成唯識論了義燈 2.7

2.7

問：敘後三類所計我中，瑜伽六十四等總有四類，然但前二，不攝第三。若爾，何故彼論說云，依我分別計為有者，皆攝在此四種計中，除此更無，如何不收？答：彼據我執自性，不越彼四。今據情解，妄謂為我，故敘破之，實是法執。問：若爾如何下生空斷？答：彼文總說，非別別屬，文總意別，斯文大例。又《樞要》中更有一解，如彼不錄。西明云：第一即蘊者，是殊徵伽外道，彼計諸蘊皆有蘊性。如內宗說，一切諸法以如為性。彼計蘊性以為實我。即當大《婆沙》所說二十句薩迦耶見。今謂此解，理稍難詳，二十句身見等執，即色等五蘊為我，彼執色性。云何言即二十句耶？今且解者，雖俱即蘊，而執有別：一執色等即為其我；一執色性以為其我。性雖非即色，然是蘊收。以蘊性故。或執蘊性，非即蘊攝。如大乘如雖諸蘊性，非是蘊攝，應是第二異蘊，而住蘊中句收。或執蘊性，性者體。執此蘊體即是其我，以他不立有五蘊故，言五蘊者佛法談故，更撿《婆沙》。西明又云：後三之中，何故唯三而無亦即亦離？解云：非即非離即是亦即非離，故不別說。其義如何？若表即離成第三句，若遮即離成第四句。謂即故非離，離故非即。故《顯揚》、《婆沙》等皆作是說。第三、四句由義有異，而體無別。然此第三與第四句，或有同體、或有異體，隨所應知。今謂，未必皆為四句，如說邊見，但有斷、常，不立四句。思非思量，等句皆然，何故此我獨嘖四句？又復計我據有體說，第三、四句既無別體，故無此計。西明又云：三與四句展轉相攝，此論第三即彼前二，所以者何？以非即故當彼離蘊，以非離故當彼即蘊。故此論云：許依蘊立，若不爾者，便違瑜伽一切計我不過四種。今謂不爾，若准此釋，但只第三一類計我，即攝瑜伽四種之計。何得說言或三、或四？又即前二。論何別說以為第三，設此煩辨，有何所益？故應依取本疏、《樞要》說之為正。《要集》云：有解《瑜伽》四計唯分別，此中第三俱生收，任運我執不計即、離故。下具說二見依蘊，不緣我生。若敘計破不通二執，不應通示二執緣蘊。集云：今謂瑜伽唯說分別，此論通二，此義可爾。此論第三，如何得知，唯是俱生而無分別？唯內非外？三藏傳說：犢子計我似犢子外道計。既爾，如何不破外道，分別唯彼小乘俱生？又彼犢子却談未得聖時計者，如何不計異生身中起分別見？由此第三通敘通破分別、俱生，於理為勝。今謂不爾，若唯分別，可順論文。彼立五藏，我在第五不可說藏，豈俱生見作是計耶？又不得言犢子部計，却談昔計，非據現計，理亦不爾。《宗輪論》中現敘彼等，同計我故。正量部等，本非外道亦計我故。又《俱舍》二十九，引經為難犢子部云：經說起我見、墮惡見，趣同諸外道，乃至廣說。彼部通云：此經非量，於我部中曾不誦故。若爾，無學如何更起我執見耶？答如前解：或可，得言唯有學，凡作如是計，文無簡故。

