成唯識論了義燈 2.161

2.161

The Treatise: 'Furthermore, if the life faculty were substantially existent distinct from consciousness, it should be like sensation and the rest, not a real life faculty.' The inference is as in the text. Question: Since being distinct from consciousness is used as the reason to challenge it as not being a real life faculty, if the opponent uses the reason of not being separate from consciousness to challenge it as not being a nominal life faculty, what principle can dismiss it? Answer: The Mahāyāna life faculty is not like the definitive designations of names; even if one took arising and so forth to challenge it as not being a nominal life [faculty], that would still be an instance of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana). For according to Mahāyāna positing, it is merely a nominal designation having this capacity. Furthermore, another explanation says: making it a fault of contradicting scripture for the opponent, where it is said that in the cessation attainment life is not separate from consciousness, does not constitute a valid challenge either, because the opponent also accepts that life is not separate from consciousness. Hence, the text of the Treatise merely says: 'substantially existent distinct from consciousness, it should not be a life faculty.' Ximing says: If the opponent challenges the Mahāyāna, saying: 'The sensation and the rest spoken of by the treatise master should not be real sensation and the rest, because they are substantially existent separate from consciousness, like characteristics and the like'; and solves this by: 'The opponent commits the fault of contradicting their own doctrine, because they accept that sensation and the rest are substantially existent.' This is not so; because 'substantially existent separate from consciousness' commits the fallacy of the reason being unproven for both parties (ubhāyāsiddha), since Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna alike accept that sensation and the rest are not separate from consciousness, and the example has the fault of lacking what is to be proved. Although it was stated above that 'by inference, there should be no distinct life faculty separate from consciousness', this was a provisional rebuttal, not that the opponent accepts life having a real entity separate from form and mind. They merely say it has an entity distinct from form and mind, not that it is separate. Ximing also says: The Sarvāstivāda inference is: 'The life faculty is substantially existent; because it can sustain the body; like karma.' This is not so; this reason has the fault of being unproven for the other party (anyatarāsiddha), because the Mahāyāna master does not accept that the life faculty can sustain the body. If sustaining the body were accepted, then below, when refuting the Sautrāntika category of consciousness receiving perfuming and that what is nominal cannot sustain, there would be the fault of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). The Yaoji says: One should say, 'Your life, being separate from consciousness, cannot sustain the body,' then there is no contradiction of the thesis. Because the Mahāyāna life faculty is accepted as sustaining the body, and both commonly accept that sabhāga does not sustain the body. This is also not so, because it commits the same previous fault; all treatises merely state that it causes the continuity to dwell for a determinate duration, and upon this phase the life faculty is nominally posited, not saying that it can sustain. Even if in some places it is said that it can sustain consciousness, it is because seeds led by karma can generate actual consciousness, and the specific capacity of unbroken continuity can establish the meaning of sustaining, so it is metaphorically called sustaining life; it is not sustaining in the sense of embracing and maintaining, nor does it directly take the function of directly generating. The refutation of nominal sustaining below is based on embracing and maintaining. Now the opponent says 'life can sustain the body', which means embracing and maintaining, so it still falls under the previous refutation.