成唯識論了義燈 2.108

2.108

言若待餘因得便無用者，有解心待四緣。色待二緣足得生法，何繁得起？故得無用。此破不爾，可非增上法得生起。然《要集》云：得非四因及生等五，其理易知者，當撿《俱舍》引文具注。又具善、惡、無記得者，此中總難，過去已捨，雖無後得，有法俱得；未來已失，及無前得，並有俱得，難令得生亦得。然准本意，唯難不失現成前得，三性之法，應頓現前，所以下云：若待餘因得便無用。若難已捨，及未來世緣闕不生，雖有俱得，他許無用不能生故，便成相符。故難不失現成得者。此雖二說，准《俱舍》云：誰言此得，作法生因？《正理論》中，唯有不失無能生因，故彼論云：由所許得是已得法不失因故。《婆沙》二說：正義亦唯為不失因。

Regarding the statement, 'If it depends on other causes, possession is useless': some explain that mind depends on four conditions and form depends on two conditions, which are sufficient to produce dharmas; why trouble oneself with possession arising? Hence, possession is useless. This refutation is not like that; could it not be that dharmas arise through the sovereign condition? However, the Yaoji says: 'Possession is not among the four causes, nor among the five such as production (janana); this principle is easy to understand.' One should check the Kośa and quote the text in full annotation. Furthermore, regarding 'possessing the acquisitions of good, bad, and indeterminate': here it is an overall objection that although what was relinquished in the past lacks subsequent possession, it has simultaneous possession; what is already lost in the future and what lacks prior possession both have simultaneous possession, and objecting so that they might arise would also work. However, according to the original intent, it only objects that the dharmas of the three moral natures whose prior possession is unlost and currently accomplished should appear all at once. Therefore, it says below: 'If it depends on other causes, possession is useless.' If one objected to what has already been relinquished, and what does not arise in future times due to lack of conditions: although they have simultaneous possession, the other [school] admits that they are useless and cannot produce, so it would become an admission of what is already agreed (siddhasādhana). Therefore, one objects to that whose possession is unlost and currently accomplished. Although there are these two explanations, according to the Kośa: 'Who says that this possession acts as a cause for the arising of dharmas?' In the Nyāyānusāra, there is only the cause of non-loss, not an active generative cause. Thus that treatise says: 'Because the posited possession is the cause of non-loss for dharmas that have already been acquired.' In the Mahāvibhāṣā's two views, the correct doctrine is likewise only that it is the cause of non-loss.