consciousness, or up to seven, and so on; if, as previously stated, they could mutually act as conditions, material form should also be thus, with its quantity variable. Regarding 'equal' (sama): first, equality of essence; second, equality of function. Equality of essence means that before and after there is one single dharma; just as the mind is only one, up to sensation (vedanā) and so on also being only one; arising immediately in succession, without any other mind of its own category intervening, it is therefore called 'immediate' (anantara). If one mind were permitted to be the condition for multiple minds, it should not be 'equal', just like form and so on. If they should further say that form is like mind and the like, admitting that it is an equal-and-immediate condition—

5.73

Treatise: —then it would contradict the noble teaching […] only mind and mental factors.

5.74

The Commentary states: Mind and mental factors are definitively governed by the four conditions, as stated in the thirty-eighth fascicle of the Bodhisattvabhūmi among the ten causes: 'Only mind and mental factors are equal-and-immediate conditions.' It is also as stated in the third fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi and elsewhere: 'Four conditions can give rise to consciousness.' The first fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'Because mind and mental factors are definitively governed by the four conditions.' Therefore, material form does not have the equal-and-immediate condition. If they should object again: 'Why does the third fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha state that the mind of an arhat can only admit of the equal-and-immediate condition? Thus we know that material form also has this condition.'

5.75

Treatise: However, what the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says […] the word 'equal' would become useless.

5.76

The Commentary states: Below is the resolution of the contradiction. What the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states is a 'concessive refutation'—that is, hypothetically conceding to the Sautrāntikas within the Hīnayāna Sthaviravāda that form has the equal-and-immediate condition, in order to refute their generative cause (hetu-pratyaya); for they lack the eighth mind and take form as the cause, meaning that even if form were conceded to have this condition, it would have no meaning of generative cause. If one does not explain it this way, the word 'equal' is useless: that is, when there is one dharma before and after respectively, being similar is called 'equal'; here, even when dissimilar they would be called 'equal'. Therefore, this hypothetical concession has two meanings. First, because that school posits that form has this condition, this text is taken as proof. If so, why does the first fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha state: 'It is not the case for the Sautrāntikas that material dharmas alone are named the immediate condition'? In the third fascicle, it is spoken of as having this condition with reference to form containing seeds or including mind. The first fascicle is based on their having neither consciousness nor seeds, and possessing form alone; hence it says it cannot constitute an equal-and-immediate condition; or, the first fascicle reflects the Sautrāntika position, and the third fascicle the doctrine of the Sthaviras and others. Second, the text of the first fascicle is taken as definitive. This meaning is definitive: the original Sautrāntika tenet does not necessarily admit form as an immediate condition, because it is not equal. In the third fascicle, it is temporarily conceded in order to refute the generative cause, not that they posited form as equal-and-immediate; here it is form and mind before and after, the former being the cause for the latter.

5.77

Treatise: If you say that the word 'equal' […] equal-and-immediate condition.

5.78

The Commentary states: The former master rescues his position again. Previously it was only stated generally, without distinguishing the word 'equal'. He considers that this is not so: it does not exclude quantity; being one dharma each is called 'equal'. It merely indicates that the preceding thought is this mind and mental factors, and the subsequent thought is also this mind and mental factors; if it merely expresses that those of the same category can act as conditions, then this contradicts your attachment that consciousnesses of different categories act as equal-and-immediate conditions, since they do not rely on each other. When the eight consciousnesses are compared to one another, each is of a different category; how could they act as conditions for one another?

5.79

Treatise: Therefore, among the eight consciousnesses […] meaning of co-arising.

5.80

The Commentary states: The third major section sets forth the correct principle. Because eye-consciousness and so on of the same category have no meaning of co-arising, a consciousness of the same category in the preceding moment serves as the basis for the subsequent one.

5.81

Treatise: This basis for mental factors should be explained according to their consciousness.

5.82

The Commentary states: Since mental factors belong to the mind, their basis is explained in accordance with each of their root consciousnesses; hence it says 'should be explained according to their consciousness'.

5.83

The Commentary states: Below is the fourth major section, resolving objections, in which there are five points. 1. The objection regarding mental association (saṃprayukta). Question: The eight consciousnesses arise simultaneously, and when viewed as different categories, do not act as conditions for one another; since mental factors of different categories arise together, they should not be guided by mental factors.

5.84

Treatise: Although mind and mental factors […] should not serve as an analogy.

