成唯識論了義燈 2.161

2.161

《論》：「又若命根異識實有，應如受等，非實命根。」比量如文，　問：既以異識為因，難非實命根，他以不離識因，難非假命根者，何理能遣？答：大乘命根非如名定，縱將生等，難非假命，亦是相符。以大乘立，但假名字，有此功能故。又有釋云：與他為違教失，說住滅定等壽不離識者，亦不成難，他亦許壽不離識故。由此論文，但云異識實有，應非命根。西明云：他若難大乘云：論主所說受等應非實受等，離識實有故，如相等。解云：外違教失，彼許受等，是實有故者。不爾，以離識實有故，因兩俱不成過，小大同許受等不離識故，喻無能立過。上雖云：應比離識，無別命根者，是設遮破，非他所許，命離色、心有實自體。他只言異色、心有體，不言離故。西明又云：薩婆多量云：命根實有；能持身故；如業者。不爾，此因有他隨一不成過，以大乘師不許命根能持身故。若許持身，下破經部識類受熏，假不能持，有不定過。《要集》云：應云汝命離識不能持身，即無違宗。大乘命根許持身故，共許同分不持身故者，亦不爾，同前過故，諸論但說，能令相續住時決定，於此分位假立命根，不說能持故。設有處言能持識者，由業引種能生現識，相續不斷功能差別，能建持義，假名命持，非是攝受執持之持，亦不即取正能生用，下破假持據攝受執持。今他云：命能持身者，即攝持義，故住前破。

The Treatise: 'Furthermore, if the life faculty were substantially existent distinct from consciousness, it should be like sensation and the rest, not a real life faculty.' The inference is as in the text. Question: Since being distinct from consciousness is used as the reason to challenge it as not being a real life faculty, if the opponent uses the reason of not being separate from consciousness to challenge it as not being a nominal life faculty, what principle can dismiss it? Answer: The Mahāyāna life faculty is not like the definitive designations of names; even if one took arising and so forth to challenge it as not being a nominal life [faculty], that would still be an instance of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana). For according to Mahāyāna positing, it is merely a nominal designation having this capacity. Furthermore, another explanation says: making it a fault of contradicting scripture for the opponent, where it is said that in the cessation attainment life is not separate from consciousness, does not constitute a valid challenge either, because the opponent also accepts that life is not separate from consciousness. Hence, the text of the Treatise merely says: 'substantially existent distinct from consciousness, it should not be a life faculty.' Ximing says: If the opponent challenges the Mahāyāna, saying: 'The sensation and the rest spoken of by the treatise master should not be real sensation and the rest, because they are substantially existent separate from consciousness, like characteristics and the like'; and solves this by: 'The opponent commits the fault of contradicting their own doctrine, because they accept that sensation and the rest are substantially existent.' This is not so; because 'substantially existent separate from consciousness' commits the fallacy of the reason being unproven for both parties (ubhāyāsiddha), since Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna alike accept that sensation and the rest are not separate from consciousness, and the example has the fault of lacking what is to be proved. Although it was stated above that 'by inference, there should be no distinct life faculty separate from consciousness', this was a provisional rebuttal, not that the opponent accepts life having a real entity separate from form and mind. They merely say it has an entity distinct from form and mind, not that it is separate. Ximing also says: The Sarvāstivāda inference is: 'The life faculty is substantially existent; because it can sustain the body; like karma.' This is not so; this reason has the fault of being unproven for the other party (anyatarāsiddha), because the Mahāyāna master does not accept that the life faculty can sustain the body. If sustaining the body were accepted, then below, when refuting the Sautrāntika category of consciousness receiving perfuming and that what is nominal cannot sustain, there would be the fault of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). The Yaoji says: One should say, 'Your life, being separate from consciousness, cannot sustain the body,' then there is no contradiction of the thesis. Because the Mahāyāna life faculty is accepted as sustaining the body, and both commonly accept that sabhāga does not sustain the body. This is also not so, because it commits the same previous fault; all treatises merely state that it causes the continuity to dwell for a determinate duration, and upon this phase the life faculty is nominally posited, not saying that it can sustain. Even if in some places it is said that it can sustain consciousness, it is because seeds led by karma can generate actual consciousness, and the specific capacity of unbroken continuity can establish the meaning of sustaining, so it is metaphorically called sustaining life; it is not sustaining in the sense of embracing and maintaining, nor does it directly take the function of directly generating. The refutation of nominal sustaining below is based on embracing and maintaining. Now the opponent says 'life can sustain the body', which means embracing and maintaining, so it still falls under the previous refutation.