成唯識論了義燈 2.31

2.31

論：又彼所執，地、水、火、風，應非有礙，實句義攝，身根所觸故等者。《要集》云：有說地、水、火、風，父母極微，非現量得，子微已上是現量得。下破順世及勝論中云：極微聚集足成根，境何用果為，故知爾也。有釋：實等五句是現量境，和合非現，故下破云：彼許實等現量所得，以理推徵尚非實有，況彼自許，和合句義，非現量得，而可實有，由此證知，父母極微，亦現量得。有解云：今謂二微所生子微，亦非現量得。十句論說，三微所生子，方麁得合，下說麁色量德合，為故乃色根得。《集》曰：今謂有釋為正，謂彼宗中不云色根所取，方是現量境，有現量境，未必色根得。乃至云：有說引破順世中，多因極微，合應非細，足成根境，何用果為？由此證知：子微已上是色根境，父母非者，此破色根境，未說現量，引非色根境，證非現量得，於理太疎，今詳此意。云有說：疎未悟至理，何者彼十句論云：謂至實色等根，等合時有了相，生名為現量。既云根等合時有了相，生名為現量，明知子微已上方與根合，故子微已上，名為現量，是彼宗計，引下破順世等救。云由果多分合故成麁，多因極微，合應非細，足成根境。意取多果合，故成麁為色根境，故取此證子微已上是現量境。於何理疎，妄說為過。若以有釋為正，五句現得彼此極成。說父母微是我現境，准何文說？十句論中但說覺德為現比故，又云根等合時有了相，生名為現量，不說神我為現量體，復無文說父母極微，我現量得，若據總相，有釋不違，若委細論，有說為好。

The treatise states: 'Furthermore, the earth, water, fire, and wind posited by them should not be obstructive, because they are subsumed under the category of substance and are touched by the body faculty, and so forth.' The *Yaoji* says: Some say that the parent paramāṇus of earth, water, fire, and wind are not apprehended by direct perception, whereas from the child atoms upward they are apprehended by direct perception. Below, in refuting the Lokāyata and Vaiśeṣika, it says: 'An aggregation of paramāṇus is sufficient to constitute faculties and objects; what use is an effect [substance]?' Therefore, we know this is so. Another explanation says: The five categories such as substance are objects of direct perception, whereas inherence is not directly perceived. Therefore, the refutation below states: 'Those [categories] such as substance accepted by them as apprehended by direct perception are, when investigated by logic, still not substantially real; how much less could the category of inherence, which they themselves accept as not apprehended by direct perception, be substantially real?' From this it is proven that the parent paramāṇus are also apprehended by direct perception. Yet another explanation says: We now maintain that the child atom produced from two atoms is also not apprehended by direct perception. The *Daśapadārtha-śāstra* states that only a child produced from three atoms is gross and able to combine; below it says that through the combination of the qualities of gross form and dimension, it is only then apprehended by the material faculties. The *Yaoji* states: We now consider the second explanation to be correct; that is, within their school they do not say that only what is apprehended by a material faculty is an object of direct perception—there are objects of direct perception that are not necessarily apprehended by material faculties. Down to where it says: Some cite the refutation of the Lokāyata: 'Through multiple causes combining, paramāṇus should not be subtle, and would suffice to constitute faculties and objects; what use is an effect?' From this it is proven: from child atoms upward they are objects of material faculties, whereas parents are not. This refutes objects of material faculties, but does not speak of direct perception; citing what is not an object of a material faculty to prove that it is not apprehended by direct perception is too loose in principle. We now examine this intention: Saying that 'some' are loose and have not realized the ultimate principle—why is that? That *Daśapadārtha-śāstra* says: 'When the senses and the rest combine reaching the real visible form and so forth, there arises an apprehending characteristic, which is called direct perception.' Since it says 'when the senses and the rest combine, there arises an apprehending characteristic, which is called direct perception,' it is clear that only from the child atoms upward do they combine with the faculties; therefore, from child atoms upward, they are called direct perception. This is the doctrine of their school. It cites below the defense against the refutation of the Lokāyata and others, which says: 'Because many parts of the effect combine, it becomes gross; if many cause paramāṇus combined, they should not be subtle, and would suffice to constitute faculties and objects.' The meaning takes the combination of many effects so that it becomes gross and serves as the object of material faculties; hence this is taken to prove that from the child atoms upward they are objects of direct perception. In what way is the principle loose, that one falsely alleges it to be a fault? If the second explanation were taken as correct, that the five categories are directly apprehended is mutually established between both parties. If one says that the parent atoms are objects of direct perception for the self, on what text does this rely? In the *Daśapadārtha-śāstra*, it only speaks of the quality of cognition as direct perception and inference; furthermore, it says: 'When the senses and the rest combine, there arises an apprehending characteristic, which is called direct perception,' not stating that the spiritual self is the essence of direct perception, nor is there any text stating that the parent paramāṇus are apprehended by the self through direct perception. If based on the general characteristic, the second explanation does not conflict; if discussed in precise detail, the view of 'some' is better.