成唯識論了義燈 1.124

1.124

釋獨影唯從見中，西明云：緣極微空花等，所有相分，皆熏成種。問：既從種起，云何極微等，說之為假？解云：以不生質故，說為假。據有種生相分成實。今難：若云不生本質，即為假者，異熟心、心法等，應假非實，以各不能熏成種故。若云彼猶緣慮等故，是實非假，即不由成種生，質不生名為假實。又五識異熟心緣五境相，一非緣慮；二不能熏應假非實。此既非假，彼云何然？若以獨相分無質礙用，名為假者，即法處中自在生色。論說無礙，應假非實。若許爾者，八地已上，自在所變，金銀乳等，應非實有。又復且如色等之中，若質若相，有假有實，而色聚攝。如無為，緣相分何攝？若無為攝現有生滅，若言色法現緣無為，云何名色？若云心法為難亦爾。若云同分，豈有同分從種生耶？又若極微，別熏種起，復有五失。三失如前，一向別種說。第四、不如理思失，五十四云：由五相知，名不如理思惟極微，謂於色聚中，有諸極微，自性而住，應知名初一不如理思。既從種生，即自性而住；五、違正理失，《論》云：「以假想慧，於麁色相，漸次除折至不可折假說極微。」本無微質，但以假想，立為極微，即熏成種有極微色，應實無我，妄計遍空。相熏成種，生遍空相，名遍滿我。許即違教，有遍滿我，不許違理，俱心假想，何不成種？《要集》又云：《雜集》所說十八界種，各各不同，必無意識，不從二緣，緣無為影，似無為故。於百法中，無為所攝，他界緣、無漏緣，雖異地無繫，而不離色等。緣一切無法，定必有所，無不離色等，故與見相，必不同體。強分別心，得緣無等，所現相分，具四緣義，故是能熏。既得自熏，何用見種？故依西明，不依《樞要》。此等過失，准前應知，恐煩不述。又云：然所變相，能熏不熏，總有三解，初二解非，《要集》自斷。第一解云：緣菟角等，獨影從見。然異熟無記，劣不能熏。勝者能熏，例圓鏡、成事，以觀察、平等杖，因八、五緣他身土及佛說，緣亦得成種。第二說：緣無一向影從見，如《樞要》解。第三解云：有質、無質、他界、有漏、無漏、無為、無法，所現相分，除劣無記，餘一切法具四義者，皆是能熏。云此說勝，不違教故，理遍通故。前之二說，有力不熏成過失故，今謂此判，不應正理。若已相分，除劣無記，皆別熏種，如緣假法，不相應等，既有相分，能熏成種，種何法收？若不相應攝，即各有體，非三分位，從種生故。若非此攝，復在何收？成種義齊，非是彼法，不應道理。又他界緣，散非他引，相別成種，是何界攝？若他界攝，不應異地心熏，成他界種，不應正理。若自界攝，緣他根心成種何攝？若根心攝，不應正理，何以故？生心應慮根起發識，若不能爾，何名根心？若在餘攝，亦多過故。又過如前，恐煩且止。

