成唯識論掌中樞要 1.93

1.93

破我之中，數論、勝論立我宗云：我、我性是常；許無初後故；如虛空等。又我體周遍；許常住故；如虛空等。前所立宗，即為此因。我體常遍；許隨身造業受苦、樂等故；如大虛空。難初量云：有、有法差別，相違過。我有法上意所許義，隨身造業，受苦、樂我；不隨身造業受苦、樂我。是有法、我之差別。今造相違云：汝我應非隨身受苦、樂我；許無初後故；如大虛空。難第二量，作法差別相違過，體常遍法自相上意所許義，隨身造業受苦、樂，體常遍；非隨身造業受苦、樂，體常遍，是差別。今作相違云：汝我應不隨身造業受苦、樂；許常住故；如大虛空。難第三量云：隨身之因，既隨一不成，於同喻空上無，即不共不定，常遍之宗空為同喻，瓶為異喻，隨身造業等因，二亦俱非有。論文或別比量相違難云：汝我應不隨身造業受果；許常遍故；如太虛空。此別以比量徵，不要述其本量。

In refuting the self, the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika establish their thesis of the self, saying: 'The self, the nature of the self, is permanent; because it is accepted as having no beginning or end; like empty space, and so forth.' Also: 'The substance of the self is all-pervading; because it is accepted as permanently abiding; like empty space, and so forth.' The thesis established previously serves as the reason here: 'The substance of the self is permanent and all-pervading; because it is accepted as acting and experiencing suffering, pleasure, and so forth in accordance with the body; like great empty space.' Against the first inference, they object, saying: There is the fallacy of contradiction in the specification of the subject (dharmin). The meaning intended in the subject 'self' is a self that acts and experiences suffering and pleasure in accordance with the body, not a self that acts and experiences suffering and pleasure without accordance with the body. This is the specification of the subject, the self. Now, constructing the contradictory [inference], we say: 'Your self should not be a self that experiences suffering and pleasure in accordance with the body; because it is accepted as having no beginning or end; like great empty space.' Against the second inference, raising the fallacy of contradiction in the specification of the predicate (dharma): the meaning intended in the intrinsic nature of the predicate 'permanent and all-pervading substance' is that acting and experiencing suffering and pleasure in accordance with the body is a permanent and all-pervading substance, and not acting and experiencing suffering and pleasure in accordance with the body is a permanent and all-pervading substance—this is the specification. Now, constructing the contradictory [inference], we say: 'Your self should not act and experience suffering and pleasure in accordance with the body; because it is accepted as permanently abiding; like great empty space.' Against the third inference, they object, saying: The reason 'in accordance with the body' is both unproven for one party (anyatarāsiddha) and absent in the similar example of empty space, hence it is an inconclusive, unique reason (asādhāraṇānaikāntika); for the thesis of 'permanent and all-pervading', empty space is the similar example and a jar is the dissimilar example, but the reason 'acting in accordance with the body, etc.' is absent from both. Alternatively, the treatise makes a distinct contradictory inference to object, saying: 'Your self should not act and experience results in accordance with the body; because it is accepted as permanent and all-pervading; like great empty space.' This presses them by a distinct inference; it is not necessary to formulate their original inference.