成唯識論了義燈 1.124

1.124

Regarding the explanation that a solitary reflection solely follows the darśana, Ximing states: all nimittabhāgas cognizing paramāṇus, sky-flowers, and so forth, are perfumed to become bījas. Question: Since they arise from bījas, why are paramāṇus and the like said to be nominal? The explanation states: because they do not produce an original basis, they are said to be nominal; in terms of possessing a bīja that produces the nimittabhāga, they are established as real. Now I object: If it is said that not producing an original basis makes it nominal, then vipāka minds, mental factors, and so forth should be nominal and not real, because each cannot perfume to become bījas. If it is said that because they still possess cognitive deliberation and so forth, they are real and not nominal, then nominality and reality are not determined by whether bījas are formed to produce an original basis. Furthermore, the nimittabhāga of the five sense objects cognized by the vipāka minds of the five consciousnesses is, first, not cognitive deliberation, and second, unable to perfume; thus it should be nominal and not real. Since this is not nominal, how could that be so? If a solitary nimittabhāga lacking tangible obstruction is called nominal, then the forms arisen from mastery within the dharmāyatana, which the treatise states are unobstructed, would have to be nominal and not real. If that were granted, then the gold, silver, milk, and so on transformed through mastery at the eighth bhūmi and above would not be real entities. Furthermore, just as among forms and the like, whether basis or nimitta, there are the nominal and the real, yet all are subsumed under the aggregate of form; when an unconditioned dharma is cognized, what subsumes the nimittabhāga? If subsumed under the unconditioned, it visibly possesses arising and ceasing. If it is said to be form, when currently cognizing the unconditioned, how could it be called form? If it is said to be a mental dharma, the objection is the same. If it is said to be nikāya-sabhāga, how could a nikāya-sabhāga arise from a bīja? Moreover, if a paramāṇu perfumes a distinct bīja to arise, there are further five faults. Three faults are as mentioned earlier under the assertion of an exclusively distinct bīja. Fourth is the fault of ayoniśomanaskāra: Fascicle 54 states that by five characteristics one recognizes improper attention to paramāṇus, namely, that within a collection of forms there are paramāṇus existing by their own nature; one should know that this is the first improper attention. Since it arises from a bīja, it would exist by its own nature. Fifth is the fault of contradicting right reasoning: the treatise states, 'By conceptual wisdom, coarse form is gradually broken down to what cannot be broken down, nominally designated as a paramāṇu.' Originally there is no atomic basis; it is merely posited as a paramāṇu by conceptualization. If this perfumed to become a bīja producing paramāṇu-form, then although there is truly no self, falsely imagining an omnipresent space-filling self would perfume to become a bīja producing an omnipresent nimitta, called an omnipresent self. Granting this contradicts teaching, that there is an omnipresent self; not granting it contradicts reasoning—both being conceptualizations of the mind, why would it not form a bīja? The Yaoji further states: The bījas of the eighteen dhātus taught in the Samuccaya are each distinct; certainly no manovijñāna fails to arise from two conditions. Because the reflection of an unconditioned dharma resembles the unconditioned, among the hundred dharmas it is subsumed under the unconditioned. Cognitions of other realms and anāsrava cognitions, though belonging to a different sphere and unbonded, are not separate from form and so forth. Cognition of all non-existent dharmas must have an objective support, none being separate from form and so forth; therefore, it is necessarily not of the same substance as the darśana. A strongly discriminative mind can cognize non-existence and the like; the manifest nimittabhāga possesses the four conditions, and hence is capable of perfuming. Since it can perfume itself, what use is the bīja of the darśana? Therefore one should follow Ximing and not the Shuyao. Such faults should be understood on the model of what precedes; I refrain from explaining further for fear of verbosity. It also says: Regarding whether the transformed nimitta perfumes or does not perfume, there are three explanations in total. The first two explanations are incorrect, as the Yaoji itself decides. The first explanation states: cognizing hare's horns and the like, the solitary reflection follows the darśana; however, vipāka-avyākṛta is weak and incapable of perfuming, whereas superior states can perfume—by analogy with the mirror-wisdom and fulfilling-action wisdom, where observing and equality rely on the causal eighth and fifth to cognize other bodies and lands, and the Buddha's preaching, cognition can also form bījas. The second explanation says: cognizing non-existence exclusively reflects following the darśana, as explained in the Shuyao. The third explanation states: whether possessing a basis or lacking a basis, other realms, sāsrava, anāsrava, unconditioned, or non-existent dharmas, all manifest nimittabhāgas—except for the weak and indeterminate—that possess the four conditions are capable of perfuming. It says this explanation is superior, because it does not contradict teaching and its reasoning is universally applicable, whereas the previous two explanations have the fault of having power yet not perfuming. Now I say: this judgment does not accord with correct reasoning. If the nimittabhāga, except for weak indeterminate states, all separately perfume bījas, then when cognizing nominal dharmas, non-associated dharmas, and the like, since there is a nimittabhāga capable of perfuming into a bīja, what dharma subsumes that bīja? If subsumed under non-associated dharmas, they would each possess an intrinsic substance, not being positional states of the other three, because they arise from bījas. If not subsumed under this, under what else would they be subsumed? If their capacity to form bījas is equal, yet they are not that dharma, it does not accord with reason. Furthermore, when cognizing other realms, if discursive thought is not induced by the other, and the nimitta separately forms a bīja, what realm subsumes it? If subsumed under the other realm, it is unreasonable for the mind of a different realm to perfume and form a bīja of another realm; this does not accord with reason. If subsumed under its own realm, when cognizing another's faculty or mind, what subsumes the formed bīja? If subsumed under faculty or mind, it does not accord with reason; why? Arising from the mind, it should deliberate; arising from a faculty, it should give rise to consciousness; if it cannot do so, how could it be called a faculty or mind? If subsumed under other categories, there are also many faults. Moreover, the faults are as before; for fear of verbosity I shall stop here.