成唯識論了義燈 2.34

2.34

言：若離有法至有別無性。《樞要》云：第三第四俱比量相違，如疏文述。《要集》云：有說量云：汝第十句無法之外，應別立性。因云：除大有等六句之外，有無二法互相違故。如實、德、業，欲簡不定因云：除大有等六句。有釋量云：五種無句應別有性宗，有無二中隨一攝故。如實、德等。又量汝說實等，應無別性，有無二中隨一攝故。如畢竟無，《要集》但舉二家不知得失，准有釋前量有不定過，五種無句為如實等三句外，應別有性，為如大有等三外不別有性。《要集》又云：有說並云：無性體非有。無上不立無性，有法體非無，何須別立有性？彼若救言：有法雖非無，不自有故須有有，亦應無法不自無，無法之外別立無（此即相望）。《集》今解云：有法體非無，有故有有性；無法體非有，無故無無性。或可，反對云：有、無以相反，無法無無性；有、無以相對，有法有有性。此答恒別，如何破他？故今論中但立量破，非要須並，　今謂設並，亦能破他。且如《集解》不能離過，何者若云無法體非有，無故無無性。亦應有法體自有，有故無有性。有法體自有，有故立有性；無法體是無，無故立無性。反對之中有、無以相對，有法立有性，無有以相違，無法立無性，恒不離過。

Regarding the words: 'If it were apart from existent dharmas [...] there would be a distinct nature of non-existence': The Hub and Essentials states that the third and fourth are both contradictions to inference, as described in the Commentary's text. The Essence Collection says: 'One says the inference is: "Apart from your tenth category of non-existence, a distinct nature should be established. The reason is: Because apart from the six categories of great existence and so forth, the two dharmas of existence and non-existence are mutually contradictory. Like substance, quality, and action." In order to exclude an inconclusive reason, it states: "apart from the six categories of great existence and so forth."' Another explains the inference: '"The five kinds of categories of non-existence should have a distinct nature"—this is the thesis; "because of being subsumed under either one of existence or non-existence"—this is the reason; "like substance, quality, and so forth"—this is the example. Also the inference: "The substance and so forth that you speak of should have no distinct nature; because of being subsumed under either one of existence or non-existence; like absolute non-existence."' The Essence Collection merely adduces the two masters without knowing their merits and faults. If we evaluate by the latter master's former inference, there is the fault of inconclusiveness: Should the five kinds of categories of non-existence be like the three categories of substance and so forth, having a distinct nature apart from them, or be like the three of great existence and so forth, not having a distinct nature apart from them? The Essence Collection also says: 'One formulates the parallel challenge: "The entity of the nature of non-existence is not existent. A nature of non-existence is not established upon non-existence; why must a nature of existence be established distinctly when the entity of an existent dharma is not non-existent?" If they reply defensively: "Although an existent dharma is not non-existent, it does not exist of itself, hence there must be an existence that exists," then similarly, a non-existent dharma does not become non-existent of itself, and a non-existence should be established distinctly apart from non-existent dharmas (this is viewing them in reciprocity).' The Essence Collection now explains: 'The entity of an existent dharma is not non-existent; because it exists, it has a nature of existence. The entity of a non-existent dharma is not existent; because it is non-existent, it has no nature of non-existence. Alternatively, one may retort: "Existence and non-existence are mutually contrary: non-existent dharmas have no nature of non-existence; existence and non-existence are mutually relative: existent dharmas have a nature of existence."' Since this answer constantly differs, how can it refute the opponent? Therefore, the present śāstra merely formulates an inference to refute them, and does not necessarily have to make a parallel challenge. I say now: Even if a parallel challenge is made, it can also refute the opponent. As for the explanation in the Essence Collection, it cannot avoid faults. Why? If it is said: 'The entity of a non-existent dharma is not existent; because it is non-existent, it has no nature of non-existence,' then correspondingly, the entity of an existent dharma exists of itself; because it exists, it should have no nature of existence. If the entity of an existent dharma exists of itself, and because it exists, a nature of existence is established, then the entity of a non-existent dharma is non-existent, and because it is non-existent, a nature of non-existence should be established. Within the retort, existence and non-existence are mutually relative, so for an existent dharma a nature of existence is established; non-existence and existence are mutually contradictory, so for a non-existent dharma a nature of non-existence should be established—thus it never avoids faults.