5.85

The Commentary states: Sensation, ideation (saṃjñā), and other dharmas arise side by side as different categories, yet they are associated with each other and do not conflict, harmonizing as if they were one. The Prakaraṇāryavācā, fascicle fifty-five and elsewhere, states: 'Mind and mental factors are harmonious, not unharmonious; they cannot be separated and designated as distinct; they definitively arise and cease together; their operations are necessarily identical; and together they apprehend this object.' Therefore, whenever a single mind opens and guides, its associated mental factors can also open and guide. Because they possess these five meanings, mind and mental factors, and mental factors and mind, can mutually serve as equal-and-immediate conditions. Regarding the five meanings: 1. association, meaning that basis, time, entity, and place are identical in these four respects; 2. harmonizing as if one; 3. arising and ceasing together; 4. identical operations, being necessarily equal in the three natures; 5. identical opening and guiding. The various consciousnesses are not like this: viewed with respect to each other, they lack these five; one should not make an analogy with mental factors to make them equivalent to different consciousnesses. Below is the second: the objection regarding mental factors becoming a basis. Question: Although mind and mental factors of different categories mutually act as conditions, since the meaning of condition has no difference, should their being a basis not also be equal?

5.86

Treatise: However, mental factors […] because they lack the meaning of being a master.

5.87

The Commentary states: Mental factors are not opening-and-guiding bases, because with respect to what is induced and generated in the subsequent moment, they lack the meaning of being a master. A 'basis' is the meaning of being a master, and mental factors are not bases. A 'condition' is the meaning of being an occasion/cause, and mental factors are this as well.

5.88

The Commentary states: Below is the third: the objection that each should act as a condition. Question: For the eight consciousnesses within their own categories, as the preceding eye-consciousness serves as the basis for the subsequent eye-consciousness, why do sensation and the like not solely serve as the basis for subsequent sensation and the like, while sensation associated with eye-consciousness can serve as the basis for subsequent ideation and the like associated with itself? Why is this not like the position of the famous śramaṇa, where ideation is compared to ideation, sensation to sensation, and so on? It is to resolve this objection.

5.89

Treatise: If mind and mental factors […] this condition would then be lacking.

5.90

The Commentary states: If mind only viewed mind, and mental factors individually viewed individual mental factors as bases of their own categories, then when the seventh and eighth consciousnesses at whatever stage first transform their basis (āśrayaparavṛtti), their associated faith (śraddhā) and so on would lack this condition, because in their defiled state they never previously existed. To establish that they have this condition, mind viewed with respect to mental factors can serve as this condition. Question: What does it matter if the condition is lacking?

5.91

Treatise: Then it would contradict the noble teaching […] are all born from four conditions.

5.92

The Commentary states: Since it contradicts the noble teaching, it reduces the conditions by three. Thus it contradicts what the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, fascicle one and elsewhere, states: 'Mind and mental factors are definitively governed by four conditions.' Hence it says 'contradiction'. Below is the fourth: the objection that subsequent arising depends on another. Question: As when emerging from the five mindless states, the sixth consciousness arises because the seventh and eighth existed previously, why does the sixth not take the seventh and eighth as its basis?

5.93

Treatise: In mindless and other states […] are simply the preceding ones of their own category.

5.94

The Commentary states: Although they are interrupted in that state, when they arise subsequently, their opening-and-guiding basis solely takes the prior one of their own category when first entering meditative concentration as its basis, as stated in the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya, fascicle five.

5.95

Treatise: For the interrupted five consciousnesses […] because it is named 'immediate'.

5.96

The Commentary states: Taking the sixth mental consciousness as an analogous dharma, as long as there is no mind of its own category intervening, it is named the equal-and-immediate condition.

5.97

The Commentary states: Question: At what time does it serve as a basis, since the past does not exist?

5.98

Treatise: When they formerly ceased […] serves as the opening-and-guiding basis.

5.99

The Commentary states: Having once abided, when it was in the present and on the verge of cessation, it was already capable of serving as a basis, opening and guiding the consciousness of the present time. If that had not departed, the subsequent could not arise. Through the preceding reasoning and teaching, we know that there is no reliance on a consciousness of a different category to serve as an opening-and-guiding basis.