Regarding the explanation that a solitary reflection solely follows the darśana, Ximing states: all nimittabhāgas cognizing paramāṇus, sky-flowers, and so forth, are perfumed to become bījas. Question: Since they arise from bījas, why are paramāṇus and the like said to be nominal? The explanation states: because they do not produce an original basis, they are said to be nominal; in terms of possessing a bīja that produces the nimittabhāga, they are established as real. Now I object: If it is said that not producing an original basis makes it nominal, then vipāka minds, mental factors, and so forth should be nominal and not real, because each cannot perfume to become bījas. If it is said that because they still possess cognitive deliberation and so forth, they are real and not nominal, then nominality and reality are not determined by whether bījas are formed to produce an original basis. Furthermore, the nimittabhāga of the five sense objects cognized by the vipāka minds of the five consciousnesses is, first, not cognitive deliberation, and second, unable to perfume; thus it should be nominal and not real. Since this is not nominal, how could that be so? If a solitary nimittabhāga lacking tangible obstruction is called nominal, then the forms arisen from mastery within the dharmāyatana, which the treatise states are unobstructed, would have to be nominal and not real. If that were granted, then the gold, silver, milk, and so on transformed through mastery at the eighth bhūmi and above would not be real entities. Furthermore, just as among forms and the like, whether basis or nimitta, there are the nominal and the real, yet all are subsumed under the aggregate of form; when an unconditioned dharma is cognized, what subsumes the nimittabhāga? If subsumed under the unconditioned, it visibly possesses arising and ceasing. If it is said to be form, when currently cognizing the unconditioned, how could it be called form? If it is said to be a mental dharma, the objection is the same. If it is said to be nikāya-sabhāga, how could a nikāya-sabhāga arise from a bīja? Moreover, if a paramāṇu perfumes a distinct bīja to arise, there are further five faults. Three faults are as mentioned earlier under the assertion of an exclusively distinct bīja. Fourth is the fault of ayoniśomanaskāra: Fascicle 54 states that by five characteristics one recognizes improper attention to paramāṇus, namely, that within a collection of forms there are paramāṇus existing by their own nature; one should know that this is the first improper attention. Since it arises from a bīja, it would exist by its own nature. Fifth is the fault of contradicting right reasoning: the treatise states, 'By conceptual wisdom, coarse form is gradually broken down to what cannot be broken down, nominally designated as a paramāṇu.' Originally there is no atomic basis; it is merely posited as a paramāṇu by conceptualization. If this perfumed to become a bīja producing paramāṇu-form, then although there is truly no self, falsely imagining an omnipresent space-filling self would perfume to become a bīja producing an omnipresent nimitta, called an omnipresent self. Granting this contradicts teaching, that there is an omnipresent self; not granting it contradicts reasoning—both being conceptualizations of the mind, why would it not form a bīja? The Yaoji further states: The bījas of the eighteen dhātus taught in the Samuccaya are each distinct; certainly no manovijñāna fails to arise from two conditions. Because the reflection of an unconditioned dharma resembles the unconditioned, among the hundred dharmas it is subsumed under the unconditioned. Cognitions of other realms and anāsrava cognitions, though belonging to a different sphere and unbonded, are not separate from form and so forth. Cognition of all non-existent dharmas must have an objective support, none being separate from form and so forth; therefore, it is necessarily not of the same substance as the darśana. A strongly discriminative mind can cognize non-existence and the like; the manifest nimittabhāga possesses the four conditions, and hence is capable of perfuming. Since it can perfume itself, what use is the bīja of the darśana? Therefore one should follow Ximing and not the Shuyao. Such faults should be understood on the model of what precedes; I refrain from explaining further for fear of verbosity. It also says: Regarding whether the transformed nimitta perfumes or does not perfume, there are three explanations in total. The first two explanations are incorrect, as the Yaoji itself decides. The first explanation states: cognizing hare's horns and the like, the solitary reflection follows the darśana; however, vipāka-avyākṛta is weak and incapable of perfuming, whereas superior states can perfume—by analogy with the mirror-wisdom and fulfilling-action wisdom, where observing and equality rely on the causal eighth and fifth to cognize other bodies and lands, and the Buddha's preaching, cognition can also form bījas. The second explanation says: cognizing non-existence exclusively reflects following the darśana, as explained in the Shuyao. The third explanation states: whether possessing a basis or lacking a basis, other realms, sāsrava, anāsrava, unconditioned, or non-existent dharmas, all manifest nimittabhāgas—except for the weak and indeterminate—that possess the four conditions are capable of perfuming. It says this explanation is superior, because it does not contradict teaching and its reasoning is universally applicable, whereas the previous two explanations have the fault of having power yet not perfuming. Now I say: this judgment does not accord with correct reasoning. If the nimittabhāga, except for weak indeterminate states, all separately perfume bījas, then when cognizing nominal dharmas, non-associated dharmas, and the like, since there is a nimittabhāga capable of perfuming into a bīja, what dharma subsumes that bīja? If subsumed under non-associated dharmas, they would each possess an intrinsic substance, not being positional states of the other three, because they arise from bījas. If not subsumed under this, under what else would they be subsumed? If their capacity to form bījas is equal, yet they are not that dharma, it does not accord with reason. Furthermore, when cognizing other realms, if discursive thought is not induced by the other, and the nimitta separately forms a bīja, what realm subsumes it? If subsumed under the other realm, it is unreasonable for the mind of a different realm to perfume and form a bīja of another realm; this does not accord with reason. If subsumed under its own realm, when cognizing another's faculty or mind, what subsumes the formed bīja? If subsumed under faculty or mind, it does not accord with reason; why? Arising from the mind, it should deliberate; arising from a faculty, it should give rise to consciousness; if it cannot do so, how could it be called a faculty or mind? If subsumed under other categories, there are also many faults. Moreover, the faults are as before; for fear of verbosity I shall stop here.