成唯識論了義燈 2.36

2.36

《論》云：又緣實智下，破能緣智。疏有二解假合生故，初解緣多法，後解智起，假藉多緣，不障能緣，緣彼一多。若依初解，但破總緣，不破別緣。後解通破，所緣之境雖有一多，能緣之智，要藉多緣，云假合生。《要集》云：今謂初師後解亦有不定，緣實現智為如有、和合智，假合生故，是緣實智，為如緣德、業、同異智，假合生故，非緣實智。今詳此說，妄出彼過。何者若約總緣，緣有、和合即亦緣實，即在法中，正是所破，無不定過。若破別緣，緣有、和合，雖假合生，即不緣實，亦無不定。作兩解者，前約境多智，方得起名假合生；後約因多智，方得生名假合生，非避不定。

The śāstra says: 'Furthermore, the cognition cognizing substance,' and so forth below, refuting the cognizing consciousness. The Commentary has two explanations for 'because of being produced from a composite cause (prajñapti-saṃgata-janyatva).' The first explanation is that it cognizes multiple dharmas; the second explanation is that when the cognition arises, it conditionally relies on multiple conditions, which does not hinder the cognizing cognition from cognizing that unity or multiplicity. If following the first explanation, it only refutes collective cognizing, not distinct cognizing. The second explanation refutes both: although the cognized object may be one or many, the cognizing cognition must rely on multiple conditions, which is called 'being produced from a composite cause.' The Essence Collection says: 'I now consider that the second explanation of the first master also has inconclusiveness: Is the cognition cognizing the reality of substance like the cognition of existence and inherence (samavāya), being a cognition cognizing substance because of being produced from a composite cause; or is it like the cognition of quality, action, and generic-and-specific, not being a cognition cognizing substance because of being produced from a composite cause?' Now examining this statement, it fabricates a fault for him without reason. Why? If we consider collective cognizing, cognizing existence and inherence also amounts to cognizing substance, and is thus within the predicate, which is precisely what is refuted, with no fault of inconclusiveness. If we refute distinct cognizing, although cognizing existence and inherence is produced from a composite cause, it does not cognize substance, so there is also no inconclusiveness. The reason two explanations were made is that the former is based on multiple objects before the cognition can arise, termed 'produced from a composite cause,' while the latter is based on multiple causes before the cognition can be produced, termed 'produced from a composite cause'—not to avoid inconclusiveness.