Question: In explaining the latter three classes of postulated selves, the Yogācārabhūmi (fascicle sixty-four, etc.) has four classes in total, yet it includes only the first two and does not subsume the third. If so, why does that treatise say that all those who, based on discrimination of a self, postulate its existence are subsumed within these four kinds of postulations, and that apart from these there are no others—why does it not include it? Answer: That [treatise] relies on the intrinsic nature of the grasp of self, which does not exceed those four. Here, it relies on emotional understanding, falsely claiming it to be a self, and hence explains and refutes it; in reality it is a grasp of dharmas. Question: If so, how can it be severed below by [the realization of] the emptiness of persons? Answer: That text speaks in general terms, not assigning it distinctively to each; the text is general while the intent is distinctive—this is the general pattern of this text. Furthermore, there is another explanation in the Shuyao, which is not recorded here as it is found there. Ximing says: The first, which is identical with the aggregates, refers to the Śulika tīrthikas. They postulate that all aggregates possess an aggregate-nature. Just as our internal tradition states that all dharmas take tathatā as their nature, they postulate the nature of the aggregates to be the real self. This corresponds to the twenty views of the real personality (satkāyadṛṣṭi) spoken of in the Mahāvibhāṣā. Now I say: This explanation is somewhat difficult to accept in detail. The grasp of the twenty views of the body and so forth takes the five aggregates of form and so on directly as the self; they grasp at the nature of form. How can one say it is identical with the twenty views? Now, to explain provisionally: although both are identical with the aggregates, their grasps differ. One grasps form and so forth directly as its self; one grasps the nature of form as its self. Although the nature is not directly form, it is subsumed under the aggregates because it is the nature of the aggregates. Or else, they grasp the nature of the aggregates as not subsumed directly under the aggregates; just as the tathatā of the Mahāyāna, though the nature of the aggregates, is not subsumed under the aggregates, it should be subsumed under the second alternative: different from the aggregates yet dwelling within the aggregates. Or else, they grasp the nature of the aggregates—"nature" meaning substance—and grasp this substance of the aggregates as their self, because the others do not posit the existence of the five aggregates, the term "five aggregates" being spoken of by the Buddha-Dharma; inspect the Vibhāṣā further. Ximing also says: Among the latter three, why are there only three, with no alternative of "both identical and separate"? The explanation says: "Neither identical nor separate" is itself "both identical and separate", so it is not separately stated. What is its meaning? If affirming identity and separateness, it forms the third alternative; if negating identity and separateness, it forms the fourth alternative. That is to say, because it is identical, it is not separate; because it is separate, it is not identical. Therefore, the Prakaraṇāryavācā, the Vibhāṣā, and so on all state this. The third and fourth alternatives differ in sense, yet their substance is not distinct. However, this third and fourth alternative may have the same substance or different substances, as appropriate to know. Now I say: They need not necessarily form four alternatives. Just as when speaking of extreme views, there are only annihilation and permanence, and four alternatives are not posited; [the views of] ideation and non-ideation and so on are all likewise—why should this self alone be forced into four alternatives? Furthermore, the postulation of a self is spoken of based on having a real substance; since the third and fourth alternatives have no separate substance, there is no such postulation. Ximing also says: The third and fourth alternatives mutually subsume one another; the third in this treatise is identical with the former two of that [treatise]. Why is this? Because being "not identical," it corresponds to being separate from the aggregates; because being "not separate," it corresponds to being identical with the aggregates. Therefore this treatise says: "admitting that it is established depending on the aggregates." Were it not so, it would contradict the Yogācārabhūmi's statement that all postulations of self do not exceed four kinds. Now I say: This is not so. If following this explanation, merely this single third class of postulated self would subsume the four kinds of postulations in the Yogācārabhūmi. How could it be said that there are either three or four? Furthermore, if it is identical with the former two, why does the treatise state it separately as the third? What benefit is there in setting up such cumbersome distinctions? Therefore, one should follow the original commentary and the Shuyao, taking their explanation as correct. The Yaoji says: There is an explanation that the four postulations in the Yogācārabhūmi are exclusively discriminative (parikalpita), whereas the third here is subsumed under the innate (sahaja), because the spontaneous grasp of self does not calculate identity or separateness. Below, it explains in full that the two views depend on the aggregates and do not arise by taking a self as an object. If the explanation and refutation of the postulations did not cover both grasps, it should not universally show that the two grasps take the aggregates as object. The Ji says: Now I consider that the Yogācārabhūmi speaks only of the discriminative, while this treatise covers both; this point is tenable. Regarding the third in this treatise, how can one know that it is exclusively innate and without discrimination, exclusively internal [to Buddhism] and not tīrthika? The Tripiṭaka Master [Xuanzang] handed down the tradition: the Vātsīputrīyas' postulation of a self resembles the postulation of the Vātsīputrīya tīrthikas. If so, why not refute the tīrthikas, rather than restricting the discriminative exclusively to that Hīnayāna innate [grasp]? Furthermore, when those Vātsīputrīyas discuss those who have not yet attained the holy state, how could they not consider that discriminative views arise within the bodies of worldlings? Hence, for this third alternative to universally explain and universally refute both the discriminative and the innate is superior in principle. Now I say: This is not so. If it were exclusively discriminative, it would accord with the treatise text. They posit five repositories (kośa), and the self is in the fifth, ineffable repository; how could an innate view form such a postulation? Furthermore, one cannot say that the Vātsīputrīya school's postulation is merely discussing past postulations and not based on present postulations; this is also not reasonable. In the Samayabhedoparacanacakra, they are currently described as uniformly postulating a self. Schools such as the Sammatīya were originally not tīrthikas, yet they also postulated a self. Furthermore, in the Kośa, fascicle twenty-nine, citing a sūtra to challenge the Vātsīputrīyas, it says: The sūtra states that giving rise to the view of self, falling into evil views, leads to the same destinies as the tīrthikas, and so forth extensively. That school resolved it by saying: this sūtra is not valid authority (pramāṇa), as it has never been recited in our school. If so, how could an aśaikṣa give rise to a view grasping a self? The answer is as explained before: or else, one may say that only śaikṣas and ordinary persons make such a postulation, for the text makes no exclusion.