5.100

The Commentary states: Below is the fifth: the objection concerning contradictions with various teachings. Question: As in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra and others, the five consciousnesses are induced by the mental consciousness. In the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle three, the five consciousnesses induce the mental consciousness, and an inquiring mind arises. The Buddhabhūmi-sūtra and Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra say: when the equality wisdom first arises, and when the eighth first attains purity. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha relies on defilement, the Abhidharmasamuccaya relies on compassionate vows, etc.; all say that the various consciousnesses mutually induce and generate one another. Is this not scriptural evidence for different categories? Why do you now explain the text to the contrary?

5.101

Treatise: However, in the noble teachings […] therefore there is no contradiction.

5.102

The Commentary states: What was cited above all relies on the predominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya) of a superior kind, where mutual induction is designated as 'immediate'; it is not really this equal-and-immediate condition. Therefore it does not contradict that.

5.103

[Treatise:] As for what the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states, up to calling it the 'mental faculty' (manendriya):

5.104

[The Commentary states:] In fascicle 85, there is an extensive differentiation of the four conditions (pratyaya), which corresponds exactly to this. For example, fascicle 5 of the Great Treatise [Yogācārabhūmi] and fascicle 18 of the Prakaraṇāryavācā state that these cittas and caitasikas are the equal and immediate [condition], up to: that which must definitely arise; the final citta of an arhat is not this condition because it does not arise; after an initial perceptual mind (sadyo-jāta-citta), a definite mano-vijñāna arises. Furthermore, fascicle 52 states: 'Also, these six consciousnesses, etc., are called the mental faculty,' etc., which all refer to the various consciousnesses being conditions relative to one another. Why, then, in the present context, would another consciousness not be a condition?

5.105

[Treatise:] The expression is general, but the intended meaning is specific; hence there is also no contradiction.

5.106

[The Commentary states:] The words of that treatise are general and encompass all six consciousnesses, but its intended meaning speaks specifically of the six consciousnesses within their own respective categories in mutual relation; thus it does not violate reason either. That is to say, the statement is general, but the meaning is specific. When it says 'the various consciousnesses arise', the intended meaning refers to the determined consciousness, not to all of them. Here it speaks generally, thus 'the various consciousnesses arise', etc.; as stated in chapter one of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha: 'Not yet comprehending the one dharma, with the intention of having not fully known.'

5.107

[Treatise:] Therefore, reliance on its own category accords profoundly with both doctrine and reason.

5.108

[The Commentary states:] Third, concluding with the correct view. Therefore, one knows that the eight consciousnesses rely on their own category, which profoundly accords with doctrine and reason, since there is no contradiction at all. From this point below is the third part, which provides the overall conclusion for what follows.

5.109

[Treatise:] The side discussion having been completed, we should examine the main treatise.

5.110

[The Commentary states:] Taking the support of this consciousness as the occasion for an extensive differentiation is termed a 'side discussion'. The supports of the various consciousnesses are stated summarily in the verse: 'Five have four, six has two, / Seven and eight have one simultaneous support; / Along with the opening-and-guiding and causal conditions, / Each adds two.'

5.111

[Question:] As explained above, there are three kinds of support. When this verse says 'proceeding in reliance upon it', to which support does it refer?

5.112

[Treatise:] Among the three supports of this transformative consciousness, the text only displays the first two.

5.113

[The Commentary states:] Excluding the equal and immediate condition, because this is a general explanation.

5.114

[Question:] Why does it only speak of the first two supports?

5.115

[Treatise:] To show that the support and the cognitive object (ālambana) of this consciousness are identical.

5.116

[The Commentary states:] There are two interpretations of this. The first says: It is merely spoken in aggregate without need for differentiation; because the seed is not separate from the substance of consciousness itself, it is also called an ālambana, which is the correct meaning. The second says: Because the two supports are themselves the cognitive object, this means the seventh takes seeds and the like as its cognitive object. Were it not so, the causal condition support would not exist here; as for the support as immediate cessation, it definitely does not exist by this reasoning, because the seventh does not take its own preceding moment as cognitive object.

5.117

[Treatise:] Furthermore, because the first two supports have superior function.

5.118

[The Commentary states:] The simultaneous support is proximate, and the seed directly produces [it]; moreover, both are simultaneous, so the treatise speaks of them together. It is not like the equal and immediate condition, which is temporally separated and distant; that is the meaning of not taking seeds and the like as cognitive objects.

5.119

[Treatise:] Or because the opening-and-guiding support is easily understood.

5.120

[The Commentary states:] Because the opening-and-guiding support is easy, it is not mentioned; it merely says that it relies on the eighth basic consciousness, while the other two are obscure and therefore spoken of. Above is the second part, completing the explanation of the support. Next, the third section should explain the cognitive object (ālambana), in which there are two parts: first, concluding the preceding and asking about what follows in order to open the treatise; second, explaining sequentially according to the verse.

5.121

[Treatise:] Having thus explained what this consciousness relies upon, what is its cognitive object?

5.122

[The Commentary states:] This is the first passage.

5.123

[Treatise:] It means it takes that very one as cognitive object.

5.124

[The Commentary states:] The text below has three parts: first, explaining the words 'takes that as cognitive object' in the verse; next, showing the characteristics of the cognitive object of consciousness in cause and effect; third, resolving objections. In the first part there are two: first, citing the verse to answer; then, explaining separately. This cites the verse to answer; below is the explanation of the verse.

5.125

[Treatise:] 'That' means the preceding consciousness upon which this relies.

5.126

[The Commentary states:] Below is the separate explanation, which again contains two parts: first, a general explanation; then, specific disputes. This is the first. The 'that' of support refers to that first transformative consciousness. The 'that' of cognitive object refers to that consciousness upon which this seventh relies, intending to show that the support is identical to the cognitive object, not something different from it. How is this known?

5.127

[Treatise:] Because the Noble One said that this consciousness takes the storehouse consciousness as its cognitive object.

5.128

[The Commentary states:] Various treatises such as the Great Treatise [Yogācārabhūmi], Prakaraṇāryavācā, and Abhidharmasamuccaya all speak alike in this manner; thus we know that this consciousness takes its own support as its cognitive object. This is the common explanation. Below, the disputes are recounted; there are four theories, the first being the doctrine of Nanda and others.

5.129

[Treatise:] There is an opinion: This manas only takes the storehouse consciousness and its associated dharmas as cognitive objects.

5.130

[The Commentary states:] This shows that it does not take the nimittabhāga—matter and the like, as well as its seeds—as cognitive object, because throughout the three realms it grasps uniformly, and does not take that objective sphere as cognitive object. If it took that objective sphere as cognitive object, then grasping at what belongs to a self (ātmīyagrāha) would sometimes be absent. If it took those seeds as cognitive object, they lack the function of taking cognitive objects, and not being superior dharmas, they cannot be grasped as a self. Moreover, what belongs to a self would sometimes be interrupted. Therefore, it only takes the substance of consciousness and its caitasikas as cognitive objects. What is the proof?

5.131

[Treatise:] Because treatises state that manas is constantly associated with views of a self and of what belongs to a self.

5.132

[The Commentary states:] Because of this, taking the substance of consciousness as cognitive object constitutes 'self', and taking the caitasikas as cognitive object constitutes 'what belongs to a self'. Because citta is the master, it is grasped as self; because caitasikas are assistants, they are grasped as what belongs to a self. Which treatises state that there are self and what belongs to a self? The Yogācārabhūmi fascicle 63 in the Decision on the Mental Bhūmi, the Abhidharmasamuccaya fascicle 2, the Prakaraṇāryavācā fascicle 1, etc., all state this.

5.133

[Treatise:] That is to say, taking its substance and its associated states respectively as cognitive objects, it produces the grasping of self and of what belongs to a self.

5.134

[The Commentary states:] By connecting reason to scripture to clarify the meaning, a single moment of citta has two modes of understanding: when taking self as cognitive object, it operates bearing the ākāra of what belongs to a self. Question: If taking the substance is self and taking caitasikas is what belongs to a self, why does the treatise only say that it takes that consciousness as cognitive object, and not say that it takes caitasikas as cognitive object? To answer this question:

5.135

[Treatise:] However, because the caitasikas are not separate from the consciousness, speaking of consciousness already includes them; thus there is no error of contradicting scripture.

5.136

[The Commentary states:] This means that because caitasikas are not separate from consciousness, when speaking of consciousness, caitasikas are already spoken of. As in the term 'vijñapti-mātra', there is no error of contradicting scripture. Because treatises state that there is what belongs to a self, we know it takes caitasikas as cognitive object. If it took the objective sphere of the basic consciousness as cognitive object, since that objective sphere is indefinite, this doctrine could not be established by taking that as cognitive object.

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成唯識論述記 — Classical Chinese