成唯識論了義燈 2.32

2.32

論：彼所執有至如實德等，疏及《樞要》俱云：法自相相違因過，以彼本量云：我宗有性，定離實句有別自性，許非無故如德、業等。此量不定，實為異喻，許非無因於實轉故。更有餘過，思准可知。今且與作法自相相違云：汝有性，離實句外無別自性；許非無故；猶如實句。此量之中雖有他不定，德、業句等他許非無，因於彼轉非自、共許，故非不定。又就破他於他不定，亦可為過，故《樞要》判但是比量相違過攝，若准疏判云：應離實等八句之外無別自性，即無不定。《要集》云：准相違量云有性，離實外無別自性；許非無故；猶如實句者。當比量相違，此意《樞要》自已判訖。《要集》出過云：既別用喻，如何相違同前不定？此說亦非，何者設別用喻，亦是相違，如因明論法自相相違因外，立聲常，所作性故，猶如虛空。作相違云：聲是無常；所作性故；譬如瓶等。此因用舊同喻改之。今者此量因，亦用舊但改同喻，與因明同，云：既別用喻如何相違者？是妄出過，不善因明也。

Regarding the passage in the śāstra: 'What they postulate as existence [...] down to: just as substance, quality, and so forth,' both the Commentary and the Hub and Essentials (Shu yao) state that this is the fault of a reason contradictory to the property's own nature (dharma-svarūpa-viparīta-sādhana). For their original inference was: 'In our tenet, the nature of existence definitely has a distinct intrinsic nature apart from the category of substance; because it is accepted as not non-existent; like quality, action, and so forth.' This inference is inconclusive (anaikāntika), because substance serves as a dissimilar instance (vipakṣa), and the reason 'being accepted as not non-existent' occurs in substance. There are further faults, which can be understood by pondering accordingly. Now, we temporarily formulate for it [the counter-inference of] contradiction to the property's own nature: 'Your nature of existence has no distinct intrinsic nature apart from the category of substance; because it is accepted as not non-existent; just like the category of substance.' In this inference, although there is inconclusiveness for the opponent (parataḥ-anaikāntika)—since quality, action, etc., are accepted by the opponent as not non-existent, and the reason occurs in them without being accepted by oneself or by both, hence it is not inconclusive. Furthermore, in terms of refuting the opponent, inconclusiveness for the opponent can also count as a fault; thus the Hub and Essentials determined that it is merely subsumed under the fault of contradiction to inference (anumāna-bādha). If we go by the Commentary's determination: 'It should have no distinct intrinsic nature apart from the eight categories of substance and so forth,' then there is no inconclusiveness. The Essence Collection (Yao ji) says: 'If we rely on the contradictory inference: "The nature of existence has no distinct intrinsic nature apart from substance; because it is accepted as not non-existent; just like the category of substance," this amounts to contradiction to inference. This meaning has already been determined by the Hub and Essentials itself.' The Essence Collection points out a fault, saying: 'Since a different example is used, how can it be contradictory and identical to the previous inconclusiveness?' This statement is also incorrect. Why? Even if a different example is used, it is still contradictory. As when outside the reason contradictory to the property's own nature in the Hetuvidyā treatises, [the opponent] establishes: 'Sound is eternal; because of being produced; just like empty space,' and one formulates the contradictory [inference]: 'Sound is impermanent; because of being produced; like a pot and so forth.' Here, the reason uses the old one, but alters the similar example. Now, the reason in this inference also uses the old one and merely alters the similar example, which is identical to the Hetuvidyā treatises. To say: 'Since a different example is used, how can it be contradictory?' is to fabricate a fault erroneously, not being skilled in Hetuvidyā.