成唯識論了義燈 2.7

2.7

Question: In explaining the latter three classes of postulated selves, the Yogācārabhūmi (fascicle sixty-four, etc.) has four classes in total, yet it includes only the first two and does not subsume the third. If so, why does that treatise say that all those who, based on discrimination of a self, postulate its existence are subsumed within these four kinds of postulations, and that apart from these there are no others—why does it not include it? Answer: That [treatise] relies on the intrinsic nature of the grasp of self, which does not exceed those four. Here, it relies on emotional understanding, falsely claiming it to be a self, and hence explains and refutes it; in reality it is a grasp of dharmas. Question: If so, how can it be severed below by [the realization of] the emptiness of persons? Answer: That text speaks in general terms, not assigning it distinctively to each; the text is general while the intent is distinctive—this is the general pattern of this text. Furthermore, there is another explanation in the Shuyao, which is not recorded here as it is found there. Ximing says: The first, which is identical with the aggregates, refers to the Śulika tīrthikas. They postulate that all aggregates possess an aggregate-nature. Just as our internal tradition states that all dharmas take tathatā as their nature, they postulate the nature of the aggregates to be the real self. This corresponds to the twenty views of the real personality (satkāyadṛṣṭi) spoken of in the Mahāvibhāṣā. Now I say: This explanation is somewhat difficult to accept in detail. The grasp of the twenty views of the body and so forth takes the five aggregates of form and so on directly as the self; they grasp at the nature of form. How can one say it is identical with the twenty views? Now, to explain provisionally: although both are identical with the aggregates, their grasps differ. One grasps form and so forth directly as its self; one grasps the nature of form as its self. Although the nature is not directly form, it is subsumed under the aggregates because it is the nature of the aggregates. Or else, they grasp the nature of the aggregates as not subsumed directly under the aggregates; just as the tathatā of the Mahāyāna, though the nature of the aggregates, is not subsumed under the aggregates, it should be subsumed under the second alternative: different from the aggregates yet dwelling within the aggregates. Or else, they grasp the nature of the aggregates—"nature" meaning substance—and grasp this substance of the aggregates as their self, because the others do not posit the existence of the five aggregates, the term "five aggregates" being spoken of by the Buddha-Dharma; inspect the Vibhāṣā further. Ximing also says: Among the latter three, why are there only three, with no alternative of "both identical and separate"? The explanation says: "Neither identical nor separate" is itself "both identical and separate", so it is not separately stated. What is its meaning? If affirming identity and separateness, it forms the third alternative; if negating identity and separateness, it forms the fourth alternative. That is to say, because it is identical, it is not separate; because it is separate, it is not identical. Therefore, the Prakaraṇāryavācā, the Vibhāṣā, and so on all state this. The third and fourth alternatives differ in sense, yet their substance is not distinct. However, this third and fourth alternative may have the same substance or different substances, as appropriate to know. Now I say: They need not necessarily form four alternatives. Just as when speaking of extreme views, there are only annihilation and permanence, and four alternatives are not posited; [the views of] ideation and non-ideation and so on are all likewise—why should this self alone be forced into four alternatives? Furthermore, the postulation of a self is spoken of based on having a real substance; since the third and fourth alternatives have no separate substance, there is no such postulation. Ximing also says: The third and fourth alternatives mutually subsume one another; the third in this treatise is identical with the former two of that [treatise]. Why is this? Because being "not identical," it corresponds to being separate from the aggregates; because being "not separate," it corresponds to being identical with the aggregates. Therefore this treatise says: "admitting that it is established depending on the aggregates." Were it not so, it would contradict the Yogācārabhūmi's statement that all postulations of self do not exceed four kinds. Now I say: This is not so. If following this explanation, merely this single third class of postulated self would subsume the four kinds of postulations in the Yogācārabhūmi. How could it be said that there are either three or four? Furthermore, if it is identical with the former two, why does the treatise state it separately as the third? What benefit is there in setting up such cumbersome distinctions? Therefore, one should follow the original commentary and the Shuyao, taking their explanation as correct. The Yaoji says: There is an explanation that the four postulations in the Yogācārabhūmi are exclusively discriminative (parikalpita), whereas the third here is subsumed under the innate (sahaja), because the spontaneous grasp of self does not calculate identity or separateness. Below, it explains in full that the two views depend on the aggregates and do not arise by taking a self as an object. If the explanation and refutation of the postulations did not cover both grasps, it should not universally show that the two grasps take the aggregates as object. The Ji says: Now I consider that the Yogācārabhūmi speaks only of the discriminative, while this treatise covers both; this point is tenable. Regarding the third in this treatise, how can one know that it is exclusively innate and without discrimination, exclusively internal [to Buddhism] and not tīrthika? The Tripiṭaka Master [Xuanzang] handed down the tradition: the Vātsīputrīyas' postulation of a self resembles the postulation of the Vātsīputrīya tīrthikas. If so, why not refute the tīrthikas, rather than restricting the discriminative exclusively to that Hīnayāna innate [grasp]? Furthermore, when those Vātsīputrīyas discuss those who have not yet attained the holy state, how could they not consider that discriminative views arise within the bodies of worldlings? Hence, for this third alternative to universally explain and universally refute both the discriminative and the innate is superior in principle. Now I say: This is not so. If it were exclusively discriminative, it would accord with the treatise text. They posit five repositories (kośa), and the self is in the fifth, ineffable repository; how could an innate view form such a postulation? Furthermore, one cannot say that the Vātsīputrīya school's postulation is merely discussing past postulations and not based on present postulations; this is also not reasonable. In the Samayabhedoparacanacakra, they are currently described as uniformly postulating a self. Schools such as the Sammatīya were originally not tīrthikas, yet they also postulated a self. Furthermore, in the Kośa, fascicle twenty-nine, citing a sūtra to challenge the Vātsīputrīyas, it says: The sūtra states that giving rise to the view of self, falling into evil views, leads to the same destinies as the tīrthikas, and so forth extensively. That school resolved it by saying: this sūtra is not valid authority (pramāṇa), as it has never been recited in our school. If so, how could an aśaikṣa give rise to a view grasping a self? The answer is as explained before: or else, one may say that only śaikṣas and ordinary persons make such a postulation, for the text makes no exclusion.