成唯識論了義燈 2.9

2.9

論云：又諸我見不緣實我等。《要集》云：《廣百論》立量云：我見決定不緣實我；男女等相所雜糅故；如緣身等起男等相所雜糅心。又我見不緣實我；有所緣故；如餘心等。又我見境非是實我；男等相，心之所緣故；猶如身等。由此故知：一切我見皆無實我以為境界，唯緣虛妄身等為境；隨自妄想覺惠生故；如緣闇繩顛倒蛇解。承本釋云：又諸我見不緣實我者，此非作我解之我見。若約我見不緣，即相扶之失。今云不緣者，約緣我之見是其染惠，約此為見難令不緣故無相扶。

The treatise says: "Furthermore, the various views of a self do not take a real self as their object," and so forth. The Yaoji says: The Śataśāstravaipulya formulates the syllogism: "The view of a self definitely does not take a real self as its object; because it is commingled with marks of male, female, and so forth; like the mind that, apprehending the body and so forth, gives rise to commingling with marks of male and so forth. Furthermore, the view of a self does not take a real self as its object; because it possesses an intentional object; like other minds and so forth. Furthermore, the object of the view of a self is not a real self; because it is the intentional object of a mind with marks of male and so forth; just like the body and so forth." From this, it is known: none of the views of a self have a real self as their intentional object, but take only the unreal body and so forth as their object; because they arise following the conceptual awareness of one's own false discrimination; like the inverted understanding of a snake when observing a rope in the dark. Inheriting the original explanation, it says: "Furthermore, the various views of a self do not take a real self as their object"—this does not mean a view of a self that forms the understanding of a self. If framed in terms of the view of a self not apprehending it, that would incur the fallacy of proving what is already accepted. Now, saying "does not take as object" is framed in terms of the view that apprehends a self being afflicted wisdom (kliṣṭa-prajñā); framing it around this as the view, it challenges them so that it does not take [a real self] as its object, and therefore there is no fallacy of proving what is already accepted.