成唯識論掌中樞要 2.82

2.82

依、所依別中，所依具四義者：身根望四識，闕於何義而非所依？且義解云：無決定義，以依下身起上眼等故。此亦不然。下五識俱起上意識，應非五依，亦不定故。又有解云：闕有境義。夫立有境者，必同分根起有境用故。彼同分根非是所依，但是依攝，由此身根必無與四同分有境。設自身識未必俱起為四識依，以說依用，名為有境，非依體故。此亦不然。論下文說：雖有色界亦依色根，而不定有，非所依攝。若許依用以名有境，五根於八起識不起，皆名有境，以依體說，不除有境，唯無決定。若依用說，亦應說言無有境義，非一切時恒起識故，或第七、八非五、六識定同分故。由此今釋，有其別義，夫所杖託，皆說為依。具四義者，依中最勝，立為所依，劣者不立。具決定中，何名決定，非定俱有，名為決定。決定有四：一、順取所緣決定，下名同境；二、明了所緣決定，下名分別；三、分位差別決定，下名染、淨；四、能起為依決定，下名根本。其有境為主，亦各有四：此四決定、有境、為主，亦隨有一種，即是決定、有境、為主。五根於五識有順取所緣決定、有境、為主；意識於五識有明了所緣決定、有境、為主。第七於五識有分位差別決定、有境、為主；第八於五識有能起為依決定、有境、為主。故此五識具四所依，五根能順五識取所緣故，意識能助五，明了所緣故。分別之言，明了境義。不爾，定心應非五依。七識能令五分位別，第七究竟成無漏時，五定無漏。不爾，有漏因七雖轉，非究竟故。第八於五種子能起現行為依，總說第八為能起依，准此等證。故知隨具則得彼名。若決定、有境、為主唯但一種，不通四者，則應五識無四種根。由此義言，第七於六及第八識唯有分位差別決定、有境、為主。第八於六、七唯有能起為依決定、有境、為主。後四依義皆通前三，論之本意隨應疏出。所依之體既具三義，令所生果取自所緣，為第四義。隨何前三俱具，即能令取自所緣故。此四義勝皆隨三中能可具者，即名所依，餘者不立。於所生果非殊勝故。且色蘊中五根望餘五識及六、七、八，五塵、法處色望一切識，不相應行及無為望一切識，非識種子望一切識，皆不具三，無前隨應三中義故，子細研究都無有故。一切心所隨望何識，唯有決定、有境，四種隨應可具，唯無為主。其諸種子望其自識，可有分位差別決定、為主二義，唯無有境。其前五識自互相望及望六、七、八，並六望七、八，一切皆無，無隨所應三中四義故。餘心、心所一切現行，色、不相應望諸種子一切皆無，諸心所法望自種子闕無為主，以有分位差別決定、有境，染、淨同故。體是王，臣故無為主，亦無令果取自所緣。其八現識望自種子，唯無令果取自所緣，可有分位差別決定、有境、為主義故。其中具闕，隨義應知。已略疎牒，後讀應審。然下文中五根望第八，唯除定有，不除餘者，舉初所無，例無後故，但舉無一，則不成所依，何假具述。

