成唯識論掌中樞要 2.82

2.82

Regarding the distinction between reliance (āśraya) and basis (āśraya), where a basis possesses four criteria: With respect to the four consciousnesses, what criterion does the body faculty lack such that it is not their basis? An interpretation provisionally explains: It lacks the criterion of determinateness, because one may rely on a lower body to produce the upper eye [consciousness] and so forth. This is also not correct. When the lower five consciousnesses co-arise with an upper mental consciousness, [that mental consciousness] would not be the basis of the five, since it is also indeterminate. Another interpretation explains: It lacks the criterion of possessing an object (sa-viṣaya). As a rule, to establish that which possesses an object, it must be that an operative faculty of the same class produces the function of possessing an object. An operative faculty of that same class is not a basis (āśraya), but is merely subsumed under reliance (āśraya); consequently, this body faculty definitely does not possess an object of the same class with the four. Even if the body consciousness of oneself does not necessarily co-arise to serve as a basis for the four consciousnesses, it is because of speaking of the function of reliance that it is named 'possessing an object', not because of the substance of reliance. This is also not correct. A subsequent passage of the treatise says: 'Although there is the form realm, it also relies on material faculties, yet it does not determinately exist, and is not subsumed under basis.' If one allows the function of reliance to be named 'possessing an object', then whether the five faculties produce or do not produce consciousness with respect to the eighth, all would be named 'possessing an object'; speaking in terms of the substance of reliance, 'possessing an object' is not excluded, only determinateness is absent. If speaking in terms of the function of reliance, one should also say that it lacks the criterion of possessing an object, because it does not constantly produce consciousness at all times, or because the seventh and eighth are not determinately of the same class with the fifth and sixth consciousnesses. Therefore, the present explanation has a distinct meaning: whatever is relied upon is entirely called an 'admixture/reliance' (āśraya). That which possesses the four criteria is the most supreme among reliances and is established as a basis (āśraya); the inferior are not so established. In possessing determinateness, what is called determinateness? It is not determinate co-existence that is called determinateness. There are four kinds of determinateness: first, determinateness in facilitating the grasping of an object, designated below as 'sharing the same object'; second, determinateness in clearly understanding an object, designated below as 'discrimination'; third, determinateness in status difference, designated below as 'defiled or pure'; fourth, determinateness in being able to give rise as a basis, designated below as 'root'. Those that possess an object and act as master also each have four kinds: if any one among these four kinds of determinateness, possessing an object, and acting as master is present, that itself constitutes determinateness, possessing an object, and acting as master. The five faculties, with respect to the five consciousnesses, have determinateness in facilitating the grasping of an object, possess an object, and act as master; the mental consciousness, with respect to the five consciousnesses, has determinateness in clearly understanding an object, possesses an object, and acts as master. The seventh [consciousness], with respect to the five consciousnesses, has determinateness in status difference, possesses an object, and acts as master; the eighth [consciousness], with respect to the five consciousnesses, has determinateness in being able to give rise as a basis, possesses an object, and acts as master. Therefore, these five consciousnesses possess four bases, because the five faculties can facilitate the five consciousnesses in grasping their objects, and the mental consciousness can assist the five in clearly understanding their objects. The word 'discrimination' means clearly understanding the object. Otherwise, a meditative mind would not be a basis for the five. The seventh consciousness can cause the status of the five to differ; when the seventh ultimately becomes untainted, the five are determinately untainted. Otherwise, although the tainted cause turns due to the seventh, it is not ultimate. The eighth serves as a basis for the seeds of the five to give rise to actual manifestations; the eighth is broadly spoken of as the basis that can give rise, verified by such proofs as these. Thus we know that by merely possessing [one of them], it obtains that name. If determinateness, possessing an object, and acting as master were only of one single kind and did not extend to the four, then the five consciousnesses would lack the four kinds of faculties. By this reasoning, the seventh, with respect to the sixth and the eighth consciousnesses, only has determinateness in status difference, possesses an object, and acts as master. The eighth, with respect to the sixth and seventh, only has determinateness in being able to give rise as a basis, possesses an object, and acts as master. The meanings of the latter four bases all extend to the former three; the fundamental intent of the treatise has been unpacked accordingly. Since the substance of the basis possesses three criteria, causing the produced result to grasp its own object constitutes the fourth criterion. Because whichever of the former three are completely possessed, it is thereby able to cause [the result] to grasp its own object. The superiority of these four criteria is such that whatever can completely possess [them] according to the three is named a basis; the others are not so established, because they are not exceptional with respect to the produced result. As for the aggregate of form, the five faculties with respect to the remaining five consciousnesses and the sixth, seventh, and eighth; the five dusts and the form of the dharma-base with respect to all consciousnesses; the non-associated formations and unconditioned phenomena with respect to all consciousnesses; and non-consciousness seeds with respect to all consciousnesses—all do not possess the three, because they lack the criteria among the three according to what is appropriate, and upon meticulous investigation there are none at all. All mental factors, with respect to whatever consciousness they are considered against, only have determinateness and possess an object, and may possess [them] accordingly among the four kinds, but they only lack acting as master. The various seeds, with respect to their own consciousness, may have the two criteria of determinateness in status difference and acting as master, but they only lack possessing an object. The former five consciousnesses mutually considered among themselves, as well as with respect to the sixth, seventh, and eighth, and the sixth with respect to the seventh and eighth, all lack everything, because they lack the four criteria among the three as appropriate. All actual manifestations of other minds and mental factors, form, and non-associated formations, with respect to the various seeds, lack everything; the various mental factors with respect to their own seeds lack acting as master, because while they have determinateness in status difference and possess an object, their defilement and purity are the same. Their substance is like ministers to the king, and therefore they lack acting as master, nor do they cause the result to grasp its own object. The eight actual consciousnesses with respect to their own seeds only lack causing the result to grasp its own object, because they can have the criteria of determinateness in status difference, possessing an object, and acting as master. Among them, possession and lack should be known according to the principle. Having briefly collated and cited this, subsequent readers should examine it carefully. However, in the subsequent text, when the five faculties are considered with respect to the eighth, it only excludes determinate existence and does not exclude the others; this is because adducing what is absent at first by analogy shows the absence of what follows, for merely adducing the absence of one renders it disqualified as a basis, so why need it be fully stated?