成唯識論了義燈 2.104

2.104

言得非得等，下破不相應行。除經量部及一說部，但破所餘，何以故？經部得等，皆是假有，如《俱舍論》破有部，明一說部者，既說諸法但有能詮，無實所詮一切法體，故亦不立不相應行，故此說除。然《要集》云：此中大乘、經部共破薩婆多師者，理必不爾，豈可小乘共護法等造唯識耶？雖可與彼《俱舍論》中破義相似，此非共造，今此下破，但依比量破。彼所立，無有現量及至教量破，彼實有故，《正理》十三云：又此諸相，豈如瓶等有現、比量，或至教量證體假有，既遮實有，故彼定應許生等，相體是假有。第三法有理必無故，此意不許生等實有，即應定說生等假有，以必不許有第三法，亦實亦假，故廣如彼說。由此二家現量、至教都無誠證，但可比量各為立破，故彼小乘，雖引聖教，今此論主云：經不說異色、心等，有實體用，為證不成，但比量破，於中本說此文有三：初難實有別舉體相及作用因；二此定非異下合難體用；三或心、心所下別難實有。西明釋云：此定非異下。初量釋上，體用非實；次後二量，重釋前失。初破實有；後立假有者，此不應爾。文自立量，直是破他，何須釋上及重釋失？既言重釋，何故復言初破實有，後立假有？又後二量，准文破實，未是立假。但且破他，以他立云不相應行，異色、心等有實體用。故今對破遮他為論，未即反成，不相應假，下述正中方立假故。《集》云：此定非異色、心、心所有實體用；許蘊攝故；如色、心等者。此與外宗作比量相違，然此比量即有過失，若別立二量，各有不定。謂不相應行，異色無實體用，許蘊攝故，如色異心，無體量可准知，此即不定。若合立者，即法自相相違失，及法差別相違因失，自相相違云：不相應行，異色、心等有實體用，許蘊攝故，如色、心等。此喻有二義：一、色外無別色體，心外無別心體；二、色外有別心體，心外有別色體，如色心等。言含二義，故論主取前義，外人取後義。又法差別相違量云：不相應行定是實有；詳蘊攝故；如色、心等。直言定實有體，不言異色心等，故非言顯差別中收。且前云：有法自相相違過者不爾，既合立量，雙為因、喻，若外人云：異色、心等有實體用，即色、心等是異法喻，許蘊攝因既於異轉，是彼自成法自相相違過，何得云論主相違？論主既云：定不異色、心有體，即心、色等為同法喻，因於彼轉，色、心等不異，色、心等有實體用，乃正同喻，是故無過。又法差別過亦不成，既云：定實有許蘊攝故，心、色為喻，大乘心、色通有假實，有他不定，瓶盆等假亦蘊所攝，有共不定。不可說瓶等，非蘊所攝故，以非無為復非全無，定蘊所攝，又如眼等必為他用，意含真假，成真他用名法差別。今云：不相應行必定異色心等有實體用，即言中顯立彼，意許不相應行異色、心等有實體用，與誰為差別？又復必定不異色、心、心等有實體用，合名為法。今但別取定實有體，為法差別，豈得成過？又因不定，故此分別徒設劬勞，餘准可知。