Regarding the distinction between reliance (āśraya) and basis (āśraya), where a basis possesses four criteria: With respect to the four consciousnesses, what criterion does the body faculty lack such that it is not their basis? An interpretation provisionally explains: It lacks the criterion of determinateness, because one may rely on a lower body to produce the upper eye [consciousness] and so forth. This is also not correct. When the lower five consciousnesses co-arise with an upper mental consciousness, [that mental consciousness] would not be the basis of the five, since it is also indeterminate. Another interpretation explains: It lacks the criterion of possessing an object (sa-viṣaya). As a rule, to establish that which possesses an object, it must be that an operative faculty of the same class produces the function of possessing an object. An operative faculty of that same class is not a basis (āśraya), but is merely subsumed under reliance (āśraya); consequently, this body faculty definitely does not possess an object of the same class with the four. Even if the body consciousness of oneself does not necessarily co-arise to serve as a basis for the four consciousnesses, it is because of speaking of the function of reliance that it is named 'possessing an object', not because of the substance of reliance. This is also not correct. A subsequent passage of the treatise says: 'Although there is the form realm, it also relies on material faculties, yet it does not determinately exist, and is not subsumed under basis.' If one allows the function of reliance to be named 'possessing an object', then whether the five faculties produce or do not produce consciousness with respect to the eighth, all would be named 'possessing an object'; speaking in terms of the substance of reliance, 'possessing an object' is not excluded, only determinateness is absent. If speaking in terms of the function of reliance, one should also say that it lacks the criterion of possessing an object, because it does not constantly produce consciousness at all times, or because the seventh and eighth are not determinately of the same class with the fifth and sixth consciousnesses. Therefore, the present explanation has a distinct meaning: whatever is relied upon is entirely called an 'admixture/reliance' (āśraya). That which possesses the four criteria is the most supreme among reliances and is established as a basis (āśraya); the inferior are not so established. In possessing determinateness, what is called determinateness? It is not determinate co-existence that is called determinateness. There are four kinds of determinateness: first, determinateness in facilitating the grasping of an object, designated below as 'sharing the same object'; second, determinateness in clearly understanding an object, designated below as 'discrimination'; third, determinateness in status difference, designated below as 'defiled or pure'; fourth, determinateness in being able to give rise as a basis, designated below as 'root'. Those that possess an object and act as master also each have four kinds: if any one among these four kinds of determinateness, possessing an object, and acting as master is present, that itself constitutes determinateness, possessing an object, and acting as master. The five faculties, with respect to the five consciousnesses, have determinateness in facilitating the grasping of an object, possess an object, and act as master; the mental consciousness, with respect to the five consciousnesses, has determinateness in clearly understanding an object, possesses an object, and acts as master. The seventh [consciousness], with respect to the five consciousnesses, has determinateness in status difference, possesses an object, and acts as master; the eighth [consciousness], with respect to the five consciousnesses, has determinateness in being able to give rise as a basis, possesses an object, and acts as master. Therefore, these five consciousnesses possess four bases, because the five faculties can facilitate the five consciousnesses in grasping their objects, and the mental consciousness can assist the five in clearly understanding their objects. The word 'discrimination' means clearly understanding the object. Otherwise, a meditative mind would not be a basis for the five. The seventh consciousness can cause the status of the five to differ; when the seventh ultimately becomes untainted, the five are determinately untainted. Otherwise, although the tainted cause turns due to the seventh, it is not ultimate. The eighth serves as a basis for the seeds of the five to give rise to actual manifestations; the eighth is broadly spoken of as the basis that can give rise, verified by such proofs as these. Thus we know that by merely possessing [one of them], it obtains that name. If determinateness, possessing an object, and acting as master were only of one single kind and did not extend to the four, then the five consciousnesses would lack the four kinds of faculties. By this reasoning, the seventh, with respect to the sixth and the eighth consciousnesses, only has determinateness in status difference, possesses an object, and acts as master. The eighth, with respect to the sixth and seventh, only has determinateness in being able to give rise as a basis, possesses an object, and acts as master. The meanings of the latter four bases all extend to the former three; the fundamental intent of the treatise has been unpacked accordingly. Since the substance of the basis possesses three criteria, causing the produced result to grasp its own object constitutes the fourth criterion. Because whichever of the former three are completely possessed, it is thereby able to cause [the result] to grasp its own object. The superiority of these four criteria is such that whatever can completely possess [them] according to the three is named a basis; the others are not so established, because they are not exceptional with respect to the produced result. As for the aggregate of form, the five faculties with respect to the remaining five consciousnesses and the sixth, seventh, and eighth; the five dusts and the form of the dharma-base with respect to all consciousnesses; the non-associated formations and unconditioned phenomena with respect to all consciousnesses; and non-consciousness seeds with respect to all consciousnesses—all do not possess the three, because they lack the criteria among the three according to what is appropriate, and upon meticulous investigation there are none at all. All mental factors, with respect to whatever consciousness they are considered against, only have determinateness and possess an object, and may possess [them] accordingly among the four kinds, but they only lack acting as master. The various seeds, with respect to their own consciousness, may have the two criteria of determinateness in status difference and acting as master, but they only lack possessing an object. The former five consciousnesses mutually considered among themselves, as well as with respect to the sixth, seventh, and eighth, and the sixth with respect to the seventh and eighth, all lack everything, because they lack the four criteria among the three as appropriate. All actual manifestations of other minds and mental factors, form, and non-associated formations, with respect to the various seeds, lack everything; the various mental factors with respect to their own seeds lack acting as master, because while they have determinateness in status difference and possess an object, their defilement and purity are the same. Their substance is like ministers to the king, and therefore they lack acting as master, nor do they cause the result to grasp its own object. The eight actual consciousnesses with respect to their own seeds only lack causing the result to grasp its own object, because they can have the criteria of determinateness in status difference, possessing an object, and acting as master. Among them, possession and lack should be known according to the principle. Having briefly collated and cited this, subsequent readers should examine it carefully. However, in the subsequent text, when the five faculties are considered with respect to the eighth, it only excludes determinate existence and does not exclude the others; this is because adducing what is absent at first by analogy shows the absence of what follows, for merely adducing the absence of one renders it disqualified as a basis, so why need it be fully stated?