成唯識論掌中樞要 1.109

1.109

破有句中有四：第一、法自相相違過。彼云：「有性離實句外有別自性；許非無故；如德業。」此有不定，以實句是異法喻；因於彼有故。今云：「離實句外無別自性；許非無故；猶如實句。」彼外道師。若以德、業如因、異、和合為不定過，非不定過；他不定故，非自共故。論既以德、業為同喻，但比量相違。

In refuting the category of Inherence (bhāva / existence), there are four [arguments]: First, the fallacy of contradiction with the proper nature of the probandum (sādhya-svarūpa-viparīta-sādhana). They say: 'The nature of existence possesses a distinct intrinsic nature apart from the category of substance; because it is accepted as not being non-existent; like quality and action.' This involves the fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika), because the category of substance serves as a dissimilar example (vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta); and the reason is present in it. Now we say: '[The nature of existence] does not possess a distinct intrinsic nature apart from the category of substance; because it is accepted as not being non-existent; just like the category of substance.' As for that non-Buddhist master: if they take quality and action—being like cause, difference, and inherence (samavāya)—as a fallacy of inconclusiveness, it is not a fallacy of inconclusiveness; because it is inconclusive only for the other party, not inconclusive for oneself or for both parties. Since the treatise already takes quality and action as similar examples (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta), this is simply a counter-inference (anumāna-bādha).