The words 'possession (prāpti), non-possession (aprāpti), and so on' below refute the conditioned dharmas non-concurrent with mind (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra). Excepting the Sautrāntika and Ekavyāvahārika schools, it refutes only the remainder. Why? For the Sautrāntikas, possession and so on are all conventionally existent, as in the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra refuting the Sarvāstivādins. As for the Ekavyāvahārika school, since they say that all dharmas have only designating expressions and lack any real referent or entity for any dharma, they also do not posit citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras; hence this text says they are excluded. However, the Yaoji says: 'Here, the Mahāyāna and the Sautrāntikas join together to refute the Sarvāstivādin masters.' This principle is surely not so: how could a Hīnayāna [school] compose [the treatise on] Vijñapti-mātra together with Dharmapāla and the others? Although it may be similar to the refutation in that Abhidharmakośa-śāstra, this was not a joint composition. Now the refutation below is solely based on inference (anumāna) to refute what they posit, because there are neither direct perception (pratyakṣa) nor authentic scripture (āgamapramāṇa) to refute their real existence. Hence Nyāyānusāra 13 says: 'Moreover, how could these characteristics, like a vase or the like, have direct perception, inference, or authentic scripture to prove that their entity is conventionally existent? Since real existence is negated, they must certainly accept that the entity of characteristics such as arising is conventionally existent. Because a third kind of dharma is logically impossible.' This means: since they do not accept that arising and so on are really existent, they must definitely say that arising and so on are conventionally existent, because one must not accept a third dharma that is both real and conventional. Thus it is explained at length there. Because neither of the two schools has conclusive proof from direct perception or authentic scripture, they can only establish and refute each other through inference. Therefore, although that Hīnayāna [opponent] cites sacred teachings, the author of this treatise now states: 'The sūtras do not say that distinct from form, mind, and so on, there are real entities and functions.' Thus their proof is not established, and they are refuted merely by inference. Within this, the root text originally has three parts: first, challenging real existence by separately citing the reasons of entity-characteristic and function; second, from 'These are definitely not distinct from...' downward, jointly challenging entity and function; third, from 'Or mind and mental factors...' downward, separately challenging real existence. Ximing explains: 'From "These are definitely not distinct from..." downward: the first syllogism explains the above, that entity and function are not real; the subsequent two syllogisms re-explain the previous error. The first refutes real existence; the latter establishes conventional existence.' This should not be so. The text itself formulates syllogisms directly to refute the other; why would it need to explain the above and re-explain the error? Since he says 're-explain', why does he then say that the first refutes real existence and the latter establishes conventional existence? Furthermore, the subsequent two syllogisms, according to the text, refute real existence and do not yet establish conventional existence. They merely refute the other for the time being, because the other posits that the non-concurrent dharmas have real entities and functions distinct from form, mind, and so on. Therefore, now directly confronting and refuting, it negates the other's thesis; it does not immediately establish by converse that the non-concurrent dharmas are conventional, since only below in expounding the correct view does it establish them as conventional. The Yaoji states: '"These definitely do not have real entities and functions distinct from form, mind, and mental factors; because they are accepted as being subsumed within the aggregates; like form, mind, and so on." This forms a contradictory inference (viruddhānumāna) against the other school. However, this syllogism entails fallacies. If one formulates two separate syllogisms, each has the fallacy of indeterminacy (anaikāntika): namely, non-concurrent dharmas have no real entity and function distinct from form, because they are accepted as being subsumed within the aggregates, like form distinct from mind; the syllogism lacking an entity can be known by parity of reasoning, and this is indeterminate. If they are formulated jointly, there is the fallacy of contradicting the property itself (dharmasvarūpa-viparītasādhana) and the fallacy of the reason contradicting a property's distinction (dharmaviśeṣa-viparītasādhana). Contradicting the property itself is: non-concurrent dharmas have real entities and functions distinct from form, mind, and so on, because they are accepted as being subsumed within the aggregates, like form, mind, and so on. This example has two meanings: first, outside of form there is no other entity of form, and outside of mind there is no other entity of mind; second, outside of form there is a distinct entity of mind, and outside of mind there is a distinct entity of form, like form and mind, etc. The statement contains two meanings; hence the author of the treatise takes the former meaning, while the outsider takes the latter meaning. Furthermore, the syllogism contradicting a property's distinction is: non-concurrent dharmas are definitely really existent; because they are scrutinized as being subsumed within the aggregates; like form, mind, and so on. Simply stating that they definitely have real entities without mentioning "distinct from form, mind, and so on" means it is not included among explicitly stated distinctions.' However, what was said before—that there is the error of contradicting the property itself—is not so. Since the syllogism is formulated jointly, both [form and mind] serve as reason and example. If the outsider says: 'Distinct from form, mind, and so on, there are real entities and functions,' then form, mind, and so on are dissimilar examples (vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta); since the reason 'accepted as being subsumed within the aggregates' occurs in the dissimilar case, it is they themselves who incur the error of contradicting the property itself; how could one say the author of the treatise incurs a contradiction? Since the author of the treatise says: 'They definitely do not have entities distinct from form and mind,' then mind, form, and so on are similar examples (sādharmyadṛṣṭānta); the reason occurs in them, and that form, mind, and so on are not distinct from form, mind, and so on having real entities and functions is precisely the correct similar example; therefore there is no error. Moreover, the error of contradicting the property's distinction is also not established. Since it says: 'They definitely really exist, because they are accepted as being subsumed within the aggregates, with mind and form as examples,' in the Mahāyāna mind and form include both conventional and real, so there is the fallacy of other-indeterminacy (para-anaikāntika); conventional things like vases and bowls are also subsumed within the aggregates, so there is the fallacy of common indeterminacy (sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika). It cannot be said that vases and the like are not subsumed within the aggregates, because since they are not unconditioned and also not completely non-existent, they are definitely subsumed within the aggregates. Furthermore, just as the eye and so on are necessarily for another's use, the intention implicitly contains the real and the conventional; proving 'for another's real use' is called the property's distinction. Here it says: 'Non-concurrent dharmas must definitely have real entities and functions distinct from form, mind, and so on'—this explicitly establishes that thesis in words. If the implicit intention is that non-concurrent dharmas have real entities and functions distinct from form, mind, and so on, with what does it form a distinction? Furthermore, 'definitely not having real entities and functions distinct from form, mind, and so on' is jointly termed the property (dharma). Now, merely extracting 'definitely having a real entity' as the property's distinction, how could that constitute a fallacy? Furthermore, the reason is indeterminate. Therefore, this distinction is an exercise in futile effort; the rest can be understood by